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Chapter 1 Introduction 
The European Union (EU) is known for its solid support for an effective United Nations (UN). 
“Effective multilateralism” is a fundamental and recurrent theme in various EU documents (e.g., European 
Council 2003; Commission 2003; European Union 2004). The Treaty of Lisbon (ToL), which entered into 
force on 1 December 2009, reaffirmed the EU‟s commitment to multilateral cooperation, especially within 
the framework of the UN. In order to transform the EU into a more coherent and influential international 
actor, the ToL introduced a set of institutional innovations affecting the Union‟s external representation, 
including, inter alia, the conferral of legal personality to the EU, the creation of the President of the 
European Council (hereafter the President), the appointment of the High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) and the establishment of the European External Action Service 
(EEAS).  
This dissertation examines the coherence of the EU‟s external representation in the field of the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), within the contexts of two core UN bodies, namely the General 
Assembly (UNGA) and the Security Council (UNSC). Ensuring coherent EU representation at the UN is 
vital for the Union to stay relevant in global decision making and to promote its interests on the world stage. 
In a global environment where the EU faces various challenges, including, inter alia, the rise of new powers 
and the historical changes in the Arab world, either the Union adapts and adjusts its external representation 
to a more coherent presence, or it is in danger of being sidelined due to the relative decline of its weight 
(Emerson et al 2011; Balfour and 2013). Taking the principal-agent theory as the point of departure, this 
study considers the EU and its entire membership collective principals, which have been represented by 
different agents under different circumstances. The arrangements of the ToL have reformed the delegation 
structure of the EU‟s external representation. They are expected to reduce agency losses, strengthen agent 
capacities as well as control mechanisms, and thereby infuse greater coherence into EU representation. 
However, not only the ToL left some agency problems unsolved but has created new inter- and 




be interesting to see whether the ToL has contributed to increased EU representation coherence within a 
world organization like the UN.  
A mixed approach will be adopted to combine both quantitative and qualitative methods to detect the 
coherence variation in EU representation before and after Lisbon. At the UNGA, EU representation 
coherence is measured and evaluated in terms of the voting cohesion of EU member states. At the UNSC, 
some descriptive statistics are first presented to describe and summarize the voting behaviour of the EU 
member states sitting on the UNSC. Based on the findings drawing on from these statistics, two cases – the 
conflicts of Iraq (pre-Lisbon) and Libya (post-Lisbon) – are selected for further investigation. Subsequently, 
the coherence of the EU‟s representation during each conflict is examined and then compared to each other 
to tell whether the EU performed more coherently in the Libya case where the ToL had entered into force.  
It will be argued that whereas the ToL offers the opportunity to provide more coherence to EU 
representation at international organizations, this potential can hardly be fulfilled if the remaining problems 
and new structural conflicts are left unattended, especially if EU member states are unwilling to overcome 
their diverging preferences and support common EU positions. Equally important is the need for closer 
inter- and intra- institutional coordination in order to ensure consistent and complementary representation. It 
appears that more time is needed for new EU agents, namely the President and the HR – assisted by the 
EEAS – to develop sophisticated representative capacities and well-functioning relationships with other EU 
institutions as well as national governments.  
This introductory chapter starts with an overview of the status of the EU‟s presence at the UN and 
explains why the UNGA and the UNSC are appropriate settings for this research. The second section 
considers the conceptual and methodological issues in research design. It firstly defines EU representation 
coherence and distinguishes the fundamental concept of coherence from other prominent themes in the 
studies in respect to the EU‟s role or performance in external relations. Then it continues to introduce how 
EU representation coherence is going to be measured within the two contexts of the UN and the 
corresponding analytical methods that will be adopted. The third section lays out the structure for the rest of 




1.1 An Overview of the EU’s Presence at the United Nations 
The EU and the UN share similar core values, notably the maintenance of international peace and 
security, the protection of fundamental human rights, the pursuit of sustainable development and the seeking 
of multinational solutions to global problems. In parallel with the implementation of the CFSP, the EU has 
grown into an important partner to the UN. It is virtually visible in almost all major UN bodies, agencies, 
programmes and conferences. The Union is party to more than fifty international UN agreements and 
conventions as the only non-state participant. It has also been a full participant at certain UN summits, such 
as the Rio and Kyoto summits on climate change. Outstandingly, the EU is the largest financial contributor 
to UN activities. Until the end of 2012, together EU member states provided over 36 percent of the funding 
for UN peacekeeping operations, nearly 35 percent of the UN regular budget and about one-half of all UN 
member state contributions to UN funds and programmes (United Nations 2013). The EU owns the 
capability to assist UN missions and carry out UN resolutions. It has undertaken to establish a rapid reaction 
force as part of its common defence system, which will certainly infuse more inputs to EU-UN cooperation. 
The Union has delegations in the UN based in New York, Geneva and other locations all over the world. 
Communications between the officials of the two organizations occur on a regular basis as daily working 
contacts grow. The European Parliament (EP), which is conventionally conceived less active in 
participating the UN‟s work, now sends Members of the EP (MEPs) to attend major UN meetings more 
frequently than it used to do (Rasch 2008).   
All EU countries are members of the UNGA.1 Together they represent more than one eighth of the entire 
UN membership. The Union can count on over 30 votes since candidate countries, potential candidate 
countries and members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and European Economic Area 
(EEA) frequently align themselves with EU statements (European Union 2004).2 Only sovereign states can 
become members of the UN. But it does not prevent the EU from having a collective presence in this 
organization. In 1974, the then European Community (hereafter the Community) was granted by the UNGA 
                                                 
1 Croatia joined the EU on 1 July 2013 and became the 28th EU member. But it is not included in the empirical analyses in this 
dissertation due to the limits of the data.   
2 Current EFTA members include Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. The EEA contains 28 EU members (including 




an observer status, which has been promoted to a higher level through UNGA Resolution 65/276 in May 
2011. EU representation at the UNSC is not as inclusive as it is at the UNGA. Only Britain and France (also 
known as the P2) are permanently represented while other EU states get elected on a rather random basis. 
Usually there are three to five member states (including the P2) sitting at the UNSC every year.3 The EU has 
no regular collective presence at this body. Most of the time, the Union relies on those member states sitting 
on the UNSC, particular the P2, for representation. Occasionally other EU states or EU officials are invited 
in light of the provisional rules of procedure of the UNSC. Prior to the ToL, the responsibility of EU external 
representation was mainly assumed by the EU member state holding the Presidency of the Council of 
Ministers (hereafter the Council). This representation system applied to the UNGA as well. But the 
Presidency state could only address the UNSC on behalf of the Union when it happened to be an elected or 
permanent member or when it was invited. The ToL created two new leaderships, namely the President and 
the HR, to replace the role of the Presidency in representing the EU in the CFSP field. It‟s implications on 
the structure and coherence of EU representation will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4 from a 
principal-agent perspective. 
The UNGA and the UNSC offer ideal empirical grounds to examine the ToL‟s effects on EU 
representation, as out of the five principal UN organs these two are most relevant to the CFSP.4 Both the EU 
and its member states – to varying degrees – participate in the work of the UNGA. Discussions at this level 
cover a broad range of issues, making it possible to conduct a comprehensive assessment of EU 
representation coherence. Albeit UNGA decisions are nonbinding, they are de facto influential, as many 
international norms are rooted in specific resolutions of the Assembly (Petersen 2006). Moreover, UNGA 
voting records are readily accessible and relatively well-documented, allowing coherence to be 
quantitatively measured in terms of voting cohesion. The UNSC is the core organ that deals with global 
issues of “high politics” with respect to international peace and security. While UNGA resolutions are only 
recommendatory to governments, the decisions of the UNSC are legally binding on all UN member states. 
                                                 
3 The EU had Germany and Portugal sitting on the UNSC as non-permanent members in 2012. They were replaced by Luxemburg 
starting from January 2013. 
4 There used to be six principal organs of the UN, including the UNGA, the UNSC, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), 
the Secretariat, and the International Court of Justice and the Trusteeship Council. The Trusteeship Council has suspended 




Since the end of the Cold War, it has regained its relevance in world affairs, especially in the authorization 
of the use of force (Wallensteen and Johansson 2004; Ronzitti 2012). Therefore, the coherence of EU 
representation at the UNSC is equally crucial to the functioning of the CFSP.  
1.2 Conceptual and Methodological Considerations 
It is necessary to first clarify some key concepts in order to answer the research question whether EU 
representation has become more coherent after the ToL‟s implementation. However, not only the ToL left 
the term “representation of the Union” undefined, studies regarding the EU‟s role in international 
organizations (IOs) also often take this concept for granted (e.g., Frieden 2004; Mahieu et al. 2005; 
Laatikainen and Smith 2006; Rasch 2008; Niemann and Huigens 2011). This dissertation defines “EU 
representation” by its functionality. It refers to the institutional set-up that performs the function of 
representing the Union and its member states through legitimate representatives toward third parties in the 
international arena (see also Gstöhl 2012). Drawing on, and to some extent deviating from existing literature 
on coherence in EU foreign policy or external relations (e.g., Missiroli 2001; Gauttier 2004; Hillion 2008; 
Thomas 2012), coherent EU representation is conceptualized as the Union‟s capacity to coordinate EU 
member states‟ divergent policy preferences, allowing common positions to be formulated, and articulated 
by its representatives consistently and coherently toward the outside world.5 
This conceptualization implies that the search for coherence requires on one hand coordination to attain 
internal harmony and on the other hand articulation to provide declaratory diplomacy with consistent 
contents (Gauttier 2004: 25). Both elements are indispensable to coherent EU representation. Coordination 
means the set of elaborate mechanisms through which the EU and its member states exchange information, 
make concessions and find a common ground on foreign affairs (Jordan and Schout 2006; Marchesi 2008; 
Degrand-Guillaud 2009). It is the necessary process for reaching coherence, especially when EU member 
states‟ preferences are not initially congruent. With the absence of a common approach hardly can the Union 
                                                 
5 The terms of “coherence” and “consistency” are often used interchangeably in academic discussions (e.g., Christansen 2001; 
Bretherton and Vogler 2006; Gaspers 2010). Some legal scholars and political scientists have underlined the necessity to distinguish 
one notion from the other (e.g., Gauttier 2004; Nuttall 2005; Hillion 2008): whereas “consistency” refers to compatibility and the 
absence of contradictions, “coherence” emphasizes complementarity and synergy; whereas “consistency” is an either-or concept, 
“coherence” is a matter of degree in the sense that an entity can be more or less coherent, but can only be consistent or inconsistent. 
This dissertation considers “consistency” a minimum requirement of “coherence”, meaning that coherent EU representation should 




project any sensible external representation. But EU representation coherence can be fully achieved only 
when the agreed policy as a result of coordination is consistently and coherently declared by EU and 
national representatives.  
Considering the nature of the EU as a multi-level governance system (Hooghe and Marks 2001; Smith 
2004), this research adopts a distinction between horizontal and vertical coherence that have been identified 
in the relevant studies (e.g., Christansen 2001; Gauttier 2004; Nuttall 2005; Bretherton and Vogler 2006; 
Hillion 2008; Gaspers 2010; Marangoni 2012). Horizontal coherence relates to the coherence between and 
within EU institutions.6 Vertical coherence includes the coherence between EU member states and the EU 
and the inter-state coherence among EU member states.7 The acquirement of horizontal coherence requires 
different EU institutions and different branches within these institutions to be able to represent the Union in 
a coordinated, consistent and unified manner (Helwig et al. 2013). The pursuit of vertical coherence means 
that EU member states need to aggregate their policy preferences through institutionalised coordination 
mechanisms and their representatives can present complementary or at least non-contradictory national 
positions to those of the Union (Portela 2012).  
Coherence is closely related to another prominent theme when the EU‟s international performance is 
concerned, i.e., actorness, a concept broadly understood as “the capacity to behave actively and deliberately 
in relation to other actors in the international system” (Sjøstedt 1977). This definition alone does not provide 
methods to operationalize actorness. Subsequent studies, however, have emerged to assess actors applying 
different series of variables.8 As for the relationship between actorness and coherence, the latter is often 
used either as a near-synonym (e.g., Groenleer and Van Schaik 2007; Thomas 2012) or a key criterion for 
                                                 
6 Some scholars, e.g., Guttier (2004), Nuttall (2005), Gaspers (2010) and Hillion (2008), think that horizontal coherence includes the 
coherence of policies across pillars. Since the ToL has abolished the pillar structure, it makes more sense to focus on inter- and 
intra-institutional coherence. “Institutional coherence” was seen as a sub-category of horizontal coherence in Nuttall‟s ternary 
categorisation, but was treated as a separate category because of its specialisation in the field of external relations.  
7 Gaspers (2010) differentiated between vertical and interstate coherence. Such a distinction is not made in the present study because 
the coherence among EU member states will be inevitably touched upon in order to tell whether their national policies are in line 
with the EU‟s. Marangoni (2012) identified “external coherence” as another dimension of coherence. It is related to the extent to 
which outsiders perceive the EU as coherent. For the sake of parsimony, this dissertation adopts the two-dimensional classification, 
namely horizontal and vertical coherence. 
8 For different approaches that measure actorness, see Jupille and Caporaso 1998; Bretherton and Vogler 2006; Brattberg and 




the former (e.g., Carbone 2013; Groen and Niemann 2013). This research adopts the idea that a higher 
degree of coherence contributes to a higher degree of actorness. 
Ginsberg (1999) pointed to the phenomenon that scholars were moving beyond establishing the 
existence of the EU to assessing the Union‟s effectiveness as an important international actor. Many 
researchers have, implicitly or explicitly, used “goal achievement” as the benchmark determining 
effectiveness (e.g., Laatikainen and Smith 2006; Jørgensen et al. 2011; Delaere and Van Schaik 2012; 
Niemann and Bretherton 2013). Therefore, effectiveness of EU representation is seen as the extent to which 
the EU reaches the objectives defined by its common positions and manages to influence world affairs in 
accordance with its preferred outcomes. 
EU policy-makers (e.g., Solana 2009) tend to posit a positive relationship between coherence and 
effectiveness. It is rather natural to expect greater effectiveness coming out of increased coherence since the 
Union appears to be stronger when all EU members jointly support a common position, which is expressed 
by a pooled representation. But empirical evidence suggests that their connection may not be 
straightforward. Groen and Niemann (2013) argue that whether coherence translates into effectiveness 
depends on the “opportunity structure”, the external context that enables or constrains the EU e.g., the 
involvement of other important actors. Other scholars find that increased coherence may reduce 
effectiveness: the diverse national preferences of EU member states can result in agreements based on the 
lowest common denominator, which are non-constraining and inflexible; the lengthy coordination may 
prevent the Union from responding to sudden crises in a timely fashion; a highly united Union may raise 
political pressure from other actors that have opposite interests (Gstöhl2012; Thomas 2012; Carbone 2013). 
Therefore, coherence does not necessarily lead to effectiveness. Instead, it can be seen as a necessary but 
insufficient condition for the realization of effectiveness, that is to say, a coherent EU may not be successive 
in achieving its goals, but a divided Union with its member states pursuing conflicting agendas can rarely be 
effective. 
It is difficult to measure a concept as complicated as EU representation coherence in general terms. This 




is quantitatively calculable by UNGA roll call data. The data for the statistical analyses contain all the 
recorded resolutions of the UNGA between 1993 and 2012. They were partially extracted from Voeten and 
Merdzanovic‟s (2009) data and partially retrieved by the author from the UN Bibliographic Information 
Centre (UNBISnet) and the Official Document System of the United Nations (ODS).9 Voting pattern 
analysis based on roll call votes has been commonly practiced by scholars in examining decision making 
within the UN (e.g., Kim and Russett 1996; Voeten 2000; Luif 2003; Smith 2006; Rasch 2008; Dreher and 
Jensen 2009; Hosli et al. 2010). This method is not unchallenged. Some scholars (e.g., Carrubba et al. 2008; 
Hug 2012) have pointed out the pitfalls of roll call votes: first, roll call votes only provide a partial picture of 
policy making since they are only applied to a relatively small fraction of UNGA decisions;10 second, 
recorded votes may provide lopsided inferences because they are often used on more contested issues; third, 
an analysis of roll call votes may overestimate the actual degree of group cohesion since they can be used as 
an instrument to “show off” cohesiveness; fourth, roll call votes are limited in revealing true policy 
preferences because their application can be strategic, e.g., a state may choose to vote against its own 
preference on an issue in exchange for a deal on more important ones.  
Hug (2012) pointed out in his recent findings on roll call votes that the “systematic difference” between 
decisions adopted by recorded votes and other decisions of the UNGA had become trivial starting from the 
1970s. The observations of the present study start from 1993, meaning that the biases – although inevitable 
– shall be small. Hug also found that the majority of recorded votes had occurred on resolutions dealing with 
the issues falling into the CFSP field. This could be problematic for a research that expects to draw general 
inferences across EU policy areas. This dissertation, however, focuses on EU representation coherence in 
the CFSP domain and therefore will be less skewed. Researchers often lack information of non-recorded 
resolutions and non-voted decisions. Even if such data were available, it would be beyond this study‟s scope 
                                                 
9 The data starting from 1993 until 2008 were partially obtained from Voeten and Merdzanovic‟s (2009) datasets. Votes on 
paragraphs of resolutions, votes cast by non-UN members and absences were filtered out. The author rechecked Voeten and 
Merdzanovic‟s (2009) data and corrected some discrepancies and filled in some missing values. The data between 2009 and 2012 
were manually retrieved by the author from the UN sources. The author has noticed that Voeten and his colleague Anton Strezhnev 
have extended their data collection to cover the resolutions adopted between 2009 and 2012, but decided to use her own data 
collection anyway for the sake of consistency. Voeten and Strezhnev‟s datasets can be found in the website: 
http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/Voeten/faces/study/StudyPage.xhtml?globalId=hdl:1902.1/12379.  




to analyze all those decisions, as Hug himself admitted that tailor-made estimators and techniques to better 
inferences were yet immature. Besides, the potential inferential problems listed above apply consistently for 
both the pre- and post-Lisbon period in this research. In a word, it is considered that roll call votes – in a way 
– indicate the national policy preferences of individual EU member states on particular issues. An analysis 
of voting cohesion can thus demonstrate the degree of preference homogeneity or heterogeneity among EU 
member states, and more importantly, the extent to which they are willing to coordinate national policies to 
vote coherently at the UNGA, which are of great relevance to the concept of coherence.11  
As Yin (2009) pointed out, a shortcoming of quantitative measurements is that they may be unable to 
equally describe every aspect of the dependent variable(s). Voting cohesion is directly related to the 
inter-state dimension of vertical coherence since it measures the cohesiveness of the voting behaviour 
among EU member states at the UNGA. It also concerns the coherence between the EU and EU states in a 
relatively straightforward fashion because the agreement reached by member states to vote coherently on a 
particular resolution is a result of coordination, during which an EU common position is formulated. When 
national delegations to the UN decide to synchronize their votes, they also act in line with the EU. 
Horizontal coherence, however, is indirectly manifested by voting cohesion. If a higher degree of voting 
cohesion is considered an outcome of improved coordination among EU member states, it can also be seen 
as an indicator of greater inter- and intra institutional coherence, since EU institutions, notably the HR and 
the EEAS, are established to ensure and organize the Union‟s internal coordination. Regarding the two 
elements of representation coherence, voting cohesion appears to be more directly linked to articulation. 
High cohesion often implies an agreed common approach, which shall be delivered by EU representatives at 
the UNGA. The essence of the coordination process, however, cannot be uncovered since voting cohesion 
merely reflects the outcome of political decision-making. It can be demonstrated in an indirect way in the 
sense that closer coordination tends to produce more cohesive voting behaviour.  
Annual roll-call data of adopted UNSC resolutions are also retrievable from the UNBISnet, but the 
meaningfulness of applying a similar approach as in the UNGA is questionable. Due to the unique culture of 
                                                 
11 Casting identical votes does not necessarily suggest that the voters have identical interests towards a certain resolution, but it 




decision making and voting procedures at the UNSC, over 90 percent of resolutions in the period of 
1993-2012 have been adopted unanimously with 15 votes in favour.12 It is difficult to identify an EU voting 
pattern in general or its developments led by the ToL and the policy preferences of individual EU states, not 
to mention the fact that the majority of the discussions regarding sensitive topics are held in the caucusing 
sessions or informal meetings that leave no records (Biscop and Missiroli 2008). Calculating the voting 
cohesion of the EU member states serving on the UNSC does not make as much sense as in the context of 
the UNGA. A high degree of voting cohesion or even full consensus is not tantamount to a high degree of 
coherence of the Union because the EU members in the UNSC and the members that are not may hold 
opposite positions. Furthermore, a veto threat might have led to the eventual withdrawal of an elaborately 
prepared draft. As it never came to a vote, a draft like this would not be recorded in the roll-call data.13 
Taking quantitative analysis as the only option thus risks overlooking important information (Lieberman 
2005).  
But descriptive statistics of EU voting behaviour help exposing “unusual” cases that are worth further 
investigation. The rarity of abstentions and negative votes at the UNSC implies that their occurrences may 
signify deeper disagreement with a particular resolution.14 It is feasible to get a rough idea about the 
preference orientation of the EU state(s) that abstained and the preference distance among the EU member 
states within the UNSC on this particular issue. But identifying EU member states‟ positions and the 
motivations behind requires close-range examinations so that assessing the degree of their preference 
homogeneity and the extent to which they are in line with the Union is made possible. Inter- and 
intra-institutional coherence obviously cannot be assessed by the descriptive statistics. Within-case studies 
are necessary to reveal the coordination mechanisms and articulation coherence at both horizontal and 
vertical levels. Focusing on separate cases alone does not facilitate the detection of the variations of EU 
                                                 
12 The author‟s own calculation based on the data of UNSC Resolutions collected from UNBISnet between 8 January 1993 and 20 
December 2012. 
13 An example is the resolution draft co-sponsored by the UK, Spain and the US, calling for the authorization of the use of force 
against Iraq, was eventually abandoned due to the veto threats from France and Russia. 
14 The resolutions voted against by at least one UNSC member account for less than one percent of all the UNSC resolutions 
analyzed in this research (1,264 in total). None of the EU members sitting on the UNSC voted against any resolution during the 
period under investigation. The resolutions from which at least UNSC member abstained account for about 9 percent of the total 
resolutions. EU member states cast abstentions on six resolutions, among which three resolutions concerned the situations in Iraq. 




coherence under different circumstances. Cross-case comparisons shall be conducted as a follow-up if one 
wants to explore, e.g., the extent to which the new delegation structure created by the ToL has made a 
difference in EU representation coherence. By all accounts, a mixed analytical strategy is needed. 
Guided by the research question and the descriptive statistics of EU voting behaviour at the UNSC, EU 
representation coherence will be studied in two cases: the 2002-2003 Iraq war and the 2011 Libya crisis. 
These two cases are selected based on a “most similar” design. They are considered to have many parallels 
but occurred respectively before and after the adoption of the ToL. If EU representation coherence is found 
to have increased during the Libya conflict, the ToL may possibly be responsible for the improvement. Case 
selection will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. 
EU representation is qualified to be coherent if it scores high on both horizontal and vertical coherence. 
Measuring the degree of horizontal coherence requires evidence of the role of EU institutions in external 
representation and how they coordinated with each other during the two conflicts. Vertical coherence should 
be assessed by the degree of homogeneity or heterogeneity between EU member states‟ policy preferences, 
the extent to which they coordinated their national policies to reach common approaches, and the extent to 
which the EU member states serving on the UNSC concerted and shared information. Meanwhile, the 
capacities of EU institutions in organising (and perhaps facilitating) the coordination will be evaluated. It 
also demands an examination of whether the statements between EU institutions and national 
representatives are complementary or non-contradictory at least. Increase in representation coherence will 
determined by comparing both horizontal and vertical coherence across the two cases. EU representation 
coherence is considered improved if, at the horizontal level, the Union‟s collective presence at the UNSC is 
upgraded, EU delegation structure is streamlined, and the role of EU institutions in representing the EU at 
this body is strengthened. Vertical coherence increase requires observations of converging policy 
preferences among EU member states on UNSC matters, greater concertation of the EU member states 
sitting on this council, closer contacts and improved information exchange between these states and other 
EU members as well as EU institutions, last but not least, more willingness of national delegations to 




Lastly, it needs to be clarified that the mixed analytical approach is not equally applied to the context of 
the UNGA. It is because EU voting cohesion at this platform varies across a wide range. Neither low 
cohesion nor full consensus is rare. It is not as easy to identify outstanding cases as in the context of the 
UNSC within a considerable amount of data. The advantage of a mixed method that statistical analysis 
provides guidance to case selection is less obvious regarding the UNGA.  
1.3 Structure of the Dissertation 
The remaining chapters of the dissertation are organized as follows: Chapter 2 reviews the existing 
bodies of literature with reference to the EU‟s representation in the international system, notably at the 
UNGA and the UNSC, and explains how this dissertation contributes to the relevant fields of studies.  
Chapter 3 first lays out the fundamental assumptions of the principal-agent theory and argues that this 
theoretical mode bears promising power in explaining the complexity and variety in the EU‟s external 
representation. Within this framework, the situations of EU representation in multilateral organizations are 
theorized into different types of delegation relationships, in which the EU and its member states are 
considered collective principals, while the actors that play the role of agents and the delegation structures 
are conditioned by the division of EU competences and the status of EU in particular international 
institutions. This section develops the typologies of EU competences and EU status models, and then 
specifies the agents and delegation structures under different (combinations of) circumstances within 
selected IOs. The final section of Chapter 3 places the principal-agent theory in a broader theoretical 
framework of new institutionalism. It compares the principal-agent theory with historical and sociological 
institutionalisms, and indicates that an extended and adapted model of the principal-agent theory that 
absorbs the strengths of the other two approaches of new institutionalism will serve as the theoretical 
foundation for this dissertation.  
Chapter 4 is divided into two sections, which respectively draw a panorama for the evolution of EU 
representation at the UNGA and the UNSC from an adapted principal-agent point of view. Following a brief 
introduction of the institutional structures the UNGA, the first section takes a look back at the “problematic” 




describes the reformed representation structure of the Union established by the ToL and points out the 
remaining agency problems. Based on the post-Lisbon developments in EU representation, and drawing on 
the insights of the extended principal-agent theory outlined in Chapter 3, six hypotheses regarding the 
coherence of EU representation – measured by the voting cohesion of EU member states at the UNGA – are 
proposed to be tested using a quantitative method in Chapter 5. The second section briefly describes the sui 
generis institutional structure of the UNSC and examines the horizontal coherence of EU representation 
within this context in the pre- and post-Lisbon eras. It also examines the vertical representation coherence 
by looking at the implications of the ToL on the Union‟s coordination and concertation mechanisms on UN 
matters. It is proposed that the innovations of the ToL – although limited – would contribute to an increase 
in the Union‟s representation coherence at the UNSC. The final section touches upon the inevitable question 
about the reform of the UNSC and explores the EU dimension in the ongoing debate.  
Chapter 5 tests the hypotheses formulated in Chapter 4 on EU representation coherence at the UNGA, 
with systematic statistical analyses of the voting behaviour of EU member states. This chapter also presents 
the descriptive statistics of voting in the UNSC, which not only demonstrate the unique decision-making 
methods within this body but also identify both general and unusual patterns of EU voting behaviour.  
Guided by the descriptive statistics in the previous chapter, Chapter 6 assesses EU representation 
coherence in two case studies, i.e., the 2002-2003 Iraq war and the 2011 Libya crisis, which are divided by 
the entry into force of the ToL. In each case, EU representation coherence is examined at both horizontal 
and vertical levels. In order to uncover the variation in coherence after the implementation of the ToL, a 
follow-up cross-case comparison is conducted.  
The conclusionary chapter, Chapter 7, is split into three sections: the first section summarizes and 
revisits the central empirical findings of this dissertation; the second section makes some recommendations 
concerning EU representation coherence based on the lessons that are learned; the final section points out 





Chapter 2 Literature Review 
The developments of the EU‟s CFSP in the last two decades have brought heightened academic attention 
to its role as an actor in international relations (e.g., Ginsberg 1999; Gauttier 2004; Nuttall 2005; Bretherton 
and Vogler 2006; Wunderlich 2012). These studies tend to see the EU as a sui generis actor and attempt to 
construct new conceptual categorizations, such as coherence, actorness and effectiveness, to explain its 
performance in the international system. This sui generis nature of the EU means that the Union‟s status and 
representation vary across different IOs and multilateral fora (Gehring et al. 2013).  
Because of the centralness of the UN in global governance and effective multilateralism, a considerable 
amount of literature regarding the performance of the EU in the UN system has emerged. Some scholars 
have assessed the EU-UN partnership, either in general (Farrell 2006) or in specific issue areas, e.g., conflict 
resolution (Dijkstra 2011), human rights (Smith 2006) and environment (Jupille and Caporaso 1998). This 
body of literature concentrates on the EU‟s contributions to UN activities, but pays less attention to the 
day-to-day decision-making practice and the roles played by EU institutions as well as EU member states. 
Others have explored the EU‟s presence in various UN bodies, including the UNGA (Wouters 2001; 
Hoffmeister and Kuijper 2006; Gstöhl 2009), the UNSC (Drieskens 2008; Pirozzi 2012), the ECOSOC 
(Paasivirta and Porter 2006), the International Law Commission (ILC) (McArdle and Cardwell 2012), and 
UN specialized agencies, such as the International Labour Organization (ILO) (Kissack 2006) and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Mahieu et al. 2005) or UN institutions located in Geneva (Taylor 2006). 
These scholarly works have provided solid foundations for understanding the concepts related to EU‟s 
international role, i.e., coherence, actorness and effectiveness. But further difficulties arise when it comes to 
the empirical application of these concepts as they are insufficiently delineated in the first place. These 
studies do not contain concrete measurements to assess the EU‟s performance in external representation.  
Efforts aiming to respond to these difficulties are represented by the emergence of the researches 
examining the EU‟s actual voting behaviour. Earlier studies (e.g., Hurwitz 1976; Lindemann 1982) resorted 
to voting pattern analysis of the Community at the UNGA with reference to the potential effects of the 
European Political Cooperation (EPC). They concluded that the EPC managed to increase the Community‟s 




studies carry forward the voting behaviour analysis to the later-established CFSP regime (Luif 2003; Young 
and Rees 2005; Rasch 2008; Hosli et al. 2010; Jin and Hosli 2013). Mostly these researchers maintain that 
EU voting cohesion – regardless of the ups and downs – has been increasing over time as the CFSP develops. 
Rasch specifically points out that the CFSP only functions in areas where national interests of EU member 
states converge, therefore does not make an overall difference.  
Apart from institutional developments, scholars have looked into alternative variables, e.g., enlargement, 
which may explain EU voting cohesion at the UNGA (Johansson-Nogués 2004; Jakobsson 2009). Contrary 
to the conventional assumption that enlargement results in lower voting cohesion due to increased 
transaction costs in decision-making, they find that enlargement increases the Union‟s capacity to exert 
influence if the new members are willing to act in concert with the old ones. Only tentative conclusions, 
however, can be drawn from these studies regarding the effects of enlargement because they were based on 
relatively small data collection. A few researchers have conducted some pioneering works (e.g., Birnberg 
2009; Lucas 2012) in identifying the configuration of a host of elements that may contribute to determining 
EU voting cohesion in the UNGA, such as power, issue salience, transatlantic relationship, duration of EU 
membership and treaty reforms. Unfortunately, the results of their analyses are mostly non-conclusive due 
to the difficulties in unambiguously interpreting the empirical evidence or simply the limited coverage of 
data. These academic pieces are considered inspiring in exploring alternative explanatory factors to EU 
voting cohesion, but due to time constraints their analysis did not include the latest data and thus were 
unable to reflect the most recent developments in EU representation coherence after the enforcement of the 
ToL.15  
Systematic research on the representation behaviour of the EU member states at the UNSC is still 
developing. Theoretically speaking, the Union should have been more influential over UNSC matters given 
the fact that EU member states (at least France and Britain) are always present at this forum. However, EU 
researchers find that the EU has been “pouching below its weight” because the Union and non-serving EU 
                                                 
15 An exception is Lucas‟s article (2012), which tested the effects of institutional reforms, including the Maastricht Treaty, the 
Amsterdam Treaty and the ToL, on EU voting cohesion, based on the UNGA resolutions on human rights and security issues from 
1980 until 2011. She found that the ToL had a significantly negative effect on EU voting cohesion, albeit the actual influence of the 




members are marginalized from shaping the decision making at the UNSC (Biscop and Missiroli 2008; 
Blavoukos and Bourantonis 2011). The EU‟s representation seems to mainly depend on the EU member 
states sitting on the UNSC, especially on the two permanent member states, which enjoy a high degree of 
freedom to pursue their national interests (Drieskens 2010; Hannay 2012).  
Some scholars try to find a solution to the Union‟s underperformance through the reform of the UNSC. 
On one hand, they embrace the idea that the Union should take the leading role in remodelling the UNSC 
(Chevallard 2005; Hill 2006), on the other they realize that there is no consensus on this issue between EU 
member states, especially between Germany and Italy, which are mostly blamed for drawing the dividing 
line within the EU (Fulci 1999; Martini 2010). A few reformists have suggested consolidating the seats of 
the UK and France into one EU seat, which would be subject to rotation among EU members (Kelly 2000; 
Missiroli 2005; Deudney and Maull 2011). The logic behind their suggestion is that numerousness does not 
amount to representativeness and effectiveness. This presumption so far has obtained some empirical 
support: for instance, a statistical analysis of the decision probability of the UNSC shows that increasing 
UNSC membership without abolishing or at least limiting the use of veto power has little relevance in 
improving its capability to act, or even worse, it rather leads to a higher degree of indecision (Hosli et al. 
2011). In the case of the EU, it is understood that a less numerous but more coherent EU presence at the 
UNSC is more preferable because by voluntarily “sacrificing” one seat the Union could gain an upper hand 
with more credibility, and then force other hesitating members to be on board and push forward the reform 
(Missiroli 2005: 46-47).  
The ToL is meant to initiate a new phase for the EU as an international actor. Discussions around the 
ToL‟s legal and political implications had started prior to its implementation (Drieskens 2008; Hillion 2008; 
Griller and Ziller 2008; Marchesi 2008; Blockmans and Wessel 2009). Several follow-up studies assessing 
the ToL‟s effects in a more systematic manner have appeared. Analyses using legal approaches attribute 
utmost importance to interpreting the amendments in EU treaties and how the EU‟s legal status in IOs, such 
as the UN, is going to be affected (Drieskens 2010; Piris 2010; Wessel 2011; Cardwell 2012; Blanke and 




(Gaspers 2010; Koehler 2010; Verola 2010; Emerson et al. 2011; Gstöhl 2012; Quinn 2012; Dosenrode 
2012; Zwolski 2012). Most of these studies hold a fairly optimistic view, agreeing that the ToL is a step in 
the right direction, although there are criticisms stating that it is not a quantum leap forward in terms of 
creating a more coherent EU foreign policy and defragmenting the Union‟s external representation. 
However, a few researchers maintain that the improvements made by the ToL have little impact in on the 
EU‟s representation coherence because this issue ultimately relies on the political will of its member states 
(Drieskens 2008; Quinn 2012). Regardless of the spotlight thrown on the ToL, empirical analyses testing its 
effects on the coherence of EU representation in concrete terms are still underdeveloped.  
This dissertation aims to contribute to a better understanding of the EU‟s role in international fora in 
general and at the UN in particular, by providing a clearer conceptualization of EU representation coherence 
– distinguished from other related concepts, e.g., actorness and effectiveness – and concrete measurements 
of coherence in both quantitative (voting cohesion) and qualitative terms (horizontal and vertical coherence). 
It strengthens the analyses on EU voting behaviour at the UNGA in the form of a sophisticated statistical 
investigation of EU voting cohesion within a relatively broader time frame. In the meantime, this research is 
able to reassess some alternative explanatory variables, including inter alia, membership size, socialization 
and issue areas on voting cohesion, based on a more complete data collection that includes the resolutions of 
the latest two UNGA sessions. It also adds creative values to the studies of the EU‟s presence at the UNSC 
by applying a mixed approach that combines descriptive statistics and case studies. The examinations of a 
classic case concerning the Iraq war and a timely case regarding the Libya crisis against the background of 
the Arab Spring are going to enrich the empirical observations on the EU‟s representation at the forum. 
Moreover, the current study contributes to the accumulation of interpreting the legal, political and policy 
implications of the ToL and conducts a systematic empirical test of its effects on EU representation 
coherence, which steers the discussions surrounding the ToL away from legal and theoretical perspectives 
to real-world evidence. Finally, this dissertation bridges the research traditions emphasizing the importance 
of outcomes and the approaches emphasizing the process of decision making that accounts for the 




Chapter 3 Theoretical Framework: Principal-Agent Theory 
Principal-agent theory, in essence, explains the agency relationship governed by a contract, in which the 
principal expects the agent to act on its behalf and protect its interests (Ross 1973). Originating from the 
neoclassic economic paradigm, this theoretical model has been applied to the fields of political science and 
international relations, where the principal delegates the authority to a chosen agent and let the agent carry 
out its policy preferences based on a pre-defined arrangement (Shapiro 2005; Pollack 2006). 16 
Principal-agent theory deals with three central questions: (1) the conditions under which delegation occurs; 
(2) the main problems of principal-agent relationships; (3) the measures that can be taken by the principal to 
ensure effective delegation.  
3.1 Central Arguments of Principal-Agent Theory 
A presumption of principal-agent theory is that principals and agents are rational players. The uppermost 
motivation driving a principal to appoint an agent is the prospect of achieving more benefits through 
delegation than alternative institutional arrangements. Drawing insights from seminal works on 
principal-agent theory (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991; Moravcsik 1993; Epstein and O‟Halloran 1994; 
Majone 2001; Thatcher and Stone Sweet 2002; Pollack 2003; Hawkins et al. 2006), six possible reasons 
why delegation occurs are identified. A principal delegates authority to an agent because: (1) the principal is 
in need of the agent‟s professional service, e.g., specific expertise, credibility, experience or other resources 
that the principal is either unable or unwilling to provide; (2) the principal counts on the agent to reduce 
transaction costs; (3) the principal reckons on the agent to resolve its internal disputes; (4) the principal 
needs the agent to facilitate collective decision-making; (5) the principal depends on the agent to ensure 
credible commitments and prevent the “free-rider” problem; (6) the principal relies on the agent to “lock in” 
its dominance or prerogative. As shown in this encapsulation, principal-agent theory views the occurrence 
of delegation in terms of functions.  
Notice that the expectation of reaping benefits is not sufficient for delegation to take place. Other factors, 
such as preference heterogeneity, institutional rules and power balance, interact with the pursuit of benefits 
                                                 




as mitigating dynamics and affect the possibility that delegation arises. All else being equal, the probability 
of delegation is lowered when actors‟ policy preferences become more heterogeneous. Institutional 
competences and rules decide which type of agent a principal can utilize, how the agent should be selected 
as well as the scope of agent discretion. Institutional rules also determine how decisions are made and thus 
affect the agent‟s autonomy to act (Cortell and Peterson 2006).17 For instance, decision rules requiring 
unanimity are more likely to reduce the probability of delegation than the rules under qualified majority 
voting since more votes are needed to approve an action. Power balance works as a moderating factor of 
delegation in that powerful players have more leverage in the agency relationship. They own the capability 
to act unilaterally or group with like-minded actors when delegation does not maximize their interests. In 
comparison, the weaker ones intend to rely on delegation to enhance their influence and get more benefits. 
A core challenge in principal-agent relationships is that “agent slack” is inevitable. Agent slack is the 
agent‟s independent actions that conflict with the principal‟s preferences and lead to “agency losses”. 
Information asymmetry, usually working in favour of the agent, creates more opportunities for agent slack. 
There are mainly two forms of slack: “shirking” and “slippage”. The former, also called “bureaucratic drift”, 
denotes the agent‟s opportunistic behaviour to minimize the efforts devoted to the principal in order to 
pursue its own interests. The latter occurs when the delegation structure itself provides incentives for the 
agent to act against the principal‟s interests (Pollack 2003: 39).18 In cases of shirking, serious attention shall 
be paid to the agent‟s motives to engage in slack. These may be based on the agent‟s distinct policy 
preferences, moral convictions, or its intention of competence maximization (Kerremans 2006: 175). In 
cases of slippage, incentives that induce the agent to deviate from the desired behaviour depend on the 
specific delegation structure. Take the time frame of delegation as an example, an agent can afford to act 
against the principal‟s will, if the delegation is proposed for an indeterminate period of time or in a rotational 
format since it has fewer concerns about termination of agency. If an agent‟s authority is delegated for a 
limited period of time in renewable terms, the agent may want to restrain itself from slack activities due to 
                                                 
17 A brief note on the distinction between “discretion” and “autonomy”: while the former entails the grant of authority or mandate 
the principal deems necessary to accomplish the delegated task, the latter denotes the range of independent action available to the 
agent. All else being equal, a wider discretion scope gives the agent more autonomy (Hawkins et al. 2006: 7-8).  
18 Some scholars seem to use these two terms interchangeably (e.g., Nielson and Tierney 2003; Shapiro 2005). Either way, both of 




its concern about re-delegation in the future (Pollack 2003: 45). But if the agent‟s power is delegated for a 
very short period, not least in a rotational manner, the agent is likely to maximize its own substantive 
interests while it still can, knowing that it will be selected again sooner or later anyway. Apart from 
“intentional cheating”, an agent may fail to fulfil its obligations because of capacity deficit, e.g., a lack of 
experience, resources, professionalism or institutional memory and continuity. Agency losses can be 
augmented by other exogenous factors, e.g., a sudden crisis that leads to unintended consequences beyond 
the agent‟s control or an international atmosphere that provides more leeway for the agent to act 
independently (Marks et al. 1996: 355).  
The principal can use ex ante and ex post control mechanisms to minimize agency losses. Ex ante 
mechanisms refer to “agent selection” and “contract design”. Principals can choose between existing agents 
with known biases or, at some cost, create a new agent with identical preferences. By selecting a 
sympathetic agent, the principal gains the advantage of steering the delegation from the beginning toward a 
favourable direction. In this way, the principal can grant the agent greater discretion and adopt less costly ex 
post mechanisms while still minimizing agency slack (Hawkins et al. 2006: 33-34). In contrast, weak 
screening and selection mechanisms may lead to adverse selection, ending up with an agent that does not 
represent the principal‟s interests. Through an elaborate contract, the principal can in advance decide the 
agent‟s mandate, stipulating administrative methods, decision rules, and punishments in case of contract 
violations (Blom-Hansen 2005). Discretion design is never easy. If a principal limits an agent‟s mandate too 
much, the agent may not be able to function normally. A contract must be profit-sharing to encourage the 
agent to realize the principal‟s objectives. So the trick is to grant just enough amount of authority that 
enables the agent to achieve desired outcomes with minimum agency losses. A contract that authorizes a 
legal mandate helps legitimize the agent‟s representative behaviour, but it does not have to be explicit or 
formally legalized (Hawkins et al. 2006: 6). Ex post controls include “monitoring” and “sanctions”. The 
principal can either conduct a direct supervision over the agent‟s activities or rely on third parties to perform 
the oversight (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984). Sanctions are often imposed to punish an errant agent and 




Control measures can contain agency losses, but they are not costless (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991: 27). 
Identifying the ideal agent and creating a new agent are both costly. Contracts that are too strict may produce 
inflexible and inefficient policy outcomes. Monitoring may consume considerable resources while 
sanctions often cost the principal as well. For instance, re-delegation is most reformative yet most costly and 
thus requires more caution. In any delegation relationship, there is a trade-off between gains and costs. 
Principals are willing to let a delegation continue only when the expected benefits outweigh the overall 
losses (the sum of agency losses and control costs). 
Delegations in political settings are often more sophisticated than the standard principal-agent model 
with one principal and one agent. Real-life delegations usually involve “complex principals”, i.e., a number 
of actors either independently constitute “multiple principals” or form “collective principals” as a group 
(Lyne et al. 2006). Major distinctions between the two types of complex principals lie in the number and 
nature of the contracts: whereas multiple principals conclude separate contracts with an agent, collective 
principals negotiate a single priori contract with the agent. The problems of agent slack and control costs 
become more serious in cases of complex principals. Multiple principals are likely to compete with each 
other for the loyalty of an agent, which presents more options to the agent so that it can compare the 
principals and align with the ones that maximize its interests (Larsén 2007). Powerful principals with rich 
resources are usually more attractive to the agent. For collective principals, it is more difficult to select an 
agent and agree on the range of agent discretion, especially when unanimity is applied. Collective principals 
having conflicting preferences are less willing to appoint a single agent. When they do, they intend to opt for 
a relatively centrist and pragmatic one, which may not be the optimal choice (Miller 2005: 211). The costs 
of monitoring and sanctions for complex principals in general are higher because the agent can manipulate 
the differences among the principals to escape surveillance and punishment (Brent 1999). Its manipulation 
ability is influenced by decision rules, e.g., unanimity, compared to majoritarian rules, leaves bigger room 
for agent manoeuvre because the threshold for sanctions is higher (Pollack 2003: 44; Hawkins et al. 2006: 
43). Re-delegation is also unlikely for complex principals having divergent preferences since they would 




principals – multiple and collective – as their preferences converge. Collective principals are likely to have 
preference heterogeneity better controlled compared to multiple principals because the former normally 
have more institutionalized structure that facilitates the aggregation of divergent preferences. 
Real-life delegations may also involve multiple agents. In such cases, a principal delegates the same 
function to a number of agents while each agent works as part of a bigger team of agency. The existence of 
multiple agents tends to amplify agency losses and control costs. These agents may have incompatible 
preferences. One agent may behave consciously or unconsciously in a manner that impedes the other. They 
may compete for scarce resources, influence and visibility (Dijkstra 2011: 4). The “free-rider” problem 
arises when an agent intentionally reduces its efforts devoted to the principal and let other agents perform 
the delegated task. The risk of shirking becomes higher in the case of multiple agents because it is more 
challenging for the principal to supervise all the agents at the same time (Shapiro 2005: 267). Moreover, 
informational distribution is further skewed toward the advantage of the agents (Waterman and Meier 1998: 
183). But the principal is not entirely vulnerable if additional information can be acquired by comparing the 
performances of the agents and if one agent can be used to monitor the other (Tallberg 2003: 24-25). 
3.2 Principal-Agent Theory and EU Representation in International Organizations 
EU external representation varies across international institutions and issue areas. The principal-agent 
theory is believed to hold considerable strength in explaining this variety and complexity. EU representation 
in international institutions can be theorized into different types of delegation relationships, in which the 
Union and its member states are often perceived as collective principals, whereas the actors that play the 
role of the agent(s) and the forms of delegation depend on the nature of competences within the EU and the 
statute of the international institutions (Wessel 2011).  
The ToL eliminated the pillar structure, and for the first time introduced a precise classification in the 
founding treaties of three main categories of competences: exclusive, shared and supporting (Article 2 
TFEU).19 In areas of exclusive competence (e.g., common commercial and monetary policies), the EU alone 
may legislate and adopt binding acts. The member states‟ role is therefore limited unless the Union 
                                                 




authorises them to do so. External representation in these areas normally has been delegated to the European 
Commission (hereafter the Commission). 20  At ministerial level, representation is provided by the 
corresponding Commissioner, while at the level of heads of state and government, it is provided by the 
Commission President (Kaczyński 2011). Following the ToL‟s entry into force, the delegations of the 
Commissions overseas have been replaced by the delegations of the EU, which, according to the treaty, shall 
represent the Union in third countries and IOs (Article 221 TFEU). Although EU delegations are part of the 
EEAS working under the authority of the HR, which represents the Union in the CFSP field, they comprise 
staff from relevant Commission services (Article 27 TEU), and thus can also deal with issues that fall 
outside of the scope of the CFSP.  
In areas of shared competence (e.g., environment and energy), both the EU and member states can adopt 
binding acts, but the latter may continue to exercise their competences to the extent that the Union has not 
exercised, or has decided not to exercise, its competence.21 Prior to the ToL, the rotating Presidency had 
been the leading agent speaking on behalf of the EU and its member states (Rhinard and Kaeding 2006). 
Theoretically speaking, the ToL eradicated the Presidency‟s role in providing external representation and 
entrusted this responsibility to the Commission with the exception of the CSFP and other cases provided for 
in the Treaties (Article 17 TEU). Not surprisingly, due to preference conflicts some member states are 
reluctant to accept the complete exclusion of the Presidency and stress the need for continued collaboration 
between EU institutions and member states in representing the Union externally (Szabó 2011; Emerson et al. 
2011). On 22 October 2011, the Council endorsed practical arrangements regarding the EU‟s representation 
in multilateral organizations, in which the member states (as collective principals) agree that agent selection 
and delegation structure shall be decided on a case by case basis. They may request the Council to designate 
EU actors or a member state, notably the rotating Presidency, to do so on their behalf (Council 2011).22 It 
seems that the Presidency will continue to play a role in representation in the domain of shared competence. 
                                                 
20 On the literature regarding the Commission as the EU‟s agent in external economic governance, see Pollack 1996; Kerremans 
2006; Niemann and Huigens 2011; Rommerskirchen 2013. 
21 This pre-emption principle does not apply to the areas of research, technological development, space, development cooperation 
and humanitarian aid (the so-called parallel competence), where the Union‟s competence shall not preclude the member states from 
exercising theirs. 
22 EU actors denote the actors competent to represent the Union as provided in the Treaties, i.e., the President, the Commission, the 




Finally, at high-level events involving heads of state and government, the President of the Commission shall 
be accompanied by the President, but it is the former that will address most of the substantive issues 
(Corthaut and Van Eeckhoutte 2012: 154). 
 In the domain of supporting competence (e.g., culture and education), the EU has no legislative power 
and can only intervene to support, coordinate or supplement the actions of member states. The Commission 
as per the mandate conferred by the Council has been negotiating alongside the member states, with the 
incumbent Presidency at the helm coordinating and chairing the multilateral negotiations with respect to the 
issues in this category (Ferri 2005: 21-25). Exceptionally, and after due coordination, a member state other 
than the Presidency may take the floor during the negotiations in so far as its contribution was limited to 
supporting the agreed common position (cf. Council 2005). After the ToL‟s adoption, it appears that the HR 
has replaced the role of the Presidency in representing the Union. An example is the recent Memorandum of 
Understanding agreed by the EU and United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO), which aimed to boost cooperation and information sharing between the two organizations. This 
deal was signed by the HR and the Development Commissioner on behalf of the EU and its member states 
(Commission Press Release 2012). 
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The EU has special competences in the CFSP field in the sense that it has competence in all areas 
connected to the CFSP, which are however subject to specific rules and procedures, e.g., the EU cannot 
adopt legislative acts in this field and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) does not have jurisdiction with 
respect to the provisions in this area (Article 24 TEU).23 During the years preceding the application of the 
ToL, it was the Presidency that had been representing the Union in matters falling within the CFSP. The 
Presidency was assisted by the High Representative for the CFSP and Secretary-General of the Council 
(HR/SG), while the Commission was fully associated in these tasks (Gstöhl 2009). The ToL re-delegated 
the task of representing the EU externally to the President (at the level of heads of state and government) and 
the revamped HR (at the ministerial level), both supported by the EEAS. On the ground, EU delegations are 
responsible for providing local representation of the Union. Up to July 2013, the EU has a network of 139 
delegations representing the Union in 163 third countries and international institutions (Ashton 2013). 
Meanwhile, the Presidency‟s influence on agenda setting to a large degree has been weakened since the 
right of initiative in CFSP matters has gone to the HR, who also chairs the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC), 
and the power of shaping strategic planning of the European Council has been taken over by the President. 
Its role as a consensus builder has declined as well because the EEAS has assumed the responsibility of 
preparing and organizing EU coordination meetings. However, the Presidency continues to be an important 
“stakeholder” in EU external relations in that it remains in charge of the majority of Council configurations 
(except for the FAC) and preparatory bodies, including the Permanent Representatives Committee 
(COREPER).24 On rare occasions, the Presidency can still perform representative function due to the 
absence of a Union delegation, e.g., the EU was represented by the Hungarian embassy in Tripoli during the 
                                                 
23 The EU‟s competence in the CFSP field is sometimes understood as a form of parallel competences (e.g., Keukeleire and 
MacNaughtan 2008). But there are commentators who argue that the separate treatment for CFSP competence in the ToL suggests 
that it is best described as sui generis (e.g., Cremona 2009; Sari 2012). Declarations 13 and 14 attached to the ToL that emphasize 
that the treaty should not affect the competencies of EU members in foreign policy further reinforce the presumption that 
pre-emption does not apply to the CFSP. Therefore, this dissertation follows the second approach and considers CFSP competence 
a special case. The EU also has special competences under other two circumstances: the EU has the competence to define guidelines 
to ensure coordination of economic and employment policies of the member states (Article 5 TFEU); the Union has the competence 
to adopt the appropriate measures beyond the powers conferred by the Treaties, to attain one of the Treaties‟ objectives if certain 
specific procedure are met (Article 352 TFEU). 
24 COREPER is divided into two entities: COREPER I and COREPER II. Whereas COREPER I prepares a large number of Council 
meetings (e.g., employment, agriculture, education), the Councils that discuss more politically sensitive areas (GAC, FAC, 




Libya crisis (Szabó 2011). Table 1 encapsulates the situations of EU external representation described 
above in different categories of competences in the post-Lisbon era. 
The EU‟s representation is also sensitive to the statute of international institutions. By the conferral of 
legal personality to the EU, the ToL has allowed the EU to negotiate and conclude international agreements, 
to participate in treaty regimes and pursue memberships in IOs. But the fact that some international 
institutions do not allow for EU membership often leads to a complex form of EU representation and 
hampers its coherence (Wessel 2011: 633). In the aftermath of the ToL, the Union has succeeded from the 
Community various types of status in multilateral organisations.25 Based on existing relevant studies (cf. 
Hoffmeister and Kuijper 2006; Emerson et al. 2011; Comelli and Matarazzo 2011; Gstöhl 2012), four main 
models of the EU‟s presence in IOs can be identified: 
Both the EU and its member states are full members, e.g., in the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). In IOs where the EU has obtained full membership in 
parallel with the member states, the Union is allowed to play a preeminent role. Albeit there is not 
necessarily an absolute connection between the character of a competence and the form of delegation, as the 
degree of preference homogeneity is higher among the collective principals in areas of exclusive 
competence, the opportunity to appoint EU institutions, e.g., the Commission, as the sole agent tends to 
increase.26 This delegation structure applies to the WTO. For decades, the Commission has had a delegation 
in Geneva that deal with the relationships between the EU and other IOs. After the ToL, the Commission 
delegation has transformed into Union delegation. But the HR established a new Permanent Mission to the 
WTO with the concern of the volume of WTO negotiations. This split risks creating new complexity and 
tensions between the Permanent Mission and the EU Delegation (Comelli and Matarazzo 2011: 9). The 
mandate of the FAO covers issues of both exclusive and shared competences. Depending on the topic on the 
agenda, EU representation was practiced either by the Commission or the Presidency (Emerson et al. 2011). 
Theoretically speaking, the Commission and the EU Delegation to the FAO should represent the EU in the 
post-Lisbon period. But due to the resistance from the member states, a transitional arrangement was 
                                                 
25 15 out of 139 EU delegations are to multilateral organizations. For a list of these IOs, see Comelli and Matarazzo 2011: 6. 




established: the EU delegation would indicate the nature of the competence, which would determine 
whether the Commission or the Presidency should act as the agent of the Union. 
The EU is an “enhanced observer”, “virtual member” or full participant, while (some) EU states 
are full members, e.g., in the UNGA, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 
and the G20. In many cases of shared or mixed competences, the EU has established a status, with which it 
enjoys identical operational rights as full member states do, e.g., to intervene in debate and present common 
proposals, except without vote or membership. The EU‟s competences in the UNGA are not unimportant. 
But since UN membership is only open to sovereign states, for years the Union, as one of the permanent 
observers, had been primarily represented by the Presidency before the ToL took effect. In May 2011, its 
status was upgraded to enhanced observer. The Presidency‟s role in external representation has been 
progressively taken over by “EU actors” provided in the ToL, notably the President, the HR and the Union 
Delegation in New York. The development of EU representation at this body and the implications of the 
ToL will be addressed explicitly in Chapter 4. 
The OSCE is one of the organizations with which the ToL called for “all appropriate forms of 
cooperation” (Article 220 TFEU).27 The EU is considered a “virtual member” or de factor full participant 
within the OSCE, though its status has never been formally defined (Gstöhl 2012: 151). During the 
pre-Lisbon period, the Commission had its own delegation to the OSCE. In areas of exclusive competence, 
the Commission could intervene like an OSCE member and was responsible for representing the EU and its 
member states. In areas of shared competence, the Presidency acted as the leading agent and the main 
coordinator. The Commission President would attend OSCE summits as the Union‟s representative while at 
the ministerial level the corresponding Commissioner would provide representation (Emerson et al. 2011: 
99-100). Since the ToL was implemented, the EU Delegation has started to player a stronger role the OSCE, 
despite the reluctance of some EU member states, e.g., Britain and France, to fully accept the new agents. 
Similarly, when the issue on agenda falls primarily within the EU‟s competence, the Union Delegation 
                                                 




intervenes as an OSCE member, whereas the Presidency is still in charge of EU external representation in 
other areas (Gaspers 2010: 35).  
The G20 was created in 1999 as a successor of the G7/8 meetings. It gathers 19 important industrial 
countries – including France, Germany, Britain and Italy from the EU – all over the world, plus the Union, 
which is recognized as a full participant, to discuss issues regarding global economic stability (Emerson et al. 
2011; Gstöhl 2012).28 Initially, the EU was represented by the President of the ECB and the Presidency, 
whereas the Commission was merely involved at a technical level in the delegation. The four EU member 
states were represented by their finance ministers and central bank governors. In November 2008, the G20 
was reestablished at the level of heads of state and government. Since then EU member states had been 
represented by their national leaders, while the Union was represented jointly by the Presidency (in areas of 
exclusive competence) and the Commission President (in areas of mixed competence).29 With the ToL‟s 
entry into force, the Presidency has been replaced by the newly created President, who now shares the 
representation responsibility horizontally with the Commission President: the former acts on the agent of the 
EU on CFSP matters while the latter speaks on behalf of the Union on issues falling into exclusive 
competence. When it comes to areas of shared competence, the agent is selected on a case-by-case basis 
depending on the subject at stake (Rommerskirchen 2013). For the meetings at the ministerial level, the 
Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs and the Euro, the Presidency and the head of the ECB 
represent the EU act jointly as EU representatives at the G20 (Wouters et al. 2012: 129). 
The EU is an ordinary observer, while all EU member states have full memberships, e.g., in the 
World Health Organization (WHO). The Union is likely to be an observer in multilateral organizations that 
deal with the issues where it has moderate competences. The subjects covered by the WHO, such as public 
health, mainly fall into the areas of supporting competence, where the EU can only conduct a supplementary 
role. Prior to the ToL, the Union‟s common approach had been presented by the rotating Presidency, 
whereas the Commission got involved occasionally in cases of exclusive competence, where it represented 
the EU behind the Presidency (Eggers and Hoffmeister 2006). The ToL is supposed to further encourage the 
                                                 
28 Some scholars (e.g., Wouters et al. 2012) see the EU as a full member of the G20. 




Commission‟s involvement in external representation. For issues that have CFSP implications, e.g., health 
in the Palestine territory, the ToL authorizes the HR and EU delegation in Vienna to take over the Union‟s 
representation. It remains unclear, though, whether the Presidency‟s role should be entirely eliminated. 
Besides, EU member states are largely hesitant about accepting a transfer of competences to EU institutions. 
After long debates, the Commission agreed not to claim authority for external representation on all issues 
yet during the transitional phase. As a result, EU representation is organized within a temporary framework, 
with EU common positions presented by means of the Presidency (Van Schaik 2011). In the long run, 
representation by EU actors in the WHO is going to be constrained by the fact that the EU is not a member. 
However, this problem is unlikely to be solved soon given that WHO membership is only open to states.   
The EU has no status while some member states are full members, e.g., at the UNSC and North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The situations where EU member states operate without any EU 
presence are becoming rare because of the expansion of EU competences to new policy areas (Pollack 1994). 
The absence of a formal status of the Union is mainly a result of the institutional restrictions of the particular 
IOs on memberships. Only sovereign states of the UNGA are eligible to become the members of the UNSC. 
Until the ToL entered into effect, EU representation had to rely on the two permanent EU member states 
sitting on this body and occasionally on the EU state holding the Presidency if it was invited to address the 
UNSC according to the provisional rules. The ToL has created the possibility for the HR to speak on behalf 
of the EU when there is a common EU position and extended the obligation to defend the positions and 
interests of the Union to all EU members serving on the UNSC. Apart from these improvements, the ToL 
hardly contains any further innovations that may profoundly affect the EU‟s presence at the UNSC. It 
continues to allow EU member states – reinforced by the two declarations annexed to the ToL – to prioritise 
their responsibilities to the UNSC over EU membership (Pirozzi 2012). In the future, EU representation at 
the UNSC also depends on the institutional structure of this body itself. EU member states, however, remain 
split over the questions such as whether the UNSC enlargement shall be limited to non-permanent seats and 




provided in Chapter 4 about the developments of EU representation at the UNSC and the debates between 
EU member states concerning the UNSC reform. 
NATO is a second example where individual EU member states are active while a formalized EU 
representation is non-existent. According to the founding treaty of NATO (Article 10), only European states 
that are able to “further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic 
area” can be admitted as members. Currently, there are 22 EU member states represented in NATO.30 
However, the EU‟s role as a collective security actor within NATO is very limited, e.g., there is neither a 
Union delegation to NATO nor a de facto “EU caucus” inside NATO decision making (Græger and 
Haugevik 2011: 751). Institutionalized EU-NATO cooperation on security issues goes back to the letter 
exchange between the EU Presidency and NATO‟s Secretary General in 2001.31 It was followed by a 
comprehensive package of formal arrangements between the two organizations, collectively known as the 
Berlin Plus, which has been in effect since 2003. The Berlin Plus framework promised greater cooperation 
on crisis management and information change as well as the possibility for the EU to use NATO assets and 
facilities (Reichard 2006). Gradually, EU-NATO relationship has developed into a “strategic partnership” 
as described in NATO‟s New Strategic Concept (NSC) adopted in 2010. 
There has been regular meetings since 2000 between NATO and EU officials at various levels, including, 
inter alia, the levels of foreign and defence ministers, ambassadors, military representatives and defence 
advisors (cf. Sloan 2003: 197). The absence of formal status does not imply that the Union is entirely 
invisible at NATO. The  HR/SG were invited to all ministerial meetings the North Atlantic Council (NAC) 
and in a reciprocal way the NATO Secretary General often took part in EU foreign and defence ministers‟ 
meetings. EU leaders, i.e., the Commission President and the HR/SG were also invited to participate in 
NATO summits. After the ToL took effect, the ministerial meetings of the NAC are now attended by the 
newly established HR, who can speak on behalf of the Union. On the margins of ministerial meetings, the 
HR also holds a number of bilateral meetings with important counterparts. At NATO summits, the EU are 
jointly represented by the two Presidents of the European Council and the Commission along with the HR, 
                                                 
30 Non-NATO EU members include Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta and Sweden. 
31 For detailed accounts of the development of institutionalized relationship between the EU and NATO, see Emerson et al. 2011; 




who are allowed to make statements on behalf of the Union (e.g., at the NATO Summits in Lisbon and 
Chicago). On the margins of the summits, EU leaders can hold bilateral, trilateral or multilateral meetings 
with NATO members on their respective levels.  
 
Table 2: EU Representation in Different International Organizations in the Post-Lisbon Period 
Status of the EU 
Status of (some) 
EU Member States 
Examples 
of IOs 
Competence EU Representation  
Full membership Full membership 
WTO Exclusive  
Commission 
Permanent Mission  
FAO 
Exclusive Commission, EU Delegation 
Shared The Presidency 





The HR, EU Delegation 
Non-CFSP Commission 
Virtual member OSCE 
Exclusive Commission, EU Delegation 
Shared  The Presidency 
Full participant 
Full membership 
(Four EU members) 
G20 
Exclusive Commission 
CFSP The President 
Shared Decided case by case 
Observer Full membership WHO 
Supporting The Presidency 
Exclusive Commission 
CFSP The HR, EU Delegation 
No status Full membership  
UNSC CFSP/CSDP 
Member states in the UNSC 
The HR (on invitation only) 
NATO CFSP/CSDP 
The President, the 
Commission President, and 
the HR (summits) 
The HR (ministerial meetings) 
 
Since EU actors are present at ministerial meetings and summits with speaking rights, they are entitled to 




experience shows that EU member states have rarely coordinated their positions or attempted to establish 
unified representation within this organization (Græger and Haugevik 2011). The ToL could have become 
point of departure for better coordination and more coherent representation of the EU to take place within 
the NATO context since the treaty calls on EU member states to consult one another in order to determine 
common approaches on matters concerning foreign and security policy and to coordinate in IOs in order to 
uphold the Union‟s common positions (cf. Article 32 and 34 TEU). It also authorizes the HR, at least in 
paper, the mandates to organize this coordination and represent the EU‟s interests on the international scene 
(Ibid.). On the other hand, the ToL stipulates that the EU shall respect the obligations of certain member 
states, which see their common defence realized in NATO (Article 42 TEU). Once again, similar to the case 
of the UNSC, the ToL has put the member states‟ responsibilities to NATO on top of their EU membership. 
Therefore, scholars (e.g., Græger and Haugevik 2011; Duke 2012) argue that the ToL is unlikely to have any 
dramatic effect on improving EU representation within NATO, not least considering the preference 
conflicts among EU member states, e.g., on the often cited Cyprus stalemate, and the skepticism of other 
non-EU members, the US in particular, on the formation of an EU caucus inside NATO. Table 2 
schematically shows the situations of EU representation in selected IOs along with the EU‟s competences, 
classified according to the typology of the EU‟s status in multilateral institutions. 
 
All in all, EU representation varies in different multinational organizations since the status of the EU is 
constrained by the institutional rules of the IOs under discussion. Within an international institution, EU 
representation also varies across categories of EU competences. In IOs that principally deal with issues 
falling within the domain of exclusive competence, the preferences of EU member states, which are 
considered collective principals, are already congruent. Therefore, they are more willing to appoint a single, 
supranational agent, e.g., the Commission. As for IOs that deal with matters falling into the areas of shared 
competence or mixed competences, preference multiplicity within EU member states is likely to lead to a 
complex form of delegation involving multiple agents. The ToL attempts to bring more “Europeanization” 




of competences and entrust representation to the newly created agent(s). Consequently, the Presidency is 
likely to remain involved in EU representation within these international institutions. This problem of 
multi-headed agency in EU representation may create inter-institutional rivalry between the Council and the 
Commission (Van Schaik 2011) and thus decrease the Union‟s horizontal coherence in representation. 
Meanwhile, the tensions between EU member states and EU institutions over the question of who should 
represent the Union are a main source of declined vertical coherence in the post-Lisbon era.  
As demonstrated, many disputes over the EU‟s external representation in IOs were settled by transitional 
arrangements, which either provide multiple agents for the Union or determine the agent on a case-by-case 
basis: the former approach risks creating new institutional competitions, while the latter may spend too 
much time on procedural questions. Both contribute to higher agency losses and control costs. If these 
uncertainties are left unattended, it will cost the coherence of EU representation. An understanding between 
EU institutions and the member states shall be reached either by practice or by rulings of the ECJ so that a 
streamlined representation is made possible. The aggregation of EU representation into a joint and common 
representative brings into play a fundamental trade-off between the benefits of delegation and the costs of 
overcoming heterogeneous interests within the collective principals. The greater the benefits, e.g., added 
power in shaping the decision making in the IO, the more likely EU member states are willing to support the 
delegation. The discussion above also reveals the sensitivity of EU representation to exogenous factors, e.g., 
the attitudes of third countries in the particular IO towards coherent EU representation. The closer the 
preferences of EU member states to each another, and the further way they are from those of non-EU states, 
e.g., the US, the greater possibility that the EU will face stronger resistance from other blocks in the IO, 
which consequently may obstruct the formation of coherent EU representation. 
3.3 Principal-Agent Theory and New Institutionalism 
New institutionalism is a disparate set of ideas that developed during the 1980s and early 1990s (Jupille 
and Caporaso 1999: 431).32  There are three primary variants of new institutionalism: rational-choice 
institutionalism, historical institutionalism and sociological institutionalism. Originally applied to the 
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studies of American congressional politics, rational-choice institutionalism assumes that actors are 
utility-maximizers having exogenous preferences and acting based on the “logic of consequentiality” 
(Pollack 2005: 365). This school argues that policy outcomes are determined by actors‟ strategic 
interactions that are structured and modified by institutions (Hall and Taylor 1996: 945). Its focus on 
institutions mainly points to legislative or formal decision rules.33 Principal-agent theory is the product of an 
incorporation of analytical tools of agency theories into rational-choice institutionalism (Tallberg 2003: 16). 
Historical institutionalism emerged from a reaction to the group theories of politics and functionalism 
prominent in political science during the 1960s and 1970s (Hall and Taylor 1996: 937). 
Historical institutionalists assume that actors operate under a bounded rationality based on preferences 
that are endogenous to institutions. It means that institutions, once established, shape and reshape 
preferences and interests (Bulmer 1998). This theoretical approach emphasizes the cumulative effects of 
institutions on policy outcomes over time. It maintains that historical development of institutions is 
fundamentally path-dependent, i.e., decisions at an earlier stage affect actors‟ policy choices at a later point 
in time. Therefore, historical institutionalism attaches importance to the role of timing, sequencing and 
critical moments or junctures in policy-making process (Pollack 2005). Sociological institutionalism 
developed within the subfield of organization theory in sociology (Hall and Taylor 1996: 946). It proposes 
that an actor‟s behaviour is primarily driven by the “logic of appropriateness” which goes beyond rationalist 
calculations (March and Olsen 1984; Lewis 2005).  
Sociological institutionalists endogenize policy preferences by emphasizing the constitutive role of 
socialization, i.e., preferences, instead of being fixed, can converge over time through social interaction 
processes (Breuer 2012). They define institutions more broadly, covering both formal institutional 
structures and informal rules, such as socially-constructed norms and cultural dimensions. Since its focus is 
mainly on macro-level factors, like society and culture, sociological institutionalism tends to consider 
individual actors largely dependent and rather unimportant (Koelble 1995).  
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In summary, whereas rational-choice institutionalism views the origin of institutions in terms of 
functions with the prospect of gaining benefits, historical and sociological institutionalisms see institutions 
as the results of historical development and socialization respectively. Rational-choice institutionalists tend 
to take institutions as contextual constraints that influence policy choices, while historical and sociological 
institutionalists see institutions as determinant variables in policy making. The latter two branches of new 
institutionalism give a broader interpretation of institutions that includes not only formal rules but also 
informal norms and practices. They assert that actors‟ preferences are not fixed, as rational-choice 
institutionalists often claim, but rather endogenous to institutional arrangements. However, whereas both 
rational-choice and historical theorists believe that actions of individuals affect the ultimate policy 
outcomes, sociological scholars generally think little of the role of individual actors. Each approach has its 
comparative advantages: rational-choice institutionalism is thought to be highly useful to the analysis of 
interactions among key actors within organizations; historical institutionalism is more appropriate in 
explaining systemic changes during institutional development; sociological institutionalism is a good 
choice in interpreting the implications of socially-constructed norms for institutions and policy outputs 
(Koelble 1995: 241-243).  
Although different variants of new institutionalism have different origins, assumptions as well as strong 
points, the core premise of these approaches is the same: they all admit that institutions, once created, have 
effects on policy outcomes, no matter as intervening factors or determinants. This virtue of new 
institutionalism fits nicely with the tradition of neofunctionalism, which lays emphasis on the role of 
institutional structures during the process of regional integration. Meanwhile, the theories of new 
institutionalism accept the fundamental intergovernmentalist argument about the continuing centrality of 
nation states in forming international relations. Therefore, new institutionalism contributes to transcending 
the impasse between neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism and offers a more inclusive theoretical 
framework that combines their strengths.34 Take the EU as an example, principal-agent theory accepts the 
critical role of the member states in building and amending EU institutions but does not ignore the 
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importance of EU institutions, which enjoy a certain degree of independence to influence, even shape the 
preferences of EU member states, and ultimately affects the Union‟s policy making (Pollack 1996). 
Recent years have witnessed an increasing convergence of the three approaches of new institutionalism 
(Kato 1996; Thelen 1999). For instance, many rational-choice theorists have started to accept the 
importance of institutions in determining policy outcomes and to embrace a broader view of institutions that 
includes informal rules and norms. Among historical and sociological institutionalists, there has been a 
stronger appreciation of rational calculations and individual behaviour.35 In the meantime, in order to 
reinforce our understandings of the relationship between actors and institutions, political scientists and 
theorists have applied, extended and adapted the rational-choice principal-agent analysis by taking into 
account alternative perspectives of new institutionalisms. Largely relying on principal-agent theory, but also 
drawing insights from historical and sociological institutionalisms, Chapter 4 will formulate the main 
hypotheses regarding EU representation coherence, measured by EU voting cohesion at the UNGA and 













                                                 




Chapter 4 EU Representation at the UN: Principal-Agent Explanation 
EU representation at the UN is complicated because it is not only affected by the rules of participation in 
different UN bodies but also by the delegation structures designed by the Union. This chapter attempts to 
explain these varieties and complexities from the perspective of the principal-agent theory. The Union and 
its entire membership are considered collective principals, whereas agents of the EU and the representation 
structures are different at the UNGA and the UNSC. In each context, the EU‟s representation has 
experienced different stages of development. Whether the ToL has contributed to increased EU 
representation coherence remains to be seen. This chapter will describe the evolution of EU representation 
at these two UN organs while placing a particular emphasis on the implications of the ToL. 
4.1 The EU in the Context of the UN General Assembly 
4.1.1 The UN General Assembly at a Glance  
The UNGA is the chief deliberative, policymaking and representative organ of the UN (Marin-Bosch 
1998). Currently comprising 193 Members, it provides a significant forum for multilateral discussions of the 
full spectrum of international issues. The functions and powers of the UNGA include, inter alia, discussing 
and making recommendations on any question relevant to international peace and security, except when the 
issue is being discussed by the UNSC; 36  giving recommendations to promote international political 
cooperation and peaceful settlements; considering reports from the UNSC; deciding on UN budgetary 
matters; electing the non-permanent members of the UNSC, the members of other UN councils and organs, 
as well as appointing the Secretary-General on the recommendation of the UNSC (Baehr and Gordenker 
2005; Franda 2006). The Assembly normally gathers under its president or the Secretary-General in a 
regular session, which lasts from mid-September to December every year. Special sessions can be convened 
in case of emergency by the Secretary-General, at the request of the UNSC or of a majority of the UN 
members (Article 20 UN Charter).  
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UN membership is only open to peace-loving states which accept and are willing to carry out the 
obligations under the UN Charter (Article 3 and 4 UN Charter). This requirement also applies to the UNGA. 
Member states of the UNGA are equally represented and each member has one vote. Non-member states, 
entities and organizations can be invited to participate as observers in the work of the UNGA (Weiss 2010). 
The UN Charter does not provide clear procedures for observer status. Generally, observers have access to 
most UNGA meetings and relevant documentation. But they are not allowed to vote. On 3 May 2011, the 
EU secured an enhanced observer status at the Assembly by UNGA Resolution 65/276. Since then, EU 
representatives have obtained the rights to speak in general debates, to make interventions, oral proposals 
and amendments, and to exercise the right of reply regarding positions of the Union. However, the EU 
cannot vote or challenge resolutions and decisions. Enhanced observer status is open to other IOs out of 
request. So far, the EU is the only entity that has been granted such a status.  
The UNGA can establish Committees and other subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the 
performance of its functions (Article 22 UN Charter).37 There are six Main Committees.38 Each committee 
consists of all UNGA members. The Main Committees discuss the items referred to them by the UNGA 
within their respective specialties and seek to harmonize the various approaches of states. After the relevant 
Committee has duly considered its content, a draft resolution of decision for consideration will be presented 
to a plenary meeting of the Assembly.39 
Although not legally binding,40 decisions of UNGA resolutions carry significant moral or political 
weight (Petersen 2006). Decisions can be made with or without a vote. The president of the UNGA can 
propose a resolution to be adopted by consensus after having consulted with all delegations. If a vote is 
decided to be necessary, decisions on important questions – such as peace and security, admission of new 
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38 These main committees are the Disarmament and International Security Committee (First Committee), the Economic and Finance 
Committee (Second Committee), the Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural Committee (Third Committee), the Special Political and 
Decolonisation Committee (Fourth Committee), the Administrative and Budgetary Committee (Fifth Committee) and the Legal 
Committee (Sixth Committee). 
39 According to Rule 65 of UNGA Rules of Procedure, the UNGA “shall not, unless it decides otherwise, make a final decision upon 
any item on the agenda until it has received a report of a committee on that item”. On issues such as Palestine and the situation in the 
Middle East, the Assembly acts directly in its plenary meetings without a report from any of the Committees. 




members and budgetary matters – are made by a two thirds majority of the members present and voting.41 
Decisions on other matters should be made by simple majority. Resolutions adopted by a vote can be 
documented either as roll call votes if so requested in advance or merely with a summary of the result. 
Recorded resolutions only take a small portion of all UNGA resolutions. Under exceptional circumstances, 
some meetings of the UNGA and its Main Committees are held in private without official records (Hurwitz 
1976; Kim and Russet 1996; Hug 2012).  
4.1.2 Developments of EU representation at the UN General Assembly 
The EU‟s presence at the UN can be traced back to the information office created by the Commission in 
New York. It became an official delegation in 1974 when the UNGA decided to grant the Commission 
observer status, which allowed a representative of the Commission to take the floor on behalf of the 
European Community on matters within its exclusive competences as a nonvoter. The Community could 
only address UNGA meetings after all the member states had done so. Strictly speaking, at that time the 
Community had no agent to defend its common interests coming within foreign policy. In practice, its 
opinion was expressed on official occasions by the member state holding the revolving Presidency.  
Aiming to further promote cooperation and better protect the Union‟s common interests, EU member 
states agreed in the Maastricht Treaty (signed in February 1992, in force in November 1993) to launch the 
CFSP and to entrust the responsibility of representing the EU in this field to the Presidency in legal terms. 
The Maastricht Treaty itself was a result of the growing political solidarity and preference homogeneity 
among member states since the introduction of the EPC in 1970. The Amsterdam Treaty (signed in October 
1997, in force in May 1999) created the position of the HR/SG to assist the Presidency. While the Nice 
Treaty (signed in February 2001, in force in February 2003) did not make any significant changes to the 
delegation structure of the EU, it provided a treaty basis for the Political and Security Committee (PSC), 
which had been made a permanent body of the EU in January 2001 to formally replace the Political 
Committee (PoCo).42 The PSC retains the PoCo‟s function to monitor the international situation falling in 
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the area of the CFSP, to contribute to the definition of policies, and to monitor the implementation of agreed 
policies. It exercises political control and strategic direction of crisis management operations and can take 
relevant decisions under the authorization of the Council. In this sense, the Nice Treaty delegated a function 
that had been normally reserved for the Council to the PSC (Duke 2005).43  
Before the adoption of the ToL, the Presidency had been the leading agent in the CFSP field. The 
Presidency represented the Union by delivering presidential statements on official UN occasions,44 and by 
negotiating on behalf of the EU toward a wider UN membership in troika meetings, along with the 
representatives from the Commission delegation, the Liaison Office of the Council Secretariat, and if 
necessary, the next Presidency (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008). EU troika meetings at the UN were 
held at different hierarchical levels. At the ministerial level, the EU was co-represented by the foreign 
minister of the Presidency, the Commissioner for External Relations and the HR/SG. The Presidency was 
also responsible for informing other EU members about UN activities and organizing internal coordination 
meetings over UN affairs. The workload of the Presidency was heavy, given that there were over 1,000 
meetings in New York every year. On rare occasions, the HR/SG or a Commissioner could take the floor 
behind the plate “European Community”. But their role, along with the Council Secretariat‟s Liaison Office, 
was mainly to support the Presidency (Bengtsson and Allen 2011: 114).  
The delegation relationship during this period was initially problematic. First, each Presidency was 
conditioned by its domestic, historical and geographical preferences, which were not necessarily consistent 
with the collective interests of the EU. For the Presidency, representing the EU was an option rather than an 
obligation (Drieskens 2008: 612). Second, the Presidency rotated every six months among EU member 
states. Given that the time horizon of delegation was rather short, and that EU member states had no 
concerns for cancellation of delegation, there were fewer incentives for the Presidencies to avoid agent 
shirking or slippage. Each rotation was accompanied by a shift of political priorities, diplomatic reputation 
and global influence, which would cause discontinuity in the agents‟ representative capacities (Dijkstra 
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2011).45 The troika formation was introduced to mitigate this problem, but its role in bridging the continuity 
gap was limited, not to mention the added confusion due to increased number of agents (Bengtsson and 
Allen op.cit. 109). Third, the fragmented pillar structure led to internal rivalries among the Presidency, the 
Commission and the HR/SG. Fourth, the requirement of unanimity for CFSP decision-making gave the 
Presidency more leeway to manipulate coordination meetings towards its own advantage. Finally, control 
system was inadequate in terms of both ex ante and ex post mechanisms. The Union did not have an option 
in agent selection in the sense that each member state had an equal chance of being the agent in turns and the 
EP was not involved in the appointment of the HR/SG. It was difficult to control the Presidency by limiting 
its discretion because the Presidency itself, as an EU member, participated in designing the extent of agent 
discretion. The supervisory power of the EP over the Presidency was relatively superficial. The Presidency 
was only required to keep the EP regularly informed of the development of the CFSP and consulted on 
relevant decisions. The EP could call the Presidency to answer questions but could not bring it to court in 
case of violation of EU treaties since the ECJ had no jurisdiction in the CFSP remit (Greco 2003; Hinarejos 
2009). Altogether the European Council under the leadership of the rotating Presidency performed 
sub-optimally (Dosenrode 2012: 161).  
The ToL re-delegated the task of representing the EU on CFSP matters to two separate agents: the 
President, which has replaced the Presidency to chair the European Council and the HR, which was created 
by combining the former HR/SG and the Commissioner for External Relations. The conflicting preferences 
within the EU led to the appointments of two centrist and pragmatic agents of relatively low profile in 
November 2009, namely Herman Van Rompuy as the President and Catharine Ashton as the HR. Early 
contestants for the President had included, inter alia, former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, who had 
been a charismatic global figure in the foreign policy domain. His candidacy was rejected because of his 
failure to lead the UK to adopt euro and to sign the Schengen Agreement, and because of his decision to 
engage British soldiers in the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, which had seriously split the Union 
(MacCormick 2011: 128). Mainly due to the joint support from Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel, the 
                                                 




European Council eventually chose Van Rompuy, a lesser known centre-right technocrat who had served as 
the 66th Prime Minister of Belgium. The appointment of Ashton was largely a compromise between the UK 
and the Franco-Germany axis. It was reported that Gordon Brown dropped Blair‟s bid for the President so 
that a centre-left British Labour politician could inherit the office of the foreign policy chief (Barber 
2010:61).  
The risk of shirking is reduced since both the President and the HR are full-time agents that focus 
exclusively on EU business rather than the interests of a particular member state. Compared to the 
Presidency, they are less likely to be diverted by national politics.46 The agents are no longer subject to 
semiannual rotation. The President is elected for a term of two and a half years, renewable once, while the 
HR‟s term of office is five years. Relatively stable yet limited time horizons of delegation provide fewer 
incentives for slippage. The termination of rotation also increases the continuity of agent capacities. 
Representative capacities have much to do with the two officeholders‟ personalities, e.g., their characters, 
expertises, resources, experiences as well as leadership styles. The incumbent President is described as a 
shrewd, introverted, self-effacing and mild-mannered politician (Barber 2010; Dinan 2012). Van Rompuy is 
highly regarded in EU political and policy circles for his coalition-building skills, economic expertise and 
multilingual abilities. His leadership style is open and pragmatic with a problem-solving orientation. He 
tends to respect constraints and is less likely to force an agreement if there is no general consensus (Van 
Assche 2009: 18). As for the new HR, those who have been working with Ashton portray her as an 
intelligent, cautious, hard-working official and a quick learner. As a trained economist and the former Trade 
Commissioner of the EU, she has developed rich knowledge of economic issues and good negotiation skills. 
Ashton is also known as a people person who works in a relatively flexible and practical style (Howorth 
2011; Helwig 2013).  
Though agent capacities are subject to change when different personalities assume the offices, the ToL 
has provided the President and the HR with stronger administrative and professional assistance to overcome 
capacity deficit. It established the EEAS, which, under the authority of the HR, works in cooperation with 
                                                 




the diplomatic services of EU member states and contains officials from relevant departments of the 
Commission and the Council as well as staff seconded from national diplomatic services (Article 27 TEU).47 
The delegations of the Commission around the world have been transformed into EU delegations, which 
form an integral part of the EEAS. EU delegations contain both regular EEAS staff and staff from relevant 
Commission services, who work under the authority of the Heads of Delegations. The delegations are the 
operational focus of the service and cover issues of the entire range of EU competences (Van Elsuwege and 
Merket 2012: 42). At the UNGA, the Commission Delegation and the Council‟s Liaison Office have 
merged into the Delegation of the EU, which has progressively assumed the role of the national delegation 
of the rotating Presidency. Moreover, the new agents are less vulnerable to exogenous factors than national 
governments. Take the eurozone crisis as an example, if the Spanish Presidency had been leading the 
European Council in the first half of 2010, its capabilities of representing the Union would have been 
weakened due to its wobbly financial situation. On the contrary, owing to his expertise in economic and 
financial issues, Van Rompuy was able to, in an authoritative and reassuring manner, comprehend the 
developments of the crisis and effectively lead the Union by establishing a Task Force to seek for the 
solutions (Dinan 2012).   
The EU has gained more power in agent selection. According to the ToL, the President shall be elected 
by the European Council by a qualified majority (Article 15.5 TEU) while the HR shall be appointed by the 
European Council through a qualified majority with the agreement of the President of the Commission 
(Article 18.1 TEU). Meanwhile, the EP has an indirect say over the appointment of the HR since the latter, 
as a Vice-President of the Commission, shall be subject to a vote of consent by the EP as a body together 
with other members of the Commission (Article 17.7 TEU). In practice, the EP holds a series of public 
hearings with the candidate Commissioners before the voting.  
In this new “contract”, the President is entrusted with the tasks to provide strategic leadership, coordinate 
the Commission and the GAC, facilitate consensus within the European Council, and represent the EU 
toward the outside world (Article 15 TEU) and of European Council towards other EU institutions 
                                                 




(Dosenrode 2012). In comparison, the mandates conferred upon the HR by the ToL are far more extensive: 
first and foremost, the HR acts as the EU‟s representative in the CFSP remit. As the head of the EEAS and 
the European Defence Agency (EDA), the HR conducts and implements the CFSP, including the CSDP.48 
The HR has the right to submit proposals or initiatives regarding these polices to the Council, either on its 
own initiative or jointly with the Commission (Article 22.2 TEU). Acting in contact with the PSC, the HR 
shall ensure coordination of CSDP tasks (Article 43 TEU). Moreover, the HR chairs the FAC, and can 
convene extraordinary Council meetings on emergency matters (Article 30 TEU).49 Simultaneously as a 
Vice-President of the Commission, the HR is in charge of coordinating different aspects of the Union‟s 
external action and ensuring its consistency (Article 18.4 TEU). This innovation is supposed to bridge the 
competence gap and encourage information flow between the Council and Commission (Marangoni 2012; J. 
Schmidt 2012). Inside the College of Commissioners, the HR is the chair of the Group on External Relations 
Commissioners.50  The HR also participates in the work of the European Council (Article 15.2 TEU). In 
international conferences and organizations, the HR and EU delegations have progressively replaced the 
former troika in conducting political dialogue with third parties on the Union‟s behalf and in organising the 
coordination of EU member states and ensure their compliance with the principles of “loyalty and mutual 
solidarity” (Article 24 and 27 TEU). Take the UNGA as an example, the HR, together with the President, 
supported by the EU delegation to the UN, have taken over the EU‟s representation from the Presidency. In 
international platforms where not all EU member states participate, such as the UNSC, the HR shall be kept 
informed by those members that are represented. At the UNSC in particular, the HR can be invited to 
present the Union‟s common position (Article 34 TEU). 
Parliamentary oversight over the agents is somewhat extended. The President is required by the ToL to 
submit a report to the EP after each European Council meeting (Article 15.6 TEU), while the HR needs to 
keep the EP regularly informed and consulted on issues concerning the CFSP and the CSDP. In addition, the 
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EP has the right to refer questions or make recommendations to the HR. The EP also holds semiannual 
debates – rather than “an annual debate” stipulated in the preceding treaties – on progress in implementing 
CFSP and CSDP policies (Article 36 TEU). The budgetary power – shared with the Council – over the 
operational expenditure of the EEAS allows the EP to exert indirect influence (Bickerton 2011). The Union 
has gained additional strength in sanctions as well since the European Council can terminate the President 
and the HR‟s terms of office in case of an impediment or serious misconduct.  
The Union obtained legal personality through the ToL (Article 47 TEU). It means that the EU, which has 
replaced and succeeded the European Community, thereafter has got the ability to conclude and negotiate 
international agreements, join international conventions and become a member of international 
organizations. Such an improvement made it possible for the Union to pursue an advanced status at the UN. 
According to UNGA Resolution 65/276, the EU can be invited to participate in the General Debate, to make 
interventions, to exercise the right of reply concerning EU positions, and to present proposals or 
amendments as agreed by EU member states. This resolution permitted EU representatives to rank among 
the first speakers in UN discussions.51 But EU representatives can neither vote nor challenge UN resolutions. 
Nor can they raise a point of order or put forward candidates in the UNGA. A precondition for them to take 
the floor to present the Union‟s positions is a pre-defined agreement among EU members. Nevertheless, this 
resolution has promoted the EU‟s status at the UN and aligned the modalities of EU participation in the 
UNGA to the new arrangements of the ToL. 
However, EU representation in the post-Lisbon era is far from flawless. The ToL does not contain any 
provision relating to the nomination process for the President or the HR. Candidates for both posts in 
practice are nominated by national governments and then appointed by the European Council via qualified 
majority voting (QMV). The EP has no formal control whatsoever over agent selection. It risks making the 
process into an intergovernmental horse-trading and thus depriving the collective principals of a full range 
of candidates from which to choose. For example, the appointments of Van Rompuy and Ashton were 
considered to be a trade-off among the powerful member states. Member states‟ firm attachment to national 
                                                 




sovereignty in foreign policy and their reluctance to give great powers to Brussels resulted in appointing two 
moderate and pragmatic agents who were unlikely to upstage the leaders of larger member states. The need 
to reach power balance brought about a centre-right male President from a small member state and a 
centre-left female HR from a big member state. It seemed that these concerns were put before candidates‟ 
actual qualifications for the jobs. The fact that Van Rompuy was backed by Merkel and Sarkozy while 
Ashton was championed by Brown suggests that big members within the EU are more influential on agent 
selection. The lack of treaty base and transparency for the method of appointment has led to accusations of 
“Soviet-style secrecy” from Central and Eastern member states. But the last-minute appeal from Poland to 
hold “job interviews” for the candidates in front of EU leaders was in the event quickly brushed aside 
(Barber 2010:65).  
Neither Van Rompuy nor Ashton could be counted as political heavyweights (Regelsberger 2011: 32). 
Nor could they be regarded as foreign policy specialists. This might be problematic since the first 
incumbents are especially influential in shaping the positions. It was speculated that they would become 
followers rather than leaders in EU foreign policy, that they would act as internal negotiators instead of 
representatives of the EU towards the outside world, and that they would be too much of moderators rather 
than enterprising initiators (Dinan 2012; Marangoni 2012). Assessments of their performance to date draw 
mixed responses. Admirers insist that they have basically filled the job-descriptions in difficult times while 
critics accuse them of lacking judgement and leadership.52  
In respect of contract design, the ToL puts the President in charge of presiding over the European 
Council, but the former close link with the Council of Ministers does not go automatically with the job. The 
rotating presidency continues to chair various Council formations, where the President has no ability to 
direct or control their agenda-setting and legislative processes. Within the European Council, the President 
does not enjoy the right to vote as other leaders of national governments do. On one hand, it prevents the 
President from manipulating decision-making based on individual preferences. On the other, it limits the 
President‟s role as the consensus builder. Moreover, the creation of the President could add an extra layer of 
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multiplicity to EU representation, as it increases the number of agents and places the President in 
competitions with the HR and the Commission President. The ToL prescribes that the President shall 
conduct representation without prejudice to the powers of the HR (Article 27 TEU), whereas the 
Commission shall ensure the Union‟s external representation, with the exception of the CFSP, and other 
cases provided for in the Treaties (Article 17 TEU). These provisions imply that the designers of the ToL – 
in despite of foreseeing the potential of conflicts cross EU institutions – did not clarify in the treaty the 
distribution of representation responsibilities or the possible resolutions to these problems. A reading 
between the lines seems to suggest that the President and the HR represent the Union on matters regarding 
the CFSP, respectively at the level of heads of state and government and the level of ministers, while the 
Commission represents the EU on non-CFSP issues. Although so far the picture of EU representation in IOs 
emerged from practice has been mixed (as illustrated in Chapter 3), this “formula” generally applies to the 
UNGA. Take the 67th UNGA as an example, the EU was represented by President Van Rompuy in General 
Debate, by Commission President Barroso at the High-level Meeting on the Rule of Law, and by HR Ashton 
in the meetings of Foreign Affairs Ministers. Three Commissioners also travelled to New York and 
represented the EU at various bilateral and multilateral meetings in their respective fields (EU@UN 2012).53  
The Presidency remains relevant in the Union‟s external affairs after Lisbon, though it is no longer seen 
as an EU agent in external representation. It is required that the President submits draft agenda to the GAC 
and prepares regular meetings of the European Council “in close cooperation” with the rotating Presidency, 
which still chairs most of Council formations and preparatory bodies (including working parties and 
committees).54 Especially as it is in charge of the GAC and COREPER II, which respectively prepares the 
meetings of the European Council and the FAC, the Presidency is able to exert influence on the strategic 
planning and agenda-setting of the CFSP. One can assume that the bigger the member state holding the 
Presidency, the greater influence it possesses and thus the greater the potential for friction (Rüger 2011: 
227). Moreover, the ToL affirmed the trio Presidency system, where three Presidencies work together under 
an 18-month common programme (Batory and Puetter 2012). All these arrangements lead to a higher risk of 
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conflicts between the trio Presidencies and the President or risk of competitions between the trio and the HR. 
It appeared that EU member states, at least some of them, were not prepared for a swift end to the extensive 
power of the rotating Presidency in external affairs: e.g., the Spanish Presidency insisted on hosting the 
EU-US summit in 2010 (Allen and Smith 2011: 211),55 while the Hungarian Presidency rejected the EEAS 
pledge to chair Council meetings, not until the service became more firmly established (Vanhoonacker and 
Pomorska 2013: 1325).Therefore, horizontal coherence of EU representation to a certain degree depends on 
the interplay between these EU actors, including the HR, the President, the Commission and the rotating 
Presidency, on whether they can coordinate with each other to minimize inter-institutional tensions. The 
resistance from the member states with respect to the transference of competence to supranational agents of 
the EU is also an indicator of their divergent preferences in the matter of external representation, which is a 
main source of vertical incoherence.  
As introduced earlier in this section, the ToL gives the HR a broad and cross-institutional mandate 
regarding the EU‟s external representation. It represents an attempt to combine different aspects of external 
relations and to bridge the institutional divide between the Council and the Commission. Yet, this 
“all-encompassing” mandate does not cover trade, development cooperation and humanitarian aid, despite 
their obvious connections to the CFSP. As a matter of fact, the HR does not even chair the FAC when these 
issues are under discussion, which poses the question of the extent to which she can influence the policy 
making in that configuration (Marangoni 2012). Perhaps this problem sounds less serious when it is 
compared to the relentless workload of the HR. The demanding mandate almost makes this job an 
“impossible mission” (Rüger 2011: 220). It is hard to imagine that one individual “wearing so many hats” 
can get all the work done while simultaneously maintaining high quality standards. No wonder the timing of 
Ashton‟s proposals and the quality of her discussion papers have often been criticised (Kaczyński 2011). 
Although the HR was designed to be a full-time agent, in reality she can only be a part-time leader at best in 
any of the EU institutions. Ashton was repeatedly criticised for her lack of visibility at hotspots, e.g., Haiti 
after the earthquake, and for not attending important gatherings, e.g., the first Defence Ministers meeting 
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since her assumption of the Office (Howorth 2011). Being constantly questioned and criticised weakens the 
HR‟s role as one of the leading representatives for the EU. To do her justice, it is simply impossible for her 
to attend different occasions at the same time. The ToL does not provide deputies for the HR. The current 
arrangements for other actors, e.g., Commissioners, ministers from the rotating Presidency, senior EEAS 
officials or European Union Special Representatives (EUSRs), to deputise for the HR are still ad-hoc. In the 
2013 EEAS review, Ashton calls for the formalization of these arrangements, or alternatively, the creation 
of formal deputy HR position(s), to provide the HR with stronger support (see Ashton 2013). 
The EEAS was established with the purpose of assisting the HR in fulfilling her multiple mandates. But 
by scholars‟ accounts on the performance of the EEAS in the early days (e.g., Blockmans and Laatsit 2012; 
Vanhoonacker and Pomoska 2013), it suffered from the diversity in its members‟ backgrounds, the absence 
of standard operating procedures, and the lack of an esprit de corps. This intra-institutional incoherence 
within the EEAS can be partially explained by how the Service was set up. As noted in the previous section, 
the EEAS contains officials from the Commission, the Council Secretariat and national diplomatic services, 
which before the transition were subject to different institutional rules, regulations, working cultures, 
management styles and fields of expertise. Blending these differences between branches of the EEAS and 
clarifying the allocation of responsibilities has not been easy. In fact, the process started with difficulties 
simply due to the physical dispersion of EEAS officials in different locations of Brussels (Marangoni 2012). 
As an integral part of the EEAS, EU delegations have encountered a similar problem since delegation 
employees are divided between the EEAS and the Commission. Different backgrounds and working 
approaches may cause miscommunications, even disharmony between the two categories of staff. This split 
of EU delegations staff between two institutions also raises concerns about loyalty. Legally speaking, the 
Head of Delegation, who is appointed by and accountable to the HR, has authority over all staff in the 
delegation, irrespective of their status and origins.56 It is unclear where the loyalties of the Commission staff 
lie, with the Head of Delegation and the HR, the Commission or their country of origin, especially when the 
                                                 





Commission, like the HR and the EEAS, can issue instructions to the delegation as well.57 The uncertainty is 
further amplified if these instructions from different institutions are inconsistent or even conflicting. In 
January 2012, the EEAS and the Commission agreed detailed working arrangements covering cooperation 
on instructions and management of work in EU delegations. The arrangements were considered well 
functioning in the 2013 EEAS Review, but the HR noted that the Development Cooperation coordination 
would still need to be strengthened in order to raise the profile of the EEAS (Ashton 2013).  
The “loyalty” issue within EU delegations reflects a deeper leadership rivalry between the HR and the 
Commission President. An early example of the competition between these two EU representatives is that in 
March 2010 President Barroso unilaterally appointed the Head of the EU Delegation in Washington without 
consulting Ashton in advance. It triggered a controversy as Commission delegations had become EU 
delegations following the ToL‟s entry into force, meaning the right to appoint Heads of Delegations had 
fallen on the HR. But the Commission argued that the appointment was still within its competence since the 
EEAS were not yet in place (Allen and Smith 2011: 210).  
Challenges to horizontal coherence exist not only within the EEAS but also between the EEAS and other 
EU institutions that have external or international dimensions, notably the Commission and the Council. 
According to the Council Decision establishing the EEAS, the Service shall support the HR, as 
Vice-President of the Commission, in her responsibilities in the EU‟s external relations and in coordinating 
different aspects of the Union‟s external action, without prejudice to the normal tasks of the Commission 
services.58 However, there is no clear delineation of the contents of the “normal tasks”. Many Commission 
Directorates-Generals (DGs), especially External Relations DGs, have been working on external action for 
many years.59 It is difficult for them to accept being coordinated by a new structure established outside the 
Commission. Some Commissioners fear that the EEAS represents a dangerous development of national 
governments interfering in Community competences (Helwig et al. 2013: 31). For these reasons, the 
EEAS‟s attempt to coordinate some of the Commission DGs was generally unwelcome. Even before the 
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establishment of the Service, the Commission had transferred several units from the Directorate-General for 
External Relations (DG RELEX) to newly created DGs to prevent them being merged into the EEAS. 
Another manifestation of this concern is the transference of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) from 
the External Relations portfolio to Trade and then to Enlargement (Blockamans and Laatsit 2012: 144). 
Apart from the turf wars between the two institutions, EEAS officials often complain about the hesitations 
of Commission officials in information sharing (Helwig et al. 2013).  
Meanwhile, the EEAS is required to support the HR in her capacity as President of the FAC, without 
prejudice to the normal tasks of the General Secretariat of the Council.60 Although the “normal tasks” were 
left undefined, they should include the administrative tasks of preparing and holding Council meetings 
(Blockmans and Laatsit 2012: 145). After the ToL went into effect, all the preparatory bodies with a fixed 
chair are either chaired by an EEAS official, acting as a representative of the HR, or by the General 
Secretariat of the Council.61 In all working parties preparing the PSC and FAC, the chairperson is flanked by 
a representative of the EEAS and a representative of the General-Secretariat of the Council (Helwig et al. 
2013: 16). There has been evidence indicating that the General Secretariat of the Council would have 
preferred to retain its supportive role to the HR (Marangoni 2012: 14). Allowing the EEAS, instead of the 
rotating Presidency, to take over chairing the PSC and the thematic (or geographical) working groups 
connecting to the CFSP adds to more continuity in agenda planning in the EU‟s external action. But as 
explained earlier in this section, the Presidency – by keeping its power over other preparatory bodies, 
especially COREPER II, which prepares decisions to be taken by the FAC – has found its way into 
intervening in the “business” of the EEAS.  
The inter-institutional divide is further embodied in the service the EEAS provides its different “masters” 
with (Blockamans and Laatsit 2012). According to the Council Decision,62 the EEAS is required to support 
the HR in her various capacities. The EEAS also assists the President of the European Council, the 
Commission President and Commissioners in the exercise of their respective functions in the rear of 
external relations. Furthermore, the EEAS is obliged to support, and work in cooperation with, EU member 
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states‟ diplomatic services, the Council General Secretariat, as well as Commission services, in order to 
ensure horizontal coherence of the Union‟s external action. Finally, it is required that the EEAS extends 
appropriate support and cooperation to the EP and other relevant institutions of the Union. It remains to be 
seen the extent to which the EEAS can fulfill its obligations of serving multiple political masters. 
The ToL has hardly made any advancement in the “design” of decision rules on CFSP matters since 
unanimity continues to prevail (Article 31.1 TEU). Among the rare exceptions where the Council decides by 
QMV, the one relating to the HR stipulates that the Council can do so when adopting a decision defining a 
Union action or position, based on a proposal presented by the HR “following a specific request of the 
European Council” (Article 31.2 TEU). Apparently, whether to make that request depends on the European 
Council, where national leaders of the member states continue to hold decisive power. Another innovation 
of the ToL is its introduction of passerelle clauses into CFSP decision-making, which allows the European 
Council, acting by unanimity, to replace unanimous voting in the Council with QMV, or transform a special 
legislative procedure to the ordinary legislative procedure after receiving the EP‟s consent (Article 31.3 and 
48.7 TEU).63 Whether to take that initiative, likewise, is up to the European Council. For the adoption of 
such decisions, the European Council needs to seek the agreements of the national parliaments beforehand, 
implying that domestic politics of the member states may come into play.  
The agents‟ abilities to facilitate effective policy-making are rather confined. Despite limited progress 
made in agent control, the EP remains in nature a consultative and advisory assembly when it comes to the 
CFSP. The Council can ignore the EP‟s suggestions or even reach an agreement before the EP gives its 
opinion. The ECJ, the body that is tasked with interpreting EU law and ensuring its equal application across 
all EU member states, has not yet obtained jurisdiction with respect to CFSP issues (Article 24.1 TEU).64 It 
means neither the Council nor the HR, which are entrusted with the responsibility to ensure “CFSP-specific 
principle of loyalty” prescribed in Article 24.3 TEU can appeal to the ECJ to impose sanctions for cases of 
non-compliance with CFSP obligations (Van Elsuwege and Merket 2012). However “beautiful” the spirit of 
                                                 
63 These provisions do not apply to decisions having military or defence implications (Article 31.4 TEU).  
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borderline between CFSP and non-CFSP competences of the Union and to review the legality of decisions adopted by the Council 




“loyalty and mutual solidarity” may sound, the CFSP has not become a policy area that is readily amenable 
to enforcement.  
This weakness of EU representation in ex post control mechanisms questions the HR‟s capabilities of 
promoting vertical coherence within and outside the Council, that is, to harmonize the different preferences 
of EU member states and forge common EU positions. The HR, and by analogy other EU agents, in spite of 
enjoying some level of autonomy, are largely confined within the discretion scope that was agreed by their 
collective principals, i.e., EU member states. After all, EU representatives are able to deliver and defend a 
common approach on the premise that the member states acknowledge the existence of such an approach. At 
the end of the day, the realization of vertical coherence in EU representation depends on the extent to which 
EU member states are willing to overcome the preference heterogeneity, and the degree to which they are 
willing to accept the transfer of competences, allowing EU agents to fully perform the representation and 
coordination functions. Considering the remaining differences of foreign policy culture, experiences and 
expectations among EU member states (Cameron 2011), and the fact that EU representatives have to 
compete with national leaders for centre stage in the Union‟s external relations, one can only imagine that 
the “journey” to coherent EU representation will not be easy. 
This predicament also applies to the EEAS and EU delegations. So far, national views on the new EU 
agents are mixed. Although it is difficult to make generalizations about all EU member states, some patterns 
in the perceptions of foreign policy elites can be identified. A recent edited special issue by Balfour and Raik 
(2013) represents such an effort to provide a systematic research on this subject based on case studies of 
fourteen EU member states, taking account of a broad range of features: size, duration of membership and 
geographic distribution. To summarize some of their key findings: in general, foreign policy elites see the 
new EU agents as added value but not replacements to national Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFAs), 
whereas some member states show concerns with national visibility declines (e.g., Spain, the Netherlands 
and Greece) and suggest reservations about competence transfer for specific areas (e.g., France and Italy). 
Britain and the Czech Republic rank the most sceptical countries on the enhanced status of the EEAS with 




vigilant against the EEAS as a tool of domination by larger members. In comparison, the UK government is 
more pragmatic since it considers the EEAS beneficial wherever national strategic interests are met, 
whereas Czech officials see the EEAS at best ancillary and oppose further integration of the CFSP. Both 
countries view a leading role of EU delegations in IOs as problematic. The British government even sent 
around instructions to its national embassies warning of a “competence creep” of the EEAS (Ibid. 144). 
France advocates a bigger role for EU delegations in IOs, with the exception of the UNSC. Against the 
background of eurozone crisis and economic recession, the majority of EU member states are not interested 
in expanding the EEAS budget. Estonia is one of few countries willing to consider an increase in the budget 
for the EEAS. France on the other hand stresses the importance of burden-sharing and the supports the 
establishment of a European fund to ensure credible commitments. When it comes to the transfer of 
diplomatic tasks from national to EU level, EU member states are mainly split into three groups: Estonia, 
Finland, the Netherlands and Greece welcome a potential takeover of consular services by Union 
delegations; Germany, Sweden, Portugal and Slovenia are either open-minded or ambiguous about the 
competence transfer; Italy, Spain, Poland, Britain and the Czech Republic are strong opponents of EEAS 
involvement in consular affairs. But the Czech Republic would like to see the EEAS to play an important 
part in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. France does not quite fit in any the groups because it supports the 
coordination role of the EEAS in providing consular protection and evacuation in cases of emergency, but 
has not yet prepared to go as far as surrender its right of visa issuance.65 It appears that smaller members 
within the EU tend to be less antagonistic to supranational agents of the EU. Within the “Big three” (i.e., 
France, Germany and the UK), Germany is most friendly to joint representation in IOs insofar as it does not 
cut down German diplomatic networks. It may have something to do with its long-standing pro-integration 
tradition (Díez Medrano 2003; Harmsen and Spiering 2005). On the contrary, both Britain (Díez Medrano 
2003) and the Czech Republic (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2004), which are most conservative about the 
empowerment of the EEAS and EU delegations, are conventionally considered Eurosceptical countries.66  
                                                 
65 For more detailed descriptions, see Balfour and Raik 2013. 
66 Notice that this divide between pro-integration and Euroscepticism risks oversimplifying EU member states‟ attitudes towards 
European integration, given that recent years have witnessed a rise of Euroscepticism in the regions that were traditionally regarded 




Long story short, EU member states generally accept that there is a complementary role for the new EU 
actors to play regarding the Union‟s external representation in third countries and multilateral organizations. 
But when it comes to “paying the bills” and task transfer, they are reluctant to let go of national competences 
and to make genuine commitments. This prevailing mistrust of EU member states have for the EEAS leads 
to limited information-sharing between EU delegations and national embassies (Helwig et al. 2013). It also 
results in ambiguity in the status of EU delegations overseas, which has been illustrated in Chapter 3, where 
many EU delegations to IOs are currently operating under transitional arrangements. It implies that the 
success of the EEAS and EU delegations in contributing to greater vertical coherence largely depends on 
whether they can coordinate the divergent priorities of EU member states and whether they can win EU 
member states‟ trust to take the lead on matters concerning common EU interests. Meanwhile, the EEAS is 
still developing and adapting, which is expected to have an incremental socialization effect on the EU‟s 
policy convergence at the vertical level over time, in the form of day-to-day interplay with national 
diplomatic services and of seconding and training national diplomats during the participation of EU 
decision-making structures. 
Lastly, the ToL extended the application of enhanced cooperation to military and defence policy by 
allowing the EU member states which fulfil higher criteria and have made more commitments on military 
capabilities to establish Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) (Article 42.6 TEU). Creating this type 
of enhanced cooperation has even fewer restrictions. There is no minimum threshold for the number of 
participants required. Its authorisation is determined by the Council via QMV instead of unanimity (Article 
46 TEU). Such a mechanism facilitates the optimization of resource distribution within the Union and 
enables those willing and able member states to organise deeper cooperation in CSDP missions with greater 
interoperability (Dyson and Konstadinides 2013: 72). Nevertheless, its negative effects are non-neglectable 
in the long run. PESCO may create an exclusive club which smaller members feel either reluctant or 
difficult to join, thus risks generating a multi-speed EU with greater asymmetrical power balance within the 
collective principals (Cremona 2009; Cantore 2011). It also means that it will be easier for the groups of 




this context in the sense that the role of the HR is restricted to giving opinions and launching these 
programmes does not require the consent from the EP, whose powers are confined to giving information and 
being regularly informed (Article 328.2 and 329.2 TFEU). However, in the four years since the entry into 
force of the ToL, PESCO has yet to be used. 
In a word, the ToL has succeeded in making progress in some aspects of EU representation but failed in 
others. Given that the ToL has solved some agency problems in EU representation but meanwhile created 
new institutional tensions risks for further fragmentation, interpreting the institutional developments alone 
may not answer the question whether the ToL has made a difference in EU representation coherence. 
Statistical analyses are thus necessary for assessing the variation of EU coherence, which is measured by the 
voting cohesion of EU member states in the UNGA.  
Drawing on the theoretical insights of the principal-agent theory and the new institutionalisms outlined 
in Chapter 3, a series of hypotheses are formulated and about to be tested in Chapter 5: 
 In parallel with the development of the CFSP regime, including the recent progress following the ToL‟s 
implementation, EU representation should have been gradually improved, that is to say, agency losses 
caused by agent slack and information asymmetry should have been lowered, agent autonomy and 
capabilities should have been strengthened and the overall delegation system should have become more 
stable and streamlined. The reformed representation structure in turn reshapes the policy preferences of both 
the agents (EU representatives) and the collective principals (EU member states). Moreover, the cumulative 
effects of these institutional developments and years of socialization process should have led to greater 
“Europeanization” in the field of foreign policy. At the vertical level, there should be an incremental 
convergence of policy preferences among EU member states based on shared values and norms, resulting in 
closer coordination among themselves and with EU institutions. National governments should have found it 
more acceptable to support common EU positions and to be represented by supranational agents. At the 
horizontal level, the establishment of new institutions, the EEAS in particular, is expected to facilitate – 
while potentially slowly – the cultivation of shared organizational culture and working methods. Intense 




which would ultimately promote the representation consistency and coherence of the Union. In terms of 
evidence, we expect to observe greater EU representation coherence, reflected by increased EU voting 
cohesion at the UNGA over time. 
 Hypothesis 1(H1): EU voting cohesion at the UNGA has been increasing over time.  
Following the same logic, an increase in EU voting cohesion is conceivable after the ToL took effect. 
However, the reverse argument can be equally true, given the counterproductive impact of the unsolved 
control problems and newly-created institutional complexities: e.g., the risk of political trades in the 
nomination process of the President and the HR may lead to the appointments of suboptimal agents, which 
are more likely to be sidelined; the cross-institutional collision among the President, the HR, the 
Commission President as well as the rotating Presidency, and the intra-institutional clash within the EEAS 
and EU delegations may cause inconsistency and decreased coherence in EU representation; the HR may 
become semi-functional due to the overloaded responsibilities and absence of formalised deputies; the 
sustained weakness in control mechanisms, i.e., the marginalized role of the EP and the ECJ may not be able 
to ensure vertical coherence between EU institutions and the member states. Therefore, a non-directional 
hypothesis is formulated. 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): EU voting cohesion would vary after the ToL entered into force. 
According to the principal-agent theory, preference heterogeneity, ceteris paribus, tends to be higher 
within a group with a larger membership. The UNGA has 193 members representing a wide range of 
ideologies, political systems, religious and cultural backgrounds, as well as different stages of 
socio-economic development. All EU member states are democracies with functioning market economies, 
and share relatively similar values and cultures. Compared to the entire UNGA membership, EU member 
states have more resemblances in policy perspectives and economic interests, and therefore should show a 
higher degree of coherence, in terms of a higher degree of voting cohesion. This pattern shall not be affected 
by the implementation of the ToL. 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): EU voting cohesion is higher and remains to be higher than that of the entire 




Analogously, EU representation coherence is assumed to decrease after each round of enlargement. 
Increased membership often links to higher transaction costs and preference heterogeneity with regard to 
decision-making. An EU that contains more collective principals with augmented economic and political 
diversities means that establishing coherent representation will be more difficult and time-consuming. The 
two recent enlargements saw the Union took in the former communist states of Central and Eastern Europe. 
These newcomers were remarkably poorer in wealth compared to the “old” members. They would have 
different priorities and interests in CFSP policies, which might trigger more splits within the Union over 
sensitive issues and intensify the existing tensions, e.g., between Europeanists and Atlanticists or 
Euroenthusiasts and Eurosceptics. Therefore, a decrease in EU voting cohesion should be observed at the 
UNGA right after the enlargement. However, the other side of the coin is that enlargement elevates the EU‟s 
strategic weight in IOs. The negative effects caused by enlargement could also be offset by socialization 
process and institutional adaption, such as the reformative arrangements brought by the ToL. As a result of 
constant participation in EU decision-making, the new entrants would become more familiar and 
experienced with the decision rules and working methods of the Union. Their policy preferences would be 
reconstructed through their daily interactions with EU institutions. A convergence of interests is likely to 
emerge. If EU member states can act in concert after enlargements, the Union should be more coherently 
represented at the UNGA.  
Hypothesis 4 (H4): After an enlargement, EU voting cohesion first decreases but then recovers to its 
previous level or even steps up a higher level. Overall, enlargements should be positively related to 
the degree of EU voting cohesion.  
Voting cohesion of EU member states can be expected to differ across policy areas. Generally, 
preference homogeneity or heterogeneity inside the collective principals on different issues is likely to 
influence their policy choices. After the ToL started to take effect, with additional facilitation by the new 
instruments, the autonomy of EU representatives may have increased and the coordination among EU 
member states should be promoted, even in areas where policy preferences have traditionally been 




 Hypothesis 5 (H5): EU voting cohesion varies across different issue areas. After the adoption of the 
ToL, cohesion in the conventionally conflicting issue areas is improved. 
Based on a similar logic that formulates H3, regional organizations with larger memberships, other things 
being equal, should exhibit lower degrees of coherence due to the higher risk of preference conflicts. 
However, there is a common notion that the EU is more integrated compared to other regional organizations 
(Rasch 2008; Drieskens 2010; Wunderlich 2012). So far the EU is the only regional organization that has 
been granted an advanced observer status at the UNGA. The existing extent of institutionalisation and the 
recent efforts made by the ToL aiming at more coherent representation are likely to imply that the EU 
should act more cohesively than other regional integration schemes. As a result, EU cohesion, in the 
framework of the UNGA, can be expected to be higher compared to that of other regional organizations for 
the periods both pre- and post-Lisbon, regardless of their different organizations sizes.  
Hypothesis 6 (H6): Compared to other regional organizations, the EU has higher voting cohesion at 
the UNGA for both the pre- and post-Lisbon era, regardless of its size of membership.  
These hypotheses, while only exploring part of potential effects of the ToL on EU voting cohesion at the 
UNGA, can reveal some interesting developments as to the extent of EU representation coherence in global 
politics over time, and notably after the adoption of the ToL. They also present the opportunities to examine 
the effects of some alternative variables, such as time (as a proxy for institutional developments and 
socialization), membership size, enlargement, issue areas and the degree of regional integration, on the 
coherence of the EU and of regional organizations in general. 
4.2 EU Representation at the UN Security Council  
4.2.1 UN Security Council Structure, Working Methods and Procedure 
The UNSC bears great importance at the UN. Its predominance mainly roots in its “primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security” and its exclusive power of 
authorizing the use of force. Starting from the 1990s, the UNSC has recovered from the paralysis during the 
Cold War and reactivated the willingness to shoulder its responsibilities (Hannay 2012). According to the 




working methods, construct and condition agent preferences and behaviour. EU representation on this stage 
is difficult to understand because it is co-determined by the rules of the Union and the sui generis nature of 
the UNSC (Hoffmeister and Kuijper 2006).  
Only sovereign states that are UN members can be selected to serve on the UNSC. Apart from five 
pre-defined permanent members (also known as the P5), ten non-permanent members are elected by the 
UNGA based on “equitable geographical distribution” and their contributions to the purposes of the UNSC, 
for a term of two years without the possibility of immediate re-election (Article 23 UN Charter). In practice, 
the ten rotating seats are distributed to five Regional Groups of the UN, i.e., the Group of African States 
(GAFS) with two seats; the Group of Asian States (GASS) with two seats; the Group of Latin American and 
Caribbean States (GRULAC) with two seats; the Group of Western European and Other States (WEOG) 
with two seats; and the Group of Eastern European States (EEG) with one seat. The last one seat, also known 
as the “Arab swing seat” is reserved for an Arab country, for which the GAFS and GASS take turns every 
two years to provide a suitable candidate.67 With great privilege comes great responsibility. All UNSC 
members are required to fulfil the obligations prescribed in the UN Charter in good faith (Article 2 UN 
Charter). These obligations shall prevail over the ones under any other international agreements (Article 103 
UN Charter).  
Decisions of the UNSC include resolutions and presidential statements. UNSC resolutions are legally 
binding and can be adopted either by a vote or by consensus.68 Each member has one vote. Decisions on 
procedural matters require an affirmative vote of nine members while decisions on other matters have to be 
made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the P5 (Article 27 UN 
Charter). Through this provision, the P5 are practically endowed with exclusive veto power upon all 
nonprocedural issues. Initially, the veto was designed to ensure the great powers‟ commitments so that the 
failure of the League of Nations would not be repeated. However, its existence caused nonfeasance of the 
UNSC during the Cold War. Nowadays, exercises of vetoes are very rare. Without actually blocking the 
resolutions, states with veto power often abstain or just threat to use veto to express their discontent (Voeten 
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2001). But the threat itself could prevent a serious matter from coming to a vote, which to a large degree 
allows the P5 to dominate the UNSC‟s agenda (Franda 2006; Ronzitti 2012). Another example of power 
imbalance within the UNSC is that standing and temporary members have different terms of service. Given 
that the UNSC often works by referring to precedents, the elected members are inherently at a disadvantage 
because they have suffered from a lack of both continuity and institutional memory (Bosco 2009). 
If the UNSC cannot reach consensus or a passing vote on a resolution, the decision can be taken in the 
form of a non-binding presidential statement (Hulton 2004). Both types of decisions are made in formal 
meetings of the UNSC, which can be attended by non-UNSC countries without the right to vote, if the 
council considers that their interests are specially affected or if they are parties to a dispute (Article 31 and 
32 UN Charter). The UNSC‟s Provisional Rules of Procedure refer to participation of non-members. States 
are invited to attend UNSC meetings on the basis of Rule 37:  
“Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council may be invited, as the 
result of a decision of the Security Council, to participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question 
brought before the Security Council when the Security Council considers that the interests of that Member 
are specially affected, or when a Member brings a matter to the attention of the Security Council in 
accordance with Article 35 (1) of the Charter.”69 
Individuals, e.g. experts or representatives of IOs, are invited under Rule 39: 
“The Security Council may invite members of the Secretariat or other persons, whom it considers 
competent for the purpose, to supply it with information or to give other assistance in examining matters 
within its competence.”70  
Nevertheless, the majority of deliberate negotiations actually take place on informal occasions, such as 
private consultations or working lunches, which are not officially recorded or open to non- members of the 
UNSC, unless they are invited (Hurd 2007; Malone 2012). 
                                                 
69 Provisional Rules of Procedure of the UNSC (electronic version): http://www.un.org/docs/sc/scrules.htm.  




4.2.2 EU Representation in the Context of the UN Security Council 
Not all EU member states are represented in the UNSC as they are in the UNGA. Theoretically speaking, 
the Union could obtain six seats in total – including the two permanent ones held by Britain and France – 
since EU member states are spread out across three Regional Groups: sixteen in the WEOG, ten in the EEG, 
and one (Cyprus) in the GASS. Albeit this ambition has never been realized, the Union has managed to 
secure at least four seats about half the time during the period of 1993-2012 (as shown in Table 3). At first 
sight, it appeared that the EU was well-represented, at times even over-represented. However, EU member 
states have to compete with each other for nominations in their respective geographical groups (Götz 2008). 
It is often more difficult for smaller countries to get elected since they have fewer financial and diplomatic 
resources, let alone serve on the UNSC twice. There are four EU members that have never been elected to 
the UNSC.71 
 
Table 3: EU Member States Elected to the UN Security Council (1993-2012) 
Year Number States Year Number States 
1993 1 Spain 2003 2 Germany, Spain 
1994 1 Spain 2004 2 Germany, Spain 
1995 2 Germany, Italy 2005 2 Denmark, Greece  
1996 2 Germany, Italy 2006 3 Denmark, Greece, Slovakia 
1997 2 Portugal, Sweden 2007 3 Belgium, Italy, Slovakia 
1998 2 Portugal, Sweden 2008 2 Belgium, Italy  
1999 1 Netherlands  2009 1 Austria  
2000 1 Netherlands 2010 1 Austria  
2001 1 Ireland  2011 2 Germany, Portugal 
2002 1 Ireland  2012 2 Germany, Portugal 
Table established based on data collected from: http://www.un.org/en/sc/members/search.shtml 
 
According to the UN Charter, the EU, as a regional organization, cannot procure UNSC membership. A 
formal collective presence of the EU is only possible after a profound reform of the UNSC on its 
membership. Since UNSC reform remains stagnant, to date, no official EU representation is envisaged in 
this body (Pirozzi 2012: 95). The Maastricht Treaty assigned the task of ensuring the defence of the EU‟s 
common positions and interests to the permanent EU member states sitting on the UNSC, i.e., Britain and 
France. The rotating Presidency was unable to represent the EU, unless it was simultaneously holding a 
                                                 




UNSC seat or it was invited to attend UNSC meetings under Rule 37. On even rarer occasions, the voice of 
the EU could be heard from the representatives of the Commission or other EU institutions on specific 
topics according to Rule 39. For example, the HR/SG, Javier Solana had made speeches or interventions at 
the UNSC six times in total.72 Suffice it to say that EU representation during the pre-Lisbon period was 
generally defective in almost every aspect of horizontal coherence: there was no formal collective EU 
presence at this body; the role of traditional EU representatives, namely the Presidency and the HR/SG were 
marginalized, where as the two agents sitting on the UNSC, as permanent member states with veto power, 
enjoyed a high degree of independence to engage in “shirking” and “slippage” because they saw their 
national interests and their responsibilities to the UNSC taking precedence, and because they had no 
concerns about termination of agency. The prerogative of France and the UK as the sole agents of the Union 
at the UNSC had stayed intact in the subsequent treaty amendments until the ToL went into force. 
The ToL required the HR to be fully informed by the EU member sitting on the UNSC and granted an 
opportunity for the HR to present the Union‟s joint position (Article 34.2 TEU). Since early 2010, the 
UNSC has started to invite the HR or the Head of the EU Delegation in New York to participate in its open 
debates. As of February 2013, Ashton has addressed the UNSC three times since her assumption of office.73 
But the “multi-hatted” job of the HR makes her frequent appearance at the UNSC impossible. More often, it 
is the Head of the EU Delegation to the UN that delivers coordinated statements on behalf of the Union and 
its member states. The appearance of the HR or the Head of EU Delegation may be fruitfully exploited to 
raise the profile of the EU in general on UNSC matters (Pirozzi op.cit. 97) and to create a de facto EU 
presence at this supreme UN organ. The ToL also extended the obligation to defend the position and 
interests of the EU to all EU member states serving on the UNSC. They are also obliged to concert and keep 
the other member states informed. By introducing more agents into play, the EU may gain more power in 
                                                 
72 Solana made two interventions at the UNSC in January and March 2002 on the situations of Africa and of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina respectively. In July 2003, he made an intervention at the UNSC on the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Again 
in September 2004, Solana intervened at the UNSC debate on “Civilian Crisis Management”. In January 2007, he made a 
presentation at the UNSC on DRC/EUFOR. Finally in September 2008 Solana addressed the UNSC about the EU‟s mid-term 
review of its EUFOR operation in Eastern Chad and North Eastern Central African Republic.  
73 Ashton addressed the UNSC for the first time on 4 May 2010 about EU–UN cooperation on peace and security. On 8 February 
2011, she made a speech at the UNSC on the issue of cooperation between the UN and regional and subregional organizations. 




agent control since the non-permanent EU members can exert a certain degree of restriction over France and 
Britain, although the monitoring effect will be limited and the risk of agency losses resulted by multiple 
agents is unavoidable. Another innovation of the ToL that contributes to the enhancement of the EU‟s 
representation at the UNSC is the transformed EU delegation to the UN, which combines the former 
Commission delegation in New York and the Council Secretariat‟s Liaison Office under the authority of the 
Head of the Delegation of the Union. It is now charged with the responsibility to chair the coordination 
meetings among EU member states. The added value of the Union delegation not only lies in providing a 
higher degree of continuity and institutional memory in the EU‟s diplomacy but also facilitating the vertical 
coherence of EU representation, which will be further explored in the next section. In this sense, EU 
representation coherence at the horizontal level is somewhat improved. However limited the progress is, it 
represents a step that the EU and its member states were willing to take to improve the coherence of EU 
representation on CFSP matters at this state-centric forum. 
However, the ToL has not fundamentally altered the status of the Union in the UNSC. It is partially 
determined by the institutional structure of this UN body itself, where the UK and France keep holding 
dominant power in EU representation as long as they are the only two EU member states holding permanent 
seats at the UNSC. It is only natural for them to prioritise national interests and act independently whenever 
necessary, especially if EU members fail to agree a common position. Compared to the P2, non-permanent 
EU countries are considered secondary agents, not only because they have no veto privilege, but also 
because they are less familiar with UNSC decision-making. As a result, they may not have adequate power 
to constrain the agent slack of France and Britain, or worse, they may commit agent slack themselves. The 
past twenty years have witnessed behavioural inconsistencies of these EU countries: even those belonging 
to the “Europeanist Camp” tended to adjust their policies to develop distinctive national positions once they 
became UNSC members. Speaking from this perspective, the ToL may have added more confusion in EU 
representation by assigning the task to more agents. The “free-rider” problem that is embedded in multiple 
agents is also likely to emerge. Due to lack of interests or resources, some EU members sitting on the UNSC 




agent capacities since the composition of the group of elected members in the UNSC changes constantly. 
The inequality of representative capabilities and the impermanence in structural rules at the UNSC create 
more incentives for the agents, especially the privileged ones, to engage in slippage. Information asymmetry 
has not been meaningfully ameliorated, if not worsened, given that the number of agents has increased. 
Although the ToL requires those EU countries on the UNSC to keep other members and the HR fully 
informed, it is up to the providers to determine the contents and qualities of information sharing. It remains 
to be seen whether the EU delegation can minimize information withholding and fill in the information gap 
among EU members on UNSC matters. 
A peculiar problem of “dual loyalty” exists within the framework of the UNSC since EU members 
serving on this body have to bear extra responsibilities regarding the maintenance of international peace and 
security. Moreover, their actions are heavily influenced by other non-EU countries in the “club”. For 
instance, Britain for long has linked its foreign policy closely with the position of the US, sometimes even 
closer than other EU member states. The ToL confirmed their “double agent” identities by saying that these 
countries should defend the Union‟s interests “without prejudice” to their accountabilities under the UN 
Charter (Article 34.2 TEU). Under the insistence of the P2, Declarations 13 and 14 that were attached to the 
ToL further emphasized that the ToL‟s implementation would not affect the competencies of EU members 
in foreign policy or their participation in the UNSC. These two declarations demonstrated the obstinate 
attachment to national prerogatives and deep mutual mistrust among EU member states (Verola 2010).  
Control mechanisms in the EU‟s representation remain to be weak within the UNSC. The Union has 
little say about agent selection. It can neither decide which member states to sit on the UNSC nor terminate 
their terms of service in case of “malpractice”. The autonomy of the HR is narrow since its presence in this 
body to a great extent depends on the willingness of those EU members sitting on the UNSC. It also depends 
on whether a common position has been formulated. Controlling four to five agents is apparently more 
difficult and costly than controlling two. As long as EU decision-making rules over the CFSP and the ECJ‟s 
marginalization in this field stay unchanged, the Union lacks the means to enforce member state‟s 




Still it is argued that the ToL has exhibited its potential to improve the EU‟s horizontal coherence, if the 
presence of the HR or the Head of EU Delegation can be made from an ad hoc basis to a routine. Eventually 
it is possible for the Union to establish a de facto EU collective representation in the UNSC by upgrading the 
visibility of the new EU foreign policy actors, notably the HR. It is crucial that the EU delegation can 
provide strong assistance to the HR and other EU representatives to ensure active diplomatic actions in New 
York. It also requires a convergence of national policies performed by EU member states and their readiness 
to allow the HR or the EU delegation to play a bigger role so that the coordinated approach can be promoted 
consistently and coherently by EU representatives. The second requirement leads to the importance of 
ensuring inter-state coherence and the coherence between the member states and EU foreign policy actors. 
This search of vertical coherence needs to be addressed by looking at the concertation of the member states 
sitting within the UNSC at New York and the overall coordination within the EU in Brussels, including the 
coordination among EU member states and the interplay between EU member states and EU institutions. 
4.2.3 EU Coordination on UN Matters: From Brussels to New York 
EU coordination on UN matters has a long history. Informal intergovernmental consultations had been 
taking place since 1970s within the framework of the EPC. The Council established the United Nations 
Working Party (CONUN) to study UN business and the relationship between the two organizations and 
identify the Community‟s objectives at the UNGA (Luif 2003). Back then there seemed to be a consensus 
that member states of the Community should synchronize their positions prior to UNGA sessions. 
Cooperation at that stage was mostly informal, consultative and informative. There was no agreement for 
uniform voting in any sort or any codified obligations of information sharing. Most of the time the 
Community was able to avoid casting opposing votes against each other at the UNGA. Abstentions were 
often used as a moderate way to express disagreements. But such acquiescence could not be observed at the 
UNSC. The Maastricht Treaty for the first time made clear references on the UNSC, demanding those 
serving members to concert and to keep the other EU members fully informed. The Amsterdam Treaty did 
not amend the substance of the provisions regarding the CFSP but compiled them into one place as Article 




the pivotal guidance for current EU coordination at the UNSC. A radical amendment is that Article 34 
highlights the role of the HR and the EEAS in organizing EU coordination in international conferences and 
organizations, presumably including the UN and its main bodies.  
Through many years of practice, the EU has built a relatively systematic ex ante coordination mechanism 
concerning UN matters. Internal coordination for the upcoming UNGA session in September begins with 
the preparation of the EU‟s priorities paper. A wide range of issues on the UN‟s agenda is debated in a 
number of Council working groups in Brussels, most frequently in the CONUN, which is now chaired by an 
EEAS official appointed by the HR to add greater continuity to its function. The CONUN consists of highly 
specialized officials from all EU member states, who meet on a monthly basis to discuss recent 
developments at the UN and provide strategic guidelines for the EU‟s participation in the work of the UN 
(Degrand-Guillaud 2009). It is responsible for drafting the priorities and overall positions of the EU ahead 
of UNGA meetings. The draft document is sent to the PSC for examination, and then to the FAC to be 
approved. For example, the FAC approved the EU‟s priorities for the 67th UNGA Session on 23 July 2012 
according to this procedure.74 However, the resolutions adopted in Brussels usually reflect the lowest 
common denominator, of which the contents are too general to be operational at the UNSC (Helwig et al. 
2013). More elaborated targeted meetings are held in EU capitals comprising officials of EU members‟ 
delegations to the UN (Pirozzi 2012). Still a position pre-agreed in Brussels may have to be reviewed by 
UN-based delegates in order to adapt to the up-to-the-minute situation on the ground. 
Over 1,000 EU coordination meetings on average are taking place every year in New York. Starting from 
26 September 2012, these meetings can be held at the new premises of the EU Delegation to the UN. The 
Delegation has become the information communicator for EU member states and the contact centre 
connecting the two organizations. It coordinates regular internal briefings and interactions with 
international media. Under the HR‟s authority, it has assumed the job of the former Presidency in organizing 
EU coordination at the UN.  
                                                 




Based in New York, formal EU coordination on UN issues, including those on the UNSC agenda, are 
held at three levels. The highest-level meetings are the weekly gatherings of the Heads of Missions (HoMs) 
of EU member states to the UN, normally on Tuesday mornings. Outside Tuesdays, ad hoc HoMs meetings 
are held to deal with special issues. These meetings used to be chaired by the Presidency and continued to be 
chaired by the Presidency after the ToL‟s entry into force until June 2010, when the EEAS was ready to take 
over. Currently the meetings of the HoMs are chaired by the Head of EU Delegation to the UN. In the 
discussions a great deal of time is spent on UNSC matters. There is no particular order of contributions but 
often the EU member holding the monthly UNSC Presidency starts the session. Later other members can 
add inputs, make comments, raise questions and exchange their views on a certain subject (Rasch 2008). 
Without any clearly defined obligations, the HoMs meetings are mainly retrospective and informative in 
nature. Non-UNSC EU members are more receptive rather than informative of opinions. But the latest 
developments suggest that the HoMs meetings are taking the most important decisions (Kaczyński 2011). 
More expert-level meetings are the so called Article 34 briefing meetings based on the ToL, which 
prescribes an obligation of concertation and information sharing between EU member states serving on the 
UNSC. The mechanism was first created by the Amsterdam Treaty, but had been long ignored. Only until 
early the 2000s, these meetings were made a routine under the joint efforts of the Swedish and Spanish 
Presidency. The Permanent Representative of Spain to the UN once suggested extending the obligation of 
concertation to cover the entire EU membership (Rasch 2008). But the ToL stops at the point of expanding 
the obligation of defending the Union to include non-permanent member states. On one hand, it elevates the 
status of these countries in interfering UNSC decisions and to a certain degree balances the mandates 
between permanent and non-permanent EU states. What needs to be clarified is that this arrangement does 
not transform them into first-class agents as France and the UK since they do not possess the right of veto. 
On the other hand, in view of the risk of agent shirking, it may actually create an even larger group of EU 
countries that are willing to deviate from predefined positions back in Brussels or EU capitals. Article 34 
meetings take place on Thursday afternoons and begin with a report from the “briefer of the month”, usually 




holding the Presidency of the UNSC, then the briefer shall be a representative from EU member states 
sitting in the UNSC and the position rotates every month. Like in the HoMs meetings, non-permanent EU 
members merely absorb what their superior colleagues decide to share and do not often make comments or 
add more inputs to the report. Hardly do they have any effective means to influence the decision-making 
within the UNSC.  
A comparison of the HoMs meetings and Article 34 briefings finds that both meetings consider UNSC 
matters a top priority in their weekly agendum. Both types of meetings are intergovernmental in nature, 
informative and retrospective focusing on factual matters rather than creative and proactive, although the 
HoMs meetings are considered relatively more fruitful since participants are permitted to provide the 
information that is not allowed in Article 34 briefings. On the other side, information shared in Article 34 
meetings is first-handed and timelier (Rasch 2008). Moreover, since one meeting follows the other, there 
comes a problem of duplication. But the central problem lies in these mechanisms is that concertation 
among those EU members serving on the UNSC is only possible when their national interests coincide. 
Coordination at a mid-level is the Deputy Permanent Representative (DPR) meetings attended by deputy 
chiefs of EU member state Missions to the UN. These meetings handle issues that are raised at the HoMs 
sessions but require further exploration, or issues that are too time-consuming to be discussed at the highest 
level, e.g. issues regarding UNSC reform, and issues that do not fall into a specific thematic field and are 
inappropriate to be processed by Article 34 meetings (Pirozzi 2012:96).75 Compared to the two types of 
meetings introduced above, DPR meetings take place less frequently.  
Additional coordination instruments of the EU in New York include working lunches held by EU 
member states toward third parties, consultations at the chamber next to the UNSC chamber and monthly 
gatherings of the HoMs and their respective UNSC Coordinators (Ronzitti 2012). These informal meetings 
are untraceable in record and are closed to non-members. Ironically, it is in these meetings that the actual 
preparatory work is done so that a certain resolution or action has been agreed upon before it is put before a 
formal session of the UNSC.  
                                                 




The ToL does not change the fact that EU members of the UNSC, especially the two with permanent 
seats, enjoy a high degree of independence to forward national policies and pursue domestic interests. They 
prefer to take orders from their national capitals rather than the FAC or the PSC and mainly rely on their 
national delegations to the UN to deal with UN matters rather than on EU-level concertation instruments. 
France and the UK appear to be more senior and specialized agents compared to their elected peers for not 
only do they own veto power, but also more resources, both economically and politically, and more 
institutional experiences with UNSC policy-making. Their deviation behaviour has a negative impact upon 
the elected EU members in the UNSC and will undermine the atmosphere of concertation within the group 
(Drieskens 2008). The capacity of the PSC to supervise and steer the actions of EU member states at the UN 
is tempered by the physical distance and by the fact that the ambassadors appointed by EU member states 
for the PSC are often inferior to their colleagues sent to New York. This agency problem cannot be 
ameliorated at least institutionally as long as CFSP decision-making continues to require unanimity and as 
long as the UNSC structure remains the same without a reform.  
However, the ToL managed, from certain perspectives, to improve the vertical coherence EU 
representation at both the UNGA and the UNSC. Regarding the coordination among EU member states back 
in Brussels, the ToL replaced the rotating Presidency with EEAS officials in chairing the Council working 
groups or committees that concern the EU‟s representation and participation in the work of the UN, such as 
the PSC and CONUN (Marchesi 2008). It made a similar arrangement for the coordination among EU 
member states in New York by appointing the Head of EU Delegation as the chair the meetings of the HoMs. 
In this way, the ToL stressed the role of the EEAS and the EU delegation as an organiser and 
consensus-builder in the EU‟s external representation at the UN. When it comes to the concertation among 
the EU member states sitting on the UNSC, the ToL narrowed the competence gap between permanent and 
non-permanent member states in defending the EU‟s interests, and in a way strengthened the control 
mechanism by monitoring the P2 through non-permanent EU members in the UNSC. Moreover, in light of 




day-to-day participation in EU agenda-setting and decision-making as these institutions become more and 
more mature.  
Combining the analyses in the previous section on the ToL‟s implications on the horizontal coherence of 
EU representation at the UNSC, it is expected that the ToL has somewhat increased EU representation at 
both horizontal and vertical levels, regardless of the remaining delegation problems. A closer look at these 
shortcomings suggest that they are either explained by the institutional restrictions of the UNSC, e.g., the 
lack of formal EU representation, the predominant role of France and Britain as EU agents, the absence of 
control over agent selection, or the unsolved puzzles left by the ToL, e.g., the risk of agent slack due to the 
unanimity rule in the CFSP and the absence of enforceable instruments. Considering that the reform of the 
UNSC is currently locked in stalemate and that another treaty reform of the EU is unlikely in the foreseeable 
future, the agency problems caused by these two factors would apply consistently in the periods both before 
and after Lisbon that are investigated in this dissertation. Therefore, it is hypothesized that even the limited 
reform introduced by the ToL on EU delegation structure should contribute to an increase in the coherence 
of EU representation at the UNSC in the post-Lisbon era. This hypothesis will be tested by comparing the 
degrees of EU representation coherence in two cases, namely the Iraq war and the Libya conflict, which 
respectively represent the contexts before and after the adoption of the ToL.   
4.3 UN Security Council Reform: Toward A Single EU Representation? 
Recall the constitutive role of institutions emphasized by the principal-agent theory and new 
institutionalisms in Chapter 3, the format of EU representation and its coherence at the UNSC are affected 
by the institutional rules of both organizations. A change of the landscape at this forum would not only have 
significant repercussions on the existing coordination and representation structure of the EU but also on the 
future development of the CFSP (Hill 2005; Marchesi 2008). UNSC reform is of radical importance to EU 
members states as well, not only because the status of the EU states that already have become a member of 
the council would subject to change, but also because EU member states are at strongly involved in the 
heated debate. Most EU countries agree that a reform toward more representativeness and effectiveness is 






(Hannay 2012: 46). The consensus stops at how to carry out the reform (Hill 2006; Martini 2010). Until 
today, efforts to undertake a fundamental UNSC reform have yielded few results due to the deep divisions in 
national perspectives. A timeline of UNSC reform will be first laid out before prospecting an EU dimension 
in this contentious issue. 
A profound reform implies a modification of substance of the present UN Charter, which is only possible 
if it is adopted by a vote of two-thirds of UNGA member states and ratified by two-thirds of the members, 
including the five permanent members of the UNSC (Article 108 UN Charter). Regardless of the procedural 
difficulties, in 1963 the UNGA successfully pushed through a membership increase of the UNSC. Since 
then almost all attempts for another reform have ended in vain, e.g., the endeavours devoted by the then UN 
Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali and the explorations made by the Open-Ended Working Group in the 
1990s. Neither the “Quick Fix Formula”, which advocated Germany and Japan‟s permanent candidacy (Hill 
2005) nor the “Razali Plan”, which suggested a “Two (Germany and Japan as new permanent members) 
plus Three (non-permanent rotating seats allocated to the under-represented regional groupings)” received 
substantial follow-up in order to push the progress forward (Marchesi 2008).  
The momentum of reform was picked up again in 2005. Based on the report of the High Level Panel on 
Threats, Challenges and Change, Secretary-General Kofi Annan proposed two reform models: Model A 
presented the plan to add six new permanent seats without veto and three two-year non-renewable seats 
while Model B created a new category of non-permanent members with eight four-year renewable seats and 
one non-renewable seat (Ronzitti 2012: 81). These two models could have served as a concrete basis for 
future reform at the 2005 Millennium Summit. Disappointingly, the Summit reached few positive results 
except for the establishments of the Peace-building Commission and the Human Rights Council. Realizing 
that UNSC reform had once again reached a deadlock, in September 2008, UNGA Decision 62/557 moved 
discussions from the level of working groups to intergovernmental negotiations (Martini 2010). Since May 
2010, it has been decided that the negotiations should move toward a text-based solution. In December 2011, 
the chair of the intergovernmental negotiations, Ambassador Zahir Tanin from Afghanistan, announced that 




groups (Hansen 2012). Until 10 April 2012, at the fifth meeting of the eighth round of intergovernmental 
negotiations, there was still little agreement among states, except on increasing the amount of African 
representation (Schlosser 2012).  
Stalemate is indeed frustrating but not without reason. It is the lack of a common approach among UN 
members coupled with the aversion of the P5 for reform that has been preventing the negotiations from 
making a breakthrough. The cleavage within the EU has heavily contributed to this end. EU members 
mainly split over two lines. Starting from the mid-1990s, Germany has aligned itself with Brazil, India and 
Japan (known as the G4), bidding for a permanent seat. Opposing Germany‟s candidature, Italy, Spain and 
Malta, along with other countries, forged the United for consensus (UfC), also known as the “Coffee Club”. 
On 18 February 2009, the President of the UNGA, Miguel D‟Escoto Brockmann identified five key issues 
related to UNSC reform: categories of membership; the question of the veto; regional representation; size of 
an enlarged Council and working methods of the UNSC; and the relationship between the UNSC and the 
UNGA. The paragraphs below compare the central viewpoints of EU members over the two camps on these 
five issues. 
The G4 seek a UNSC enlargement in both permanent and none-permanent terms. The standards for 
membership selection should take into account the contribution of a country to maintaining international 
peace and security while ensuring better representation of the developing world, especially African 
countries. In regard to the veto, the G4 in principle insist on the veto power for their national candidacy. But 
in order to secure more support, they have agreed to postpone the use of a veto for no more than fifteen years 
until further review. For instance, Germany has showed its willingness to accept an intermediary 
arrangement, i.e., a temporary seat for longer terms with the possibility to transform to permanent member 
with the right of veto. That no reference of veto was included in their latest report sent to Ambassador Tanin 
is an indicator of this trend toward compromise. The G4 advocate a “mid-twenties” UNSC with six new 
permanent members having no veto plus four non-permanent members allocated to the four regional group, 
namely, the GAFS, the GASS, the GRULAC and the EEG. The G4 have given their approval in reforming 




issue of the relationship between the two UN bodies, the G4 propose that the UNGA shall provide political 
guidance to the reform of the UNSC. Germany as a sponsor of the G4 and meanwhile an EU member has to 
constantly struggle between national aspirations and EU commitments. Germany considers a single EU seat 
a long-term target. But as long as this goal is not realistic, Berlin will continue to appeal for a national seat in 
the UNSC. Given its Europeanist tradition, Germany could become active agent of the EU. However, its 
willingness to pursue its own path at the UNSC should not be underestimated.76 
The UfC insist that enlargement should only occur in the category of non-permanent seats. On 21 
February 2012, the Italy/Colombia proposal suggested creating a new group of non-permanent members 
with longer terms and an increase in the number of regular non-permanent seats. The new seats would be 
assigned to UN regional groups and subject to a term either of three to five years without the possibility of 
immediate re-election or two years with up to two immediate re-elections. The regular seats would be given 
to small and medium-sized states. Candidates for the additional seats would be left to respective Regional 
Groups to decide and later submitted to the UNGA for election.77 The UfC refer to Africa as a “special case” 
and should be granted two to three of the new seats. The UfC‟s attitude toward the veto is that it should be 
abolished or at least limited. On the issue of reforming UNSC working methods, the UfC emphasize that it 
must be an integral part of the overall reform pack. The major motivation of Italy‟s participation in the UfC 
is to prevent Germany from gaining a permanent seat. It is considered that an elevation of Berlin‟s profile in 
the UNSC would alter the balance within the EU and undermine Rome‟s influence in the international 
community. Italy once had campaigned for a consolidated EU seat, but it was removed from the agenda due 
to its impracticality. Overall, its actions on UNSC reform are more national-based strategic rather than 
Europeanized.78  
Although members of the G4 and the UfC openly criticize each other for blocking the reform progress, 
their proposals are identical in many terms. Both groups propose a “mid-twenties” UNSC; both agree that a 
reform of the UNSC‟s working methods is necessary; both advocate a better representation for developing 
countries and appeal for the support of African Union (AU). As EU member states, both Germany and Italy 
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77 A/64/CRP.1. The document can be downloaded from the website: http://www.centerforunreform.org/node/470. 




consider a European seat an ultimate objective in the long run. There might be a chance of cooperation or 
compromise at least between these two countries, especially if the HR could play a bigger role in 
harmonizing their policies on this issue. 
France and Britain have consistently expressed their support for the G4‟s campaign, including 
Germany‟s request for a permanent seat. As far as they are concerned, Germany probably would give up the 
idea of an EU seat if its ambition were satisfied. The inequality of participation in the UNSC has induced 
these two privileged members to obstruct reforms in favour of a joint representation (Gstöhl 2012: 147). 
Like other permanent members of the UNSC, France and Britain are rather conservative about the UNGA‟s 
meddling with UNSC working methods.79 Their argument is that the UNSC shall decide its own rules and 
procedure as provided by the UN Charter (Article 30 UN Charter). They certainly reject any reform that will 
endanger the current veto system. In July 2009, the P2 jointly put forward an intermediate solution to create 
a group of new semi-permanent seats that would become permanent at the final phase after a review. 
Germany welcomed this temporary method as long as the possibility for transformation would be ensured. 
Both France and the UK advocate for an increase in African representation. But Paris also calls for a 
presence of the Arab world at the UNSC. Other EU members, such as Belgium, the Netherlands, Slovenia 
and Hungary have agreed to consider the G4‟s proposal (Hansen 2012). The rest of EU members either have 
not publicly taken any side or have rather ambiguous opinions about this matter. 
Whether the EU should have a unified seat in the UNSC has been a perennial and contentious question 
for EU member states since UNSC reform was reconsidered in the mid-1990s. Although some researchers 
argue that the EU is more influential with multiple spokesmen rather than having one representative in the 
UNSC (e.g., Verbeke 2006; Gstöhl 2012), advocates of a single EU seat exist both in Brussels and in 
national capitals of the EU. At the initial phase of the reform, both Germany and Italy had been proponents 
of a single EU representation. The two countries later adjusted their strategies and set a single EU seat as a 
long-term objective when regional representation was proven inoperable in the UNSC due to the severe 
resistance from the P5. But efforts keep going on to incorporate the dispersive EU representation into the 
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CFSP mechanism. During their mandates at the UNSC in 2003 and 2004, Germany and Spain suggested to 
establish a “European laboratory” to include in their delegation one representative of the Presidency and one 
representative of the HR/SG. This idea was blocked by France and Britain and never came into existence. 
During Italy‟s mandate from 2007 to 2008, it appointed a “focal point” within its own mission to liaise 
permanently with the Presidency, the Council Secretariat and national representatives of other EU members 
(Pirozzi 2012). At the supranational level, the Parliament reiterated in its resolution on 11 May 2011 that an 
EU seat would remain a central, long-term goal of the EU and called, in the interim, for the seeking of 
coordinated EU positions at the UNSC (European Parliament 2011a). Other well-known supporters include 
the former HR/SG, Javier Solana and the former Commissioner of External Relations, Benita 
Ferrero-Waldner. But what is striking is that Ashton, as the newly appointed HR, once said that she had no 
opinion about an eventual EU seat in the UNSC during her audition in front of the EP (Martini 2010). 
After the ToL‟s entry into force, it seems more sensible to “Europeanize” the seats that EU members 
have at the UNSC. By granting legal personality to the EU, the ToL has removed one of the obstacles for an 
official EU representation in this body, at least from a legal perspective. However, as Solana once pointed 
out, “as long as France and Britain are the only EU members with permanent seats on the UNSC, the EU 
does not have a chance for its common foreign policy to work” (Franda 2006). The ideal situation of a 
common seat in the UNSC is unlikely to be feasible as long as the P2 see themselves as free agents and keep 
blocking any assumptions that may endanger their special status in the UNSC.  
To sum up, the attitudes of EU members toward this particular issue are hardly consistent. The UNSC is 
still perceived as a state-centric arena to defend national interests rather than a multilateral framework to 
uphold common positions of the EU. Analogous to the case of the EU, it is the commitments of UNSC 
member states – particularly the commitments of the P5 – that matter for deciding the structure of the UNSC 
in the years to come. The adoption of the ToL could be a turning point for EU external representation in the 
sense that it gave the Union a legal personality and demanded for better concertation among EU member 
states in the UNSC. It is imaginable to establish a high-level coordination mechanism and eventually a de 




leaves the major determining power to the EU member states which sit on the UNSC. Based on this political 
reality, the EU should focus on improving coordination and concertation mechanisms at the UN in a 
pragmatic way rather than blindly strive for a single EU seat or seek the increase of numerical 
representation.  
It needs to be clarified that, although the reform of the UNSC has significant influence on EU 
representation coherence, this factor is not taken into account in the hypothesis formulated in the previous 
section. As the reform is still pending, it is unclear which model will finally be agreed by UN member states, 
therefore, the effects of the would-be reformed structure on the coherence of EU representation cannot be 



















Chapter 5 Quantitative Analysis of EU Voting Behaviour at the UN  
The first section of Chapter 5 applies a quantitative method to test whether real-world EU voting 
behaviour has provided empirical evidence that supports the hypotheses proposed in Chapter 4, on the basis 
of a study of the UNGA roll-call votes. The second section presents a statistical description of the voting 
patterns of the EU members serving on the UNSC. As clarified in Chapter 1, the meaningfulness of 
analyzing the roll-call data at this forum might be called into question due to its operational limitations. But 
it will be demonstrated that a summary of the main features of EU voting behaviour at the UNSC is useful 
for picking out the “unusual” cases that may be worth an in-depth research in qualitative terms.80  
5.1 Overall Voting Coherence of the EU at the UNGA 
5.1.1 Data Description and Analytical Model 
This part of the research assess EU representation coherence – measured by EU voting cohesion – at the 
UNGA between 1993 and 2012 (i.e., the 48th and 67th Sessions), and explores whether there is essential 
variation in its extent after the enforcement of the ToL. The time span is between 1 November 1993 – when 
the Maastricht Treaty officially created the EU – and 24 December 2012, three years after the ToL‟s entry 
into force. The UNGA provides an appropriate research environment because EU representation at this level 
is fairly well developed and the UNGA roll-call data are relatively well-documented. With these data, it is 
possible to identify the pattern of EU voting behaviour both over a long period and during a particular 
interval, e.g., before and after the Lisbon. Accounting for the EU‟s voting cohesion across different sizes of 
membership and a wide range of issues areas is also achievable. Furthermore, the statistical approach 
enables a comparison between the EU and other regional organizations at the UNGA, or even the entire 
UNGA membership.  
The data of this analysis are partially derived from the datasets created by Voeten and Merdzanovic 
(2009), which contains the votes cast by every member state of the UNGA on all adopted resolutions from 
1946 to 2008. This study selects the voting records starting from 1993 in their compilation, but expands data 
collection to include the votes until 24 December 2012, which were retrieved from the UNBISnet and the 
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ODS. Only votes cast on entire resolutions will be considered in the subsequent analyses.81 With the data 
collected from the latest two UNGA sessions, this dissertation contributes to providing updated 
explanations for the voting behaviour of the EU within this body. 
Voting cohesion is computed based on the number of affirmative, negative and abstaining votes. 
Scholars disagree with how to code abstentions (e.g., van Kampen 2007; Hosli et al. 2010). Some treat 
abstentions as a softer form of negative votes and code both choices as contributing to a resolution not 
reaching the required threshold (e.g., Voeten 2000). Others regard abstaining as “half the weight of a 
complete agreement” (e.g, Lijphart 1963; Luif 2003). A third group of researchers treats the three types of 
votes as equals, arguing that each vote deviating from the consensus undermines overall voting cohesion 
(e.g., Hix et al. 2005; Rasch 2008). Based on these coding practices, this research introduces three indices to 
assess voting cohesion: CI, CII and AI.
82 The difference between CI and CII lies in the coding of abstentions. 
For both indices, pro and con votes are respectively coded as 1 and 0, while abstentions are coded 0.5 for CI, 
and 0 for CII. The voting cohesion on resolution x in percentage term, is given by  
 
                                  
 
where AVx stands for the average vote of a group on resolution x.  
AI gives equal weight to each vote choice. The voting cohesion indicated by AI in percentage terms, is 
given by 
 
    
                                   
     
                
 
where Y, N and A respectively stand for the count of each type of votes.  
5.1.2 Hypotheses Testing and Evaluation 
Table 4 displays the average values of EU voting cohesion in each session of the UNGA, measured by CI, 
CII and AI respectively. The mean of each measurement is reported at the bottom of the table. A much higher 
                                                 
81 Votes on paragraphs were filtered out since it had been demonstrated that they would make no significant difference to the final 
results (e.g., Luif 2003; Rasch 2008).  




CII, compared to CI, suggests that the Union appears to be more cohesive when abstentions are coded as 
negative votes. An evaluation of the total 1,419 resolutions using Pearson‟s correlation reports a coefficient 
(r) of 0.3 for CI and CII (p < 0.01), 0.3 for CI and AI (p < 0.01), 0.9 for CII and AI (p < 0.01), indicating that 
while the measurements of the three indices are positively correlated with each another, the correlation 
between CII and AI is stronger.
83 The Bland-Altman analysis demonstrates that CII and AI provide more 
similar measurements to EU voting cohesion compared to the other two pairs.84 This outcome is also 
illustrated by Figure 1: whereas the lines of CII and AI are almost identical, falling between 85 percent and 
100 percent, the line of CI lies alone at the very bottom. Only AI will be applied to the subsequent tests 
because it treats all three types of votes equally in the calculation.  
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84 The points of these two measurements in the plot of identity fall closer to the line y = x compared to the other two pairs. In the 





































UNGA Session (year) CI CII AI Cases 
48 (1993/1994) 65.0 90.5 88.1 65 
  49 (1994/1995)* 74.8 90.0 89.3 68 
50 (1995/1996) 76.6 90.9 91.0 70 
51 (1996/1997) 78.2 94.2 92.3 76 
52 (1997/1998) 75.0 95.4 93.5 69 
53 (1998/1999) 81.7 95.2 94.8 61 
54 (1999/2000) 75.7 95.4 93.8 69 
55 (2000/2001) 79.5 94.2 93.6 67 
56 (2001/2002) 77.7 94.6 93.7 67 
57 (2002/2003) 77.1 92.3 91.1 73 
  58 (2003/2004)* 73.9 91.5 90.4 76 
59 (2004/2005) 79.4 93.3 93.4 71 
60 (2005/2006) 78.6 94.5 94.4 75 
  61 (2006/2007)* 76.7 96.1 96.1 84 
62 (2007/2008) 81.2 94.3 94.6 78 
63 (2008/2009) 78.4 94.4 95.0 72 
    64 (2009/2010)** 75.2 94.6 92.9 68 
65 (2010/2011) 78.3 93.4 92.1 73 
66 (2011/2012) 79.9 96.6 95.6 62 
 67 (24/12/2012) 76.4 90.3 91.6 68 
Mean 77.0  93.6 92.9 71 
*Marks the UNGA sessions during which EU enlargements took place. 
**Marks the UNGA session during which the ToL entered into force. 
 
Figure 2 compares the ratio of abstentions of the EU with that of the entire UNGA membership. It 
appears that EU countries have cast abstentions more frequently as a milder way to express disagreement. 
The share of abstentions of the EU is on average 9 percent higher than that of the global level. The rightmost 
vertical dotted line indicates the 64th Session when the ToL started to take effect, while the other three lines 
on the left respectively mark off the UNGA sessions during which the three waves of EU enlargements took 
place.85 For the EU, the proportion of abstaining votes ranges from 16.5 percent to 34 percent, whereas the 
number is constantly below 17 percent for the UNGA as a whole. The two descending lines illustrate that the 
ratios of abstentions for both the EU and the UNGA have been decreasing since the 48th Session. The range 
of decline for the EU is almost 14 percent, which is much larger compared to the UNGA‟s 6 percent. The 
                                                 




percentage of abstentions for the Union dropped to a lower level after each enlargement. Meanwhile, EU 
voting cohesion increased by a small amount, except for the 2007 enlargement, after which cohesion 
decreased by 1.5 percent. This could be a reflection of the Union‟s 20 years of efforts to cultivate the CFSP 
and avoid deviations in voting at the UNGA. A decline in the ratio of EU abstentions also occurred 
immediately after the ToL‟s entry into force, while voting cohesion dropped by 1 percent. But it appears that 
no apparent linear relationship between EU voting cohesion and the percentage of EU abstentions can be 
claimed.86 
 




 Session)   
 
 
H1 hypothesizes that EU voting cohesion has been increasing over time. The upper line in Figure 3 shows 
the cohesion pattern of the EU across UNGA sessions. The level of EU voting cohesion appears to be 
fluctuant. Since the 50th Session EU cohesion has been above the level of 90.0 percent. But it suffered a 
                                                 
86 A preliminary correlation analysis discovered that the two variables are negatively correlated. But the linear correlation was 
largely due to the extreme value (34 percent) of the percentage of EU abstentions in the 48th Session. Without this value, this is no 





























sharp drop and hit the bottom at the 58th Session.87 Then the cohesion continued to grow until the 65th 
Session.88 After a return to 95.0 percent, the voting cohesion again fell to an even lower point in the 67th 
Session.89 An OLS regression using UNGA sessions as the independent variable and EU cohesion measured 
by AI as the dependent variable reveals the existence of a significant positive linear relationship (b = 0.18, 
SE = 0.08, t (1417) = 2.37, p < 0.01, r = 0.06). For each UNGA session, EU voting cohesion increases by 0.2 
percent on average. In other words, for another decade, EU cohesion, on average, is likely to increase by 2 
percent. But the fact that the effect size is small indicates that increasing EU representation coherence 
through institutional reforms and socialization is a slow process.90  
H2 assumes that EU voting cohesion would change after the ToL‟s adoption. Contrary to the more 
general expectation that the ToL will bring more coherence to the EU, Figure 3 shows that the degree of EU 
voting cohesion actually experienced a small decline after the ToL was enforced. The cohesion reaches an 
even higher level (above 95 percent) following a rebound in the 66th Session. Then it decreases again, by 4 
percent. An independent t-test (Test 1) is conducted to compare EU cohesion levels between two groups 
using the 64th Session during which the ToL started to take effect as the cut point. The first group (Pre-ToL) 
includes 309 resolutions adopted between the 60thand 63rd sessions while the second group (Post-ToL) is 
comprised of 278 resolutions that were passed during the 64th-67th Session. The means of the two groups are 
calculated as 95.0 percent (SE = 0.71) and 93.1 percent (SE = 0.78) respectively. The mean difference in EU 
voting cohesion of the two groups is about 2 percent (MPre-ToL－MPost-ToL). It appears that there was a small 
decrease in EU voting cohesion after the ToL was adopted. But the difference is not statistically or 
substantively significant (t (517) = 1.62, p = 0.11, r = 0.07). A second test (Test 2) is performed using 1 
December 2009 – the date when the ToL officially entered into force – as the cut point to categorize the 
resolutions between 1 January 2007 and 24 December 2012 into two groups. 156 cases are classified into the 
                                                 
87 The resolutions that contributed to the lower level of EU voting cohesion during the 58th Session include, inter alia, A/RES/58/50, 
A/RES/58/51, A/RES/58/198, and A/RES/58/245, among which three are related to nuclear weapons or armed conflict while one 
was about economic measures against developing countries. 
88 The relatively low voting cohesion in the 65th Session was mainly caused by the split votes of EU member states over five 
resolutions: A/RES/65/55, A/RES/65/71, A/RES/65/119, A/RES/65/219 and A/RES/65/240, among which two are related to 
nuclear weapons, one is relevant to human rights issues and the other concerns decolonization. 
89 The low voting coherence in the 67th Session was mainly caused by the split votes of the EU over five resolutions (A/RES/67/19, 
A/RES/67/36, A/RES/67/46, A/RES/67/56 and A/RES/67/171), among which two are related to nuclear weapons, one related to 
human rights, one concerning Palestine. 




first group (Pre-ToL), while 275 cases fall into the second group (Post-ToL). Again, EU voting cohesion 
decreased by 1.2 percent (MPre-ToL－MPost-ToL) after the ToL‟s implementation. But the statistics are not 
significant and the size of effect is small (t (429) = 0.79, p = 0.43, r = 0.04), making it difficult to tell the 
overall influence of the ToL. 
 







If we look at Figure 4, in which the ink dots represent the mean cohesion difference (MPre-ToL－MPost-ToL) 
of the two groups respectively in the two tests. The error bars demonstrate the confidence intervals of these 
mean differences. It can be seen that both dots are located on the right side of 0. It means that in the two 
samples EU voting cohesion of the pre-Lisbon period is consistently higher than that of the post-Lisbon 
period. This may reveal a somewhat problematic trend. But it would be arbitrary to jump to the conclusion 
that the ToL has negative effects on EU representation coherence. Suffice it to say that the ToL has not made 
the EU a more coherent actor at the UNGA yet. A possible cause could be the remaining agency problems 

































really “bite” in the years to come when EU members can act in concert at this forum, allowing EU 
representatives to take the floor and when these representatives can truly stand as fully-fledged agents that 
can represent the Union consistently and coherently.  
 
Figure 4: Confidence Intervals of Cohesion Difference Pre and Post-Lisbon 
 
H3 stipulates that the EU performs more coherently in general than the UNGA as a whole and this 
“superiority” will not be affected by the ToL. This assumption is likely to be supported as in Figure 3 the 
line marking EU voting cohesion is obviously higher than that of the global level. An independent t-test later 
confirms that the voting cohesion of EU member states, on average, is about 20 percent greater than that of 
the entire UNGA membership between 1993 and 2012 (t (2442) = 25.67, p < 0.01, r = 0.46). The effect size 
is large, meaning that as well as being statistically significant, this effect of membership represents a 
substantive finding. A second test comparing the voting cohesion means of the EU and the entire UNGA 
membership after the date when the ToL took effect shows that the former remains to be about 20 percent 
higher than the latter (t (492) = 12.19, p < 0.01, r = 0.48). Again, this finding is both statistically and 
substantively significant. 
H4 assumes that EU voting cohesion is reduced at the early stage of a post-enlargement era. But it will 
rebound to its previous or an even higher level afterwards. The overall effect of enlargements on EU voting 
cohesion should be positive. As shown in Figure 3, only the 2004 enlargement fitted the description of H4. 
2.0  
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The development of EU voting cohesion around the 2007 enlargement appeared to be the very opposite of 
our hypothesis. As for the 1995 enlargement, EU voting cohesion did not experience any decline but 
continued to increase until the 53rd Session. Take the 1995 enlargement as an example: the resolutions 
during the 49th-50th Session are classified into two groups using the date 1 January 1995 as the cut point.91 67 
and 71 cases fall in the two groups respectively. The independent t-test results indicate that the voting 
cohesion increased about 2 percent after the enlargement (t (136) = 0.61, p = 0.55, r = 0.05). The test 
regarding the 2004 enlargement (the 58th-59th Session) reveals that post-enlargement cohesion was about 3.6 
percent higher than the cohesion prior to the enlargement (t (142) = 1.30, p = 0.19, r = 0.11). The third test 
with respect to the 2007 enlargement (the 61st-62nd Session) has produced a similar result, with 
post-enlargement cohesion 1 percent higher than that of pre-enlargement period (t (160) = 0.61, p = 0.54, r = 
0.05). It appears that EU voting cohesion was somewhat increased after each round of enlargement. 
Consistent as they are, none of these findings are statistically or substantively significant. It is safe to 
suggest that EU enlargements did not at any rate reduce EU cohesion, although there is no conclusive 
evidence of a positive relationship between EU voting cohesion and enlargements.  
The reason why EU voting cohesion did not decrease after the enlargements could be that those new EU 
member states had started to vote coherently with the EU majority at the pre-accession stage. Any European 
country can apply for EU membership if it meets the so-called “Copenhagen criteria” and has the ability to 
apply the body of EU laws and rules, also known as the acquis communautaire.92 Applicants typically sign 
association agreements with the Union to get prepared for candidacies and eventual memberships. A special 
process, the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) exists to deal with the countries of the Western 
Balkans (Cohen 2008). The Council, based on the Commission‟s opinion, decides whether to open 
accession negotiations. Once the negotiations are concluded, a draft treaty of accession needs to be 
approved by EU institutions, including the Council, the Commission, and the EP. Then it must be signed and 
                                                 
91 Austria, Finland, and Sweden acceded to the EU on 1 January 1995. 
92 The “Copenhagen criteria” requires that the candidate country seeking EU membership need to achieve “stability of institutions 
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning 
market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the Union” (Presidency 




ratified by the candidate country as well as all EU member states.93 The process from application to 
accession (e.g., the 2004 enlargement) can take more than a decade.94 After years of preparations to meet the 
requirements for EU membership, national preferences of the applicant countries might have converged 
with those of existing EU members. In other words, the socialization process and institutional adaption had 
been initiated prior to the formal accession and continued to affect the preferences of the new entrants in the 
context of their growing participation in EU foreign policy-making.  
 
Table 5: Keywords for Issue Area Classification 
Issue Area Selected Keywords Main Committee Cases (%) 
1. International 
security 
Nuclear, proliferation,   
disarmament 
First Committee 466 (33%) 
2. Middle East 
Israel, Palestine, 
Palestinian, Lebanon, Syria, 
Middle East Jerusalem. 
None95 397 (28 %) 




Fourth Committee 152 (11 %) 







78 (5 %) 
 
H5 suggests that EU voting cohesion varies across different issue areas. All 1,419 UNGA resolutions are 
classified into five issue areas. It is primarily carried out by identifying the Main Committee involved.96 The 
categorized resolutions are further distinguished by preset keywords shown in Table 5 (which also lays out 
the number and proportion of resolutions in each category). Plenary resolutions without the involvement of 
a particular Main Committee were classified by their contents. For the contents having multifaceted 
dimensions, the UN Yearbook was consulted. As a result, resolutions regarding issues like nuclear weapons, 
proliferation and disarmament, the reports of the IAEA, the security situations of states, or cooperation 
between the UN and the OSCE, fall into the category “International Security”. The category “Middle East” 
                                                 
93 For a detailed introduction of EU enlargement process, see Nicolaides (1999); Ott and Inglis (2002). 
94 For some countries, notably Sweden, Finland, and Austria, it took only a couple of years. For others, it may take two decades or 
even longer. Turkey, for example, applied for full EU membership in the 1987 and has yet to conclude accession negotiations, which 
were opened in 2005. See an analysis of the way in which time-rules and time-horizons structured and mobilized EU enlargement 
process in Avery (2009). 
95 See footnote 24. 




includes all resolutions that are relevant to the Middle East.97 The category “Human Rights” encompasses 
issues related to human rights and social development, including the resolutions regarding the restitution of 
cultural property. The category “Decolonization” contains the cases dealing with decolonization and 
self-determination. Resolutions concerning economic or political coercion against developing countries, 
e.g., the embargo imposed by the US against Cuba, are also classified into this category. The remaining 
resolutions that do not belong to any of these five groups are labelled as “Other Issues”.98  
 







Figure 5 captures EU voting cohesion across issue areas over UNGA sessions. EU cohesion ranks the 
highest on “Middle East” issues in the diagram.99 In the past 20 years, the Union‟s voting cohesion on issues 
of this domain has been consistently above 90 percent. In fact, as early as 1980 by the Venice Declaration, 
                                                 
97 Resolutions that are marked as “Middle East” issues will no longer be categorized into other issue areas.  
98 Resolutions falling into this category are excluded from the analysis testing H5 since their share is small and their topics are not as 
relevant as the resolutions of the other four categories. 
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the then nine member states of the Community had decided to coordinate their policies on Middle East 
affairs, especially on the Arab-Israeli conflict (Luif 2003: 27). The lower voting cohesiveness starting from 
the 58th Session – during which the 2004 enlargement took place – was mainly caused by the deviating votes 
of Cyprus and Malta.100 The category “Human Rights” has the second highest voting cohesion. EU voting 
cohesion has been equal to or greater than 90 percent until it experienced a considerable decrease (over 10 
percent) in the 64th Session.101 Afterwards, EU cohesion increased again and reached 94.2 percent in the 67th 
Session. EU voting cohesion on issues regarding “International Security” has been fluctuating between 85 
percent and 95 percent in the past two decades, whereas the category “Decolonization” shows the least 
voting cohesiveness and the largest extent of fluctuation between 65 percent in the 48th Session and full 
consensus in the 51st Session.  
The results of one-way ANOVA analysis suggest that there is a medium significant effect of issue areas 
on the degree of EU voting cohesion (F (3, 481) = 47.89, p < 0.01, r = 0.28).102 Games-Howell post hoc test 
further discovers that EU voting cohesion on “Middle East” issues is significantly the highest (M = 98.25, 
SE = 7.54), whereas the cohesion among “Decolonization” issues is the lowest (M = 83.66, SE = 21.85).103 
The analysis fails to detect any significant difference in voting cohesions between the categories 
“International Security” and “Human Rights”. An independent t-test later finds that the voting cohesion on 
“Human Rights” issues is about 3 percent significantly higher than that of “International Security” issues, 
although the size of effect is small (t (790) = 2.52, p < 0.05, r = 0.1). The relatively lower cohesiveness in the 
latter category may contribute to the reduction of overall EU voting cohesion, since it accounts for the 
largest share of the resolutions analyzed in this research.  
H5 also assumes that the EU‟s voting cohesion in traditionally contested areas, i.e., “International 
Security” and “Decolonization”, should be promoted after the ToL took effect. As shown in Figure 5, EU 
                                                 
100 There were two three-way splits of the EU in the 64th and the 67th Session respectively. The split votes on UNGA Resolution 
A/RES/64/21 regarded the endorsement of the Goldstone Report on the Gaza conflict. The split of EU member states over 
Resolution A/RES/67/19 on upgrading Palestine to non-member observer state status in the UN was mainly between support (14 
voted in favour) and abstention (12 abstained). Only the Czech Republic joined the US and Israel and voted against it. 
101  This sharp decrease was mainly caused by the EU‟s split votes over three UNGA resolutions: A/RES/64/148 (the 
implementation of and follow-up to the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action), A/RES/64/172 (the human right to 
development) and A/RES/64/292 (the right to water and sanitation). 
102 The Welch F is reported because the assumption of homogeneity of variance is violated. 




voting cohesion of both categories dropped to a lower level in the wake of the ToL‟s implementation. It 
quickly returned to the previous level but decreased again in the 67th Session. Independent t-tests are 
conducted to compare the EU‟s voting cohesion of the two issue areas between the period of the 60th-63rd 
Session and the period of the 64th-67th Session. According to the statistics, it seems that EU cohesion in both 
categories slightly decreased after the ToL entered into force, although the differences are not considered 
significant. On issues concerning “International Security”, such as disarmament in general or nuclear 
weapons in particular, EU member states‟ opinions tend to differ. As permanent members of the UNSC and 
nuclear powers, France and the UK prefer holding onto their nuclear prominence and have often aligned 
themselves with the US, whereas non-nuclear member states, especially Austria, Sweden and Ireland, are 
devoted to building a nuclear-free world (see also Luif 2003; Young and Rees 2005).104  In addition, the EU 
member states of NATO sometimes disagree with the non-aligned states, and within NATO, France played 
a special role after it had withdrawn from NATO‟s integrated military structure in 1966 (Fassbender 2004: 
862). As a result, two-way or even three-way split votes of EU member states prove to be unavoidable 
within this issue area.105 When it comes to “Decolonization” issues, France and Britain, as former colonial 
powers, tend to distance themselves from the EU majority (see also Wouters 2001). But recent UNGA 
sessions have witnessed a gradual convergence among EU member states since more and more frequently 
Britain is the only EU member that votes against such resolutions.106 Anyhow, the second part of H5 is not 
supported by the empirical evidence.  
It is worth mentioning that EU voting cohesion in the category “Human Rights” in the post-Lisbon era, 
appears to be about 7 percent lower than that of the pre-Lisbon era (t (84) = 2.36, p < 0.05, r = 0.25). This 
finding may raise some concerns in the sense that not only the ToL fails to improve EU cohesion in the 
traditionally contested areas but may also contribute to lower coherence in the areas where EU member 
states have exhibited highly coherent voting behaviour.  
                                                 
104 Austria is a nuclear-free zone and the country favours an anti-nuclear policy. Both Sweden and Ireland are members of the New 
Agenda Coalition, which seeks to facilitate nuclear disarmament.  
105 For instance, the decrease in EU voting cohesion during the 65th and 67th Session was mainly resulted by the Union‟s three-way 
splits on these resolutions concerning nuclear weapons: A/RES/65/49, A/RES/65/55, A/RES/65/71, A/RES/65/76 A/RES/67/31, 
A/RES/67/33, A/RES/67/36, A/RES/67/46 and A/RES/67/56, among which France and the UK voted against six out of nine. Only 
France voted against A/RES/67/33.  




H6 proposes that the EU has a higher voting cohesion than other regional organizations at the UNGA 
during the periods both before and after Lisbon. One-way ANOVA analysis is applied to compare the EU 
with the League of Arab States (Arab League),107 the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),108 
the AU,109 the Caribbean Community (CARICOM),110 the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS),111 
and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).112 These organizations are chosen 
because their integration degrees are somewhat comparable to that of the EU in economic, institutional or 
political terms and because they represent diversity in terms of both geographical location and group size. 
It turns out that the levels of voting cohesion are significantly different across regional organizations (F 
(6, 4404) = 82.17, p < 0.01, r = 0.29).113 The effect of membership on voting cohesion is a substantive 
finding and represents a medium effect size. Planned contrasts are used so that it is possible to explore 
whether the size of membership mitigates voting cohesion at the same time. Contrast 1 compares the block 
of ASEAN, CIS, CARICOM and ECOWAS (membership size < 20) with the block of Arab League, the EU 
and the AU (membership size > 20). The results show that the voting cohesion of the second block of 
regional organizations is significantly higher than that of the first block (t (8770) = 8.46, p <0.01, r = 0.1). 
Contrast 2 compares the block containing ASEAN and CIS (membership size = 10) with the block 
containing CARICOM and ECOWAS (membership size = 15). Again, the test tells us that the voting 
cohesion of the block with a larger membership is significantly higher than the block with a smaller 
membership (t (4537) = 17.01, p <0.01, r = 0.24). Contrast 3 reveals that ASEAN is significantly more 
coherent than CIS (t (2496) = 17.80, p <0.01, r = 0.34). Contrast 4 compares CARICOM and ECOWAS but 
                                                 
107 The Arab League currently encompasses 22 member states. Palestine is not included in this analysis since it is not a UN member. 
Comoros is considered in the analysis after 20 November 1993 when it became a member of the Arab League. 
108 The ASEAN has 10 members, of which Vietnam, Myanmar and Cambodia obtained membership on 28 July 1995, 23 July 1997 
and 30 April 1999, respectively. These three countries are analyzed only after their dates of accession. 
109 The AU, as the successor of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), was founded in 2002 and currently has 54 member states. 
Within our observation period, the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic has not become a UN member, and thus is not included into 
the analysis. South Africa became a member of the OAU on 23 May 1994 and is taken into account in the analysis since this date. 
South Sudan joined the UN on 14 July 2011 and the AU on 27 July 2011 and is only considered an AU member since that date. 
110 The CARICOM has 15 full members. Montserrat is not a UN member and is not considered in the analysis. Suriname and Haiti 
joined the community respectively on 4 July 1995 and 2 July 2002. They are calculated as CARICOM members only after their 
dates of accession. 
111 The CIS originally had 10 member states. Turkmenistan changed its status to associate member on 26 August 2005. Therefore, it 
is no longer considered a member in the analysis from this date onwards. Georgia withdrew from the CIS on 17 August 2009 and is 
since then no longer taken as a member state in the analysis. 
112 ECOWAS currently has 15 member states. Mauritania withdrew from ECOWAS on 1 January 2002 and therefore, is not 
considered in the analysis from this date onwards. 




fails to find any significant difference in voting cohesion between the two organizations. Contrast 5 
compares the block of Arab League and the EU (membership size < 30) with the AU. The statistics show 
that the voting cohesion of the two smaller organizations is significantly higher than that of the AU, but the 
effect size is rather small (t (2783) = 4.29, p <0.01, r = 0.08). Contrast 6 finds that there is no significant 
difference in voting cohesion between the EU and the AU.  
A conclusion can be drawn from the planned comparisons: membership size alone does not determine 
voting cohesion. According to the principal-agent theory, all things being equal, a larger group tends to have 
higher preference heterogeneity and thus lower coherence. But contrast 1 and 2 have revealed that regional 
organizations with larger size of membership manage to exhibit higher degree of coherence at the UNGA. 
Contrast 3 demonstrates that two organizations having exactly the same size of membership can have 
different degrees of voting cohesion. These findings do not have to be contradictory to the assumption of the 
principal-agent theory since the condition “all things being equal” is not met in these contrasts. For the first 
two contrasts, the CIS contributes a great deal to the lower cohesiveness in the smaller blocks. Established in 
December 1991, the CIS was seen more a vehicle for managing the inter-state relations after the Soviet 
Union‟s disassembly than an institution for closer regional cooperation (Dragneva 2004: 280). Because of 
limited and selective formalization of its institutions, policy-making within the CIS mainly relies on 
traditional diplomacy and power mechanisms (Aslund et al. 1999). Plus the problems of preference 
heterogeneity, mutual mistrust and poor commitments among its member states, the CIS has been relatively 
disappointing in terms of both economic and political integration. Therefore, the degree of integration and 
the “maturity” of institutional structure may have stronger influence on the coherence of an organization.  
The results of Games-Howell post hoc test are displayed in Table 6. Combining the findings of planned 
contrast, this ANOVA analysis uncovers that the CIS is the least coherent organization (M = 78.4, all 
p-values < 0.05) and the AU has been voting less coherently (M = 91.17) than the Arab League, CARICOM 
and ECOWAS (all p-values < 0.05). However, there is no statistical evidence suggesting that the Arab 
League, ASEAN, the AU, CARICOM, ECOWAS and the EU vote significantly different from each other at 




that the voting cohesion of the EU (M = 92.9) is significantly higher than that of the AU, but it is lower than 
the voting cohesion of the Arab League and CARICOM, although the effect sizes for all three tests are rather 
small. Neither of the two organizations is perceived to feature higher level of integration than the Union. A 
possible explanation could be that these organizations are less concerned about some subjects in UNGA 
discussions than EU member states are (see also Rasch 2008). To sum it up, the EU‟s voting cohesion is 
only found to be higher than that of the AU and the CIS. H6 is thus only partially supported. It demonstrates 
that the ToL so far has not made the EU the most coherent actor at the UNGA in terms of voting cohesion.  
 
Table 6: Multiple Comparisons of Voting Cohesion of Regional Organizations 
 
5.2 EU Voting Behaviour at the UNSC: Descriptive Statistics 
Voting behaviour to a certain degree serves as an indicator of a country‟s policy preferences. Analyzing 
the voting pattern of EU member states in a long-term period at the UNGA is commonly accepted by EU 
researchers as one reliable quantitative approach to steadily investigate the quality of EU decision-making 
in this UN organ. Following the same logic, one would look at the voting behaviour of the EU member states 
sitting in the UNSC in order to comprehend EU representation coherence in this body. However, unlike in 
the UNGA it is rather questionable to apply a similar approach in the UNSC. It is firstly because there are 
numerous informal consultations or closed meetings that either have inaccessible records or no record at all 
Membership Mean Difference  Std. Error Membership Mean Difference Std. Error 
Arab  
League 
ASEAN 1.25349 .62290 AU CARICOM -2.92887* .58863 
AU 2.82283* .61122 CIS 12.77083* .79678 
CARICOM -.10604 .58257 ECOWAS -2.53250* .58658 
CIS 15.59366* .79231 EU -1.72736 .60988 
ECOWAS .29033 .58050 CARICOM CIS 15.69970* .77502 
EU 1.09547 .60403 ECOWAS .39637 .55666 
ASEAN AU 1.56934 .62857 EU 1.20151 .58117 
CARICOM -1.35953 .60075 CIS ECOWAS -15.30333* .77346 
CIS 14.34017* .80577 EU -14.49819* .79128 
ECOWAS -.96316 .59874 ECOWAS EU .80514 .57909 
EU -.15802 .62159  




(Malone 2012). Although the annual data of adopted UNSC resolutions are available in the UNBISnet and 
the ODS, the meaningfulness to apply this method is questionable due to the unique decision making and 
voting procedures at the UNSC. 
During the period 1993-2012, the UNSC adopted 1,286 resolutions, of which 1,264 (about 98.3 percent) 
were subject to a vote and 22 were adopted by consensus with no vote casting.114 Among these resolutions, 
1,168 were adopted unanimously with 15 votes in favour (about 92.4 percent), 11 were adopted with some 
members against the draft resolution and 82 had members abstaining. It will not be difficult to predict that 
the voting cohesion of the UNSC stays at a quite high level. As expected, the average voting cohesion 
(measured by AI) of the UNSC is 98.7 percent.  
One explanation to the high frequency of unanimity and voting cohesion is that the UNSC – in order to 
refrain from its paralysis in the early days – has established a practice not to allow the matters that are too 
contested to come to a vote (Franda 2006). When a certain proposal is subject to a vote before a formal 
session of the UNSC, intense negotiations have been conducted and compromises have been made during 
informal consultations so that the concerning parties are able to agree at least not to cast negative votes. This 
tendency is also reflected by the fact that the use of the veto has largely dropped since the 1990s. Before its 
collapse, the Soviet Union used to be the most frequent exerciser of the veto. Starting from the mid-1990s, 
the US has been leading in the use of the veto. The last time France and the UK used their veto power was in 
1989 in a joint veto with the US on the situation of Panama (Okhovat 2011: 13). But France has threatened 
to apply its veto power on several occasions, e.g., in the Iraq crisis. It prevented a second resolution drafted 
by the US and its European adherents from granting mandate for a military attack on Iraq. The case of Iraq 
will be explored in more detail later on in Chapter 6. 
When the casting of negative votes becomes rare, abstentions and non-participation may bear another 
layer of meaning. Abstentions in the UNSC can be classified into three categories: obligatory abstention, 
voluntary abstention and other abstentions. Obligation abstention refers to Article 27(3) of the UN Charter 
which prescribes that “in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a 
                                                 
114 Own calculation based on the data of Security Council Resolutions between 8 January 1993 and 20 December 2012, collected by 




dispute shall abstain from voting”. The third category includes those cases in which a member is considered 
directly concerned with the matter under consideration has abstained from voting or has been recorded as 
not participating in the vote, even though itself has not contended that the matter is a dispute. Voluntary 
abstention means that a permanent member of the UNSC may voluntarily choose to abstain from voting due 
to its “strong negative” attitude toward a particular draft resolution (Gross 1951). It chooses to abstain 
because casting a negative vote may constitute a veto, which makes the adoption of a resolution impossible. 
Likewise, nonparticipation can be resulted by a negative attitude either against the way the issue under 
consideration is dealt with rather than simply due to lack of instructions from the capital. It is not always 
self-evident whether a country chose to abstain or not to participate a particular voting based on which 
ground. Without in-depth exploring the background of the matter under consideration and the foreign policy 
of the state, it is difficult to be precise about the genuine motive behind a certain voting choice. 
As for the EU, there were three to five EU member states serving on the UNSC each year, including the 
two permanent members, the UK and France, during the period of our investigation. Of all 1,264 voted 
resolutions, the entire group of EU members sitting in the UNSC have cast affirmative votes in 1,258 
resolutions (about 99.5 percent). Only in six resolutions have EU member states cast abstentions, among 
which France abstained five times while Germany three times.115 Of all six resolutions, three centred around 
the situation in Iraq: UNSC Resolution 1134, Resolution 1284 and Resolution 1958.116  In each case France 
stood as the only EU member that abstained. The first two resolutions related to the disarmament of Iraq. 
Resolution 1134 requested Iraq‟s cooperation with UN weapons inspection teams and threatened to impose 
travel bans on Iraqi officials in the event of non-compliance. France abstained because it had been trying to 
convince the international community to lift the sanctions on Iraq after the First Gulf War (Styan 2006). 
Resolution 1284 created a new weapons inspection team, lifted some restrictions in the “oil-for-food” trade, 
and promised to suspend all remaining sanctions as long as Iraq made significant progress on disarmament. 
France abstained this time along with Russia because it worried about its fair share of the “oil-for-food” deal 
                                                 
115 These resolutions include UNSC Resolutions 1134, 1284, 1487, 1497, 1958 and 1973. 
116 Resolution 1134 was adopted on 23 October 1997 by 10 votes to none against and 5 abstentions from China, Egypt, France, 
Kenya and Russia. Resolution 1284 was passed on 17 December 1999 by 11 affirmative votes with four abstentions from China, 





that was worth about $17 billion per year (Read 2003). Two out of the six deviation cases took place in the 
aftermath of the ToL‟s adoption. France who wanted additional financial guarantees abstained on 
Resolution 1958, which terminated the residual activities of the “oil-for-food” Programme and ended some 
major sanctions on Iraq. Germany‟s abstention on Resolution 1973 that formulated the legal basis for the 
military intervention in the Libyan civil war resulted in the most serious split of the EU since Iraq.117 Given 
that departure from unanimity is rare in the UNSC, topics surrounding the situations of Iraq and Libya are 
considered as unusual cases that have provoked curiosity in further inquiry. A second astonishing finding is 
that Germany and France, the two countries that are considered as the core engine driving EU integration 
forward, have contributed to EU splits at the UNSC in recent years. But without a close-range exploration of 
the particular cases, it is impossible to understand the causal mechanism behind their decisions to vote 
differently from the majority of EU members. 
Like the roll-call data of UNGA voting records, the compiled voting data of UNSC resolutions only 
represents the decisions adopted with recorded votes but not the decisions made in closed sessions nor the 
decisions made though presidential statements. It only presents the final outcome of policy-making but 
cannot reveal the entire coordination process before the final decision or the complex motives of EU 
member states that drive for a particular voting choice in a resolution. Merely taking the analysis of voting 
behaviour as the only option of the EU‟s presence within the UN would overlook other alternatives, e.g. an 
in-depth case study that can elaborately explore EU representation and coordination over UNSC matters. 
Although the data of our collection are unable to uncover the matters that were even more disputed and 
never came to a vote in the UNSC due to a promising veto (e.g., during the Iraq crisis, a draft resolution 
proposed by the US, Spain and the UK was eventually abandoned because a French and Russian veto was 
almost certain), they were able to uncover the unusual events and provide an enlightening guidance for case 
selection.   
 
 
                                                 
117 Resolution 1973 was adopted on 17 March 2011 with 10 votes in favour and 5 abstentions from Brazil, China, Germany, India 




Chapter 6 Case Studies: EU Representation in the Iraq and Libya Crises 
As analyzed in Chapter 4, the ToL to a certain degree has improved EU representation coherence within 
the UNSC at both horizontal and vertical levels, by placing emphasis on the role of the HR and the EU 
delegation, and by narrowing the competence gap between permanent and non-permanent EU member 
states. Meanwhile, it leaves some agency problems unsolved: e.g., the absence of formal representation, the 
persistent predominance of the P2 agents; the risk of agent slack; the problem of “multiple agents”; 
information asymmetry; the lack of monitoring and enforceable instruments. These shortcomings may 
continue to diminish the coherence of EU representation. However, it is hypothesized that the reformed 
delegation structure created by the ToL would increase EU representation coherence at the UNSC, 
regardless of the remaining problems.  
This chapter tests this hypothesis by assessing and comparing the extents of EU representation coherence 
in two cases, namely the 2002-2003 Iraq war and the 2011 Libya crisis, which respectively represent the 
contexts before and after the adoption of the ToL. Within each case, the degree of EU representation 
coherence is investigated at both horizontal and vertical levels. The evaluation of horizontal coherence 
requires examining the role of EU foreign policy actors, e.g., the rotating Presidency and the HR/SG 
(pre-Lisbon) or the President and the HR (post-Lisbon), in the Union‟s external representation, intra- and 
inter-institutional coordination, and the (in)consistency of their statements. The assessment of vertical 
coherence needs to look at the homogeneity or heterogeneity of EU member states‟ policy preferences, 
inter-state coordination or concertation (including the quality of information exchange), the capacities of 
EU actors to organise and catalyze the coordination, and the extent to which the statements between EU 
institutions and national governments were consistent and complementary. In cross-case comparisons, 
representation coherence is considered improved in the case of the Libya crisis if, at the horizontal level, the 
Union‟s collective presence at the UNSC was upgraded, EU delegation structure was more streamlined, and 
the role of EU actors in representing the EU is strengthened, and at the vertical level, national policy 
preferences were more convergent, coordination among the EU member states was better,  last but not least, 




An integrated method that includes an intensive qualitative research as a follow-up can improve the 
insufficient interpretation due to the lack of reliable quantitative data. It can also lend a hand in exploring the 
complexities of the second dimension of EU representation, i.e., internal coordination mechanisms during 
EU policy making. A detailed discussion of how the EU represented itself toward these two events between 
which the ToL was adopted not only expands the literature on the EU foreign policy process but also 
contributes to our knowledge of different phases of EU external representation and the difficulties the Union 
encountered in developing a common EU presence in major CFSP affairs. The case studies draw on insights 
from official statements and documents of the EU and its member states, letters of government officials, 
press coverage, event reports, online resources, survey data and academic articles or policy evaluations of 
the two cases by leading researchers and experts. Diverse resources can provide comprehensive information 
and enhance the reliability of analysis. 
The rest parts of Chapter 6 are organized as follows: it starts with a section that clarifies case selection. 
The next two sections conduct within-case analyses of EU representation coherence during the two crises 
respectively. Each case study begins with a brief introduction of background, which is followed by detailed 
discussions of EU coherence at both horizontal and vertical levels. Each section ends with an overall 
assessment of the performance of EU representation through the lens of the principal-agent theory. The final 
section of this chapter compares the degrees of EU representation coherence in the two cases in order to tell 
whether an increase can be detected in the Libya crisis, which occurred after the ToL‟s entry into force. 
6.1 A Discussion of Case Selection  
The Iraq and Libya crises first came into notice in the descriptive statistics displayed in Chapter 5 about 
EU voting behaviour in the UNSC. Out of 1,264 voted UNSC resolutions, there were six on which EU 
member states voted inconsistently. Of all these six “deviation” cases, three resolutions on which France 
abstained referred to the situation in Iraq, and one on the military action against Libya was notoriously 
known for its bitter EU debacle for Germany‟s abstention. Considering the relevant rarity of abstentions at 
the level of the UNSC, the sensitivity and intensity of the Iraq and Libya crises make them outstanding cases 




The case studies adopt a “most-similar systems” design, where the independent variable of interest is the 
implementation of the ToL.118 A close-range study of the Iraq and Libya conflicts reveal many parallels. 
Both cases exhibited roughly similar salience as security crises and attracted substantial international 
attention, e.g., both crises were covered extensively by world media, addressed at the UNGA and 
intensively debated within the UNSC. The purpose of both conflicts was to eliminate the dictatorial regimes, 
which were considered threats to their own people. Ironically, both dictators, Saddam Hussein and 
Muammar Gaddafi encountered a sudden fall despite their claims that they would prevail. Therefore, the 
durations of both conflicts were relatively short. Both conflicts were subject to foreign military intervention 
and involved similar interlocutors, including NATO-led coalitions and EU member states. One more thing, 
the primary export of both countries is oil, although whether this factor was crucial during the two conflicts 
is still debatable.  
For the EU specifically, both conflicts constitute litmus tests of reformed delegation structure of EU 
representation brought by treaty reforms. In need of addressing the failure of the Union to act cohesively 
during the Balkan crises in the 1990s, the Amsterdam Treaty appointed the HR/SG to assist the revolving 
Presidency in order to bring more coherence to EU external representation. The Iraq war was the first major 
security issue that occurred after this innovation. Similarly, the unrest in Libya – which broke out about 14 
months after the ToL was ratified and less than two months after the EEAS was declared operational – 
offered a timely opportunity to test the new CFSP-related institutional structures. Therefore, the fact that 
they are divided before and after the ToL‟s entry into force can be exploited to detect the effects of the ToL 
on representation coherence. 
Moreover, the EU was reported to be highly divided during both conflicts (e.g., Springford 2003; 
Hughes 2003; Bluth 2004; Gaffney 2004). The statistical evidence presented earlier in Chapter 5 about EU 
representation coherence at the UNGA find that although EU voting cohesion has been incrementally 
increasing over time and although the Union performs more coherently in general than the UNGA as a 
                                                 
118 The most-similar systems design means that “the chosen pair of cases is similar on all the measured independent variables, 
except the independent variable of interest” (King et al. 1994). If the independent variable of interest and the dependent variable 
differ in both cases, it can be concluded that this independent variable is likely of relevance when explaining the outcome. This 
design is useful to exclude alternative variables strategically. But notice that when it comes to explicit qualification, few events in 




whole, there is no obvious evidence between the implementation of the ToL and an increase in EU voting 
cohesion, either in general or in specific issue areas. A possible cause could be the remaining agency 
problems and new institutional tensions that were discussed in Chapter 4. However, due to the limitations of 
quantitative measurements – as mentioned in the introductory chapter – that voting cohesion is not able to 
measure every aspect of representation coherence, it is unclear whether these findings drawn from the 
context of the UNGA also apply to the UNSC. Close-range case studies can provide rich information and 
complement the limitation of our insights drawn from the descriptive statistics on EU voting behaviour at 
the UNSC in the previous chapter. An elaborate discussion of the EU‟s representation from the perspectives 
of both horizontal and vertical coherence makes up the weakness of quantitative analysis that cannot 
demonstrate the precise coordination mechanisms of the EU. Considering the attention of these two cases 
gained from the UN, and especially the UNSC, they are more than suitable for test the hypothesis regarding 
the variation of EU representation coherence at this body. In addition, by examining the recent events of the 
Libya crisis, which rooted in the Arab Spring, the case study gains the advantage to analyze the status of EU 
representation in the CFSP field as it is to date. 
Obviously, a research involving two cases will not be able to seek statistical generalization as the 
quantitative analyses conducted in the previous chapter were trying to accomplish. But it is possible to have 
analytical generalizations by comparing the empirical evidence with the hypothesis generated from the 
principal-agent theory (cf. Yin 2009). As explained earlier, the Iraq war and the Libya crisis can be seen as 
contested cases. If EU representation coherence managed to increase in highly politicized and sensitive 
conflicts like these two cases, it would be logical to assume a similar trend in less contested cases. 
6.2 The EU and the Iraq Crisis 
The Iraq crisis caused an unprecedented challenge to the CFSP since it was introduced by the Maastricht 
Treaty (Levy et al. 2005). It could have been a chance for the Union to display its collective policy-making 
abilities to the world, especially after it was equipped by the Treaty of Amsterdam with a new HR/SG. 
However, the fifteen EU member states back then failed to forge a common foreign policy toward Iraq 




preferences of EU members were arguably at odds when the UK, Italy and Spain aligned themselves with 
the US in support of military intervention while France and Germany were in strong opposition and argued 
for peaceful solutions. The rest of EU members were hesitant about any early and clear positioning but 
eventually had to choose sides between the two camps (Gaffney 2004: 247). Although the Central and 
Eastern European countries that were waiting in line to accede to the EU overwhelmingly fell to the line of 
the UK-led coalition, their proactive action did not contribute to bridging the internal cleavage with France 
and Germany. What was more problematic was the way the Union dealt with the crisis once again 
demonstrated the inherent weaknesses of its representative system and of decision-making in the foreign 
policy field. The role of the rotating Presidency, which should have been the leading agent of the EU, was 
deeply downplayed because of the enormous divergences among the collective principals, i.e., EU member 
states. The HR/SG that was supposed to assist the EU Presidency to build a common EU response to the 
crisis was almost invisible during the decision-making process that was full of clashes. The Iraq case 
exemplifies the inherent institutional agency problems of the pre-Lisbon EU representational system as 
indicated in Chapter 4.  
6.2.1 Background 
After the Gulf war, the US and its European allies had been trying to force Iraq‟s compliance with a 
series of UNSC resolutions that prohibited it from developing or possessing weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD). Their efforts proved to be hardly effective due to Iraq‟s constant resistance to cooperate with the 
UN inspection. The concerns of America about Iraq intensified after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Early in 2002, 
President George W. Bush named Iraq, Iran, and North Korea the new “axis of evil” posing grave a danger 
for world security (Copson 2003; Springford 2003). In the same year American and British intelligence 
revealed with considerable certainty that the Iraqi government possessed extensive WMD projects and 
would acquire a nuclear capability fairly soon. It directly led to a change of US foreign policy from 
containment to regime change (Levy et al. 2005). By late August, the Bush Administration had recognized 
that a pre-emptive war against Iraq was almost inevitable. The intention to attack Iraq was first revealed by 




that more UN weapons inspections would be effective and concluded that the problem of Iraq would be 
better solved without Saddam Hussein (Gordon and Shapiro 2004: 168). This speech was later denied as an 
official positioning of the US, which left European states confused (Peterson 2004: 12-13). 
On 12 September President Bush addressed the UN and called for the authorization of the use of force 
against Saddam‟s regime. But after rounds of intensive negotiations, the US eventually sought compromise 
and agreed to give Iraq a final opportunity to comply due to the strong opposition for war from three veto 
players of the UNSC, i.e., France, China and Russia. The result was the unanimously adopted UNSC 
Resolution 1441 on 8 November. The Resolution required the Iraqi government to accept the resumption of 
UN inspection and insisted on its unconditional compliance or face “serious consequences” otherwise. It 
also decided that any false statements or omissions in Iraq‟s declarations and the failure to comply with the 
implementation of this resolution would constitute a further breach of Iraq‟s obligations (UN Security 
Council 2002). UNSC members agreed that Resolution 1441 did not endorse strikes against Iraq nor did it 
contain any “automaticity” with respect to the use of force if Iraq failed to meet the requirements to be 
disarmed. It reserved the right of discussing measures for the next phase to the UNSC in the event of further 
Iraqi violations of its obligations. Washington made it clear that this resolution could not prevent any 
member state to act against the threat if the UNSC failed to issue sanctions for war (Byers 2004).  
In the aftermath of the adoption of Resolution 1441, Iraq accepted the return of UN weapon inspectors 
but still cooperated in a half-hearted manner. A month later, Iraq submitted a weapon declaration to the UN 
denying the possession of any WMD. The declaration provided few updates in the eyes of the UN 
Inspection chief Hans Blix. He reported on 27 January 2003 that Iraq had not come to a genuine acceptance 
of disarmament while admitted at the same time that no evidence of WMD was found yet (Bluth 2004; 
Gordon and Shapiro 2004). Based on this report, America, Britain and their allies asserted further Iraqi 
breach of UN resolutions, whereas opponents argued that Iraq should be given more time to comply. 
Considering the Iraqi statement a lie, US Secretary of State Colin Powell presented self-claimed compelling 
evidence gathered by American and British intelligence before the UNSC on 5 February, arguing that Iraq 




However, Blix‟s impression of Iraqi cooperation was improved in his report on 7 March because Iraq had 
begun to destroy its al-Samoud missiles. He however questioned the reliability of the evidence Powell had 
presented before by pointing out that UN inspection teams found no evidence suggesting that Iraq was 
hiding unconventional weapons (Kendall 2003). Washington persisted in using the first report as the basis 
for the conviction of Iraq‟s further defiance and meanwhile had started to prepare a war by deploying 
American troops to the Gulf region (Gordon and Shapiro op. cit. 172). 
Washington‟s resolve to go to war left its European allies unprepared and badly divided into two camps. 
Some traditionally Atlanticist European countries led by the UK aligned with the US in support of the use of 
force, while others centring around France and Germany strongly opposed military action in Iraq and 
insisted on a diplomatic solution. The tension was intensified when the eight pro-US countries – five of then 
fifteen EU members, i.e., Britain, Italy, Denmark, Spain and Portugal, and three Central and Eastern 
European countries that would join the Union in 2004, namely Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic – 
co-signed a letter to advocate the US policy publicly in late January 2003 (Wood 2003; Hughes 2004).119 
The “Letter of Eight” was shortly followed by a “Vilnius Letter”, jointly sponsored by the Vilnius Group 
that lined up to enter the NATO and the EU as well (Rhodes 2004: 428).120 On the opposite spectrum, 
Germany and France, with the support of Russia, waged an anti-war campaign. When European leaders 
were busy quarrelling with each other, an unprecedented massive anti-war demonstration started from 
mid-February in all major European cities and soon swept across the entire Europe (Balabanova 2011: 74). 
In face of the widespread protests against war, EU leaders on 17 February reached a temporary agreement 
that force would only be used as a last resort.  
Persuaded by Britain, the US went back to the UNSC to seek a second UNSC resolution authorizing 
military strikes against Iraq but only realized afterwards that such a resolution would never be approved 
since France, Russia and possibly China would use their veto power if necessary, which once wielded would 
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make other votes from other UN members irrelevant (Dunne 2012: 427).121 The three countries plus 
Germany proposed to give UN inspectors another four months to complete their work, which was found 
unacceptable by the US and its proponents in the UNSC.  
Due to lack of success in garnering support for the second resolution, Washington concluded that 
diplomatic possibilities at the UN had been exhausted. They eventually withdrew their proposal on 17 
March but decided to proceed to attack Iraq anyway with or without a clear UN mandate. On the same day, 
President Bush declared a 48-hour deadline for Saddam and his sons to leave the country or face a war 
otherwise (Gordon and Shapiro 2004: 154). When the ultimatum was ignored, the “coalition of the willing” 
led by the US officially began on 19 March with an aerial attack against a location where Saddam was 
suspected to be meeting with top Iraqi officials (Copson 2003).122 Despite the unexpected harsh resistance 
from the Iraqi side, the military operation was rather quick and decisive. Baghdad fell on 9 April, signifying 
the collapse of Saddam‟s 21-year ruling of Iraq. By the beginning of May, Bush had already declared 
victory because of the end of major combat operations while Saddam was still at large and insurgencies 
between different groups as well as attacks against coalition forces were still going on (Ibid. 35). Later that 
month the UNSC passed Resolution 1483 and legitimised the Coalition‟s control of Iraq. 
Saddam was finally captured on 13 December, and was then executed by the new Iraqi government in 
2006 after a year-long trial. Ironically, WMD stockpiles that could justify the US-led operation to topple 
Saddam were never found in Iraq, according to the Duelfer Report by the Iraq Survey Group, which was a 
fact-finding mission dispatched by the multinational force to replace the UN inspection teams to find hard 
evidence for Iraq‟s material breach of disarmament obligations (Bluth 2004:888). French and German 
leaders might somehow have felt that their decisions were vindicated, but it did not change the fact they had 
not won support by other EU member states. On 16 October 2003, the UNSC unanimously approved 
Resolution 1511 that effectively authorized the occupation of Iraq by the multinational forces. The UNSC 
called on UN members to contribute to the maintenance of security in a post-war Iraq. France, Russia and 
                                                 
121 In the UNSC at that time, the US, Britain, Spain and Bulgaria were in favour of a resolution authorizing the invasion while 
France, Germany, Russia, China and Syria had expressed their opposition to such a proposal. The other six countries, also known as 
the “undecided six”, including Angola, Cameroon, Chile, Guinea, Mexico and Pakistan, were caught in between the two lines. But 
even if the US and its allies could win the support of all six countries, their efforts would become meaningless once a veto was cast. 




Germany only agreed to support the resolution when they were assured that a deadline would be set up for 
the coalition to return power to the Iraqi people (Byers 2004: 181). 
In late June 2004, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), a transitional governing body created by 
the multinational coalition shortly after the invasion of Iraq began, formally transferred power to the 
newly-appointed Iraqi Interim Government. The transitional Iraqi National Assembly was elected on 31 
January 2005, which formed the Iraqi Transitional Government and was given a mandate to draft a 
permanent constitution (Gordon and Shapiro 2004). A referendum held on 15 October ratified the new Iraqi 
constitution. The Transitional Government was later replaced by a permanent Iraqi government on 20 May 
2006. In October 2011, US President Barack Obama declared that all U.S. troops would withdraw from Iraq 
by the end of the year. On 15 December, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta formally announced the Iraq War 
was over (Stahl 2008). However, violence continued in post-Saddam Iraq. Conflicts between Sunni and 
Shia Iraqi groups and bomb attacks against the authority constituted a constant threat to the stability of the 
new government and the safety of the Iraqi population. Until today, the Iraq war remains a disputable 
question not only because the WMD that justified the course of military intervention were never found on 
Iraqi soil but also because the security situation in Iraq is still problematic.  
6.2.2 Horizontal Coherence: EU-level Response to the Crisis 
This sub-section explores the role of the rotating Presidency, the HR/SG and the Commissioner of 
External Relations in representing the Union during the Iraq crisis, the coordination between these two 
institutions and the extent to which they were able to deliver coherent EU foreign policy. The first collective 
response towards Iraq was made in late August 2002 by the Foreign Minister from the Danish Presidency, 
Per Stig Møller, who on behalf of the Union called on the Iraqi government to allow the immediate return of 
UN inspection teams but meanwhile indicated that no decision had been reached within the EU on military 
action (Stahl 2008: 9).123 On 16 October, the Danish Presidency made a statement in the UNSC, which 
emphasised the necessity to resume UN inspections. Its pro-US position became obvious when Prime 
                                                 
123 Denmark started to serve as the EU Presidency on 1 July 2002. The successive presidencies, notably Greece (1 January – 30 June 
2003) and Italy (1 July – 31 December 2003), were cooperating with the Danish Presidency as Presidency trios for an 18-month 




Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen made a controversial statement stating that the UN resolutions to date 
sufficed to legitimize a military intervention (Stahl op.cit.11). The Danish government later became one of 
the signatories of the “Letter of Eight”. There is evidence suggesting that even before signing the letter 
Denmark had been prepared to actively support the US (Ibid. 14). Denmark officially declared war on Iraq 
in March 2003 and submitted its troops to US command (Rhodes 2004: 428). It appeared that Denmark, as 
the agent of the EU, was trying to be prudent and avoid any specific positioning on Iraq. However, in the end 
its Atlanticist policy orientation prevailed and the Danish Presidency was involved in shirking. 
Greece succeeded Denmark as the Presidency in the first half of 2003. Before the succession took place, 
Greek Prime Minister Costas Simitis had marked CFSP approach as the core of their presidential work 
(Levy et al. 2005). Since then the Greek Presidency had been trying hard to patch up the differences among 
EU member states to reach a common ground preferably based on a negotiated solution. On 27 January the 
EU was able to issue a joint declaration demanding Iraq to comply completely without delay with UN 
weapons inspection. But it merely reflected the “lowest common denominator” acceptable to all EU 
members. The Union remained to be fractured with the UK, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Denmark and several accession countries being supportive of American appeal for military intervention on 
one side as the “New Europe”, whereas Germany, France, Belgium and Luxembourg on the other side as the 
“Old Europe” strongly opposing a unilateral military action (Ibid.).  
Similar to its predecessor, Greece was also hesitant about any early and explicit positioning on the Iraq 
issue (Stahl 2008: 82). The “Letter of Eight” caught Greece by surprise and was considered a disrespect of 
Greek Presidential work since Greece had not been consulted in the first place. Simitis strongly criticised the 
letter, arguing that the declaration was inconsistent with the EU‟s endeavour to reach a common position. 
But the Prime Minister was not the only one feeling marginalized. Neither Commission President Romano 
Prodi nor HR/SG Solana were consulted either, let alone the block co-led by France and Germany that were 
against military action (Ibid.).  
In the meantime, large-scale demonstrations for peace were taking place across Europe. In mid-February, 




were organized in London, Rome and Madrid, the capitals of the three EU countries that were most 
committed to a US-led war against Iraq (Levy et al. 2005; Balabanova 2011). In order to unite an 
increasingly widening Union and to respond to the quickly growing anti-war population, the Greek 
Presidency convened an extraordinary meeting of the European Council on 17 February (Wood 2003: 15). 
UN Secretary Kofi Annan and European Parliament President Pat Cox also attended the summit. Before the 
summit began, the Greek presidency had warned that the Union would enter a deep crisis if a common 
foreign policy on Iraq was still unachievable. Luckily at the end of the meeting, EU leaders managed to 
reach a compromise resolution to give Iraq a final opportunity to resolve the crisis peacefully. The joint 
statement clarified that the EU‟s primary objective remained to be full and complete disarmament of Iraq 
and repeated the Union‟s conviction of the central authority of the UNSC in dealing with the issue of Iraq. 
This statement echoed France and Germany‟s positions that UN inspectors should be extended to complete 
their task but pointed out that inspections could not continue indefinitely. The meeting recognized that war 
was not inevitable but would only be used as a last resort. It was the first time that the EU collectively 
acknowledged the possibility of military intervention. Three days later, the thirteen acceding and candidate 
countries aligned with the EU‟s position after they were briefed by the EU troika, composed of Greek Prime 
Minister Simitis, Commission President Prodi and UN foreign policy chief Solana.  
The common position was achieved because both camps made certain concessions. The pro-US group 
led by Britain agreed to drop the demand for setting a deadline for UN teams to complete weapon 
inspections while the anti-war group represented by France and Germany accepted an agreement that did 
not rule out the use of force (Mahony 2003). Prior to the EU Summit, France, Germany and Belgium had 
softened their positions on the issue of defending Turkey against Iraq, which had been debated for weeks 
within NATO. Both Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreou and UN foreign policy chief Solana highly 
praised the EU summit. They believed that the EU was united again on a very important problem, an 
announcement which was later only proved to be too optimistic.  
Like the previous joint statement, it merely united the EU on paper but by no means resolved the 




In the wake of the summit, French President Jacques Chirac spoke at a press conference in which he rebuked 
the “Vilnius Ten” for taking the Anglo-American line and warned that such a move might endanger their 
EU membership (Rhodes 2004: 433). This speech not only incurred a storm of criticism from EU candidates 
but also conflicted with the perspective of EU Commissioner of External Relations, Chris Patten. In a 
speech before the EP on 12 March, Patten remarked that EU enlargement should not be called into question 
simply because the acceding countries had different views on Iraq and assured that they would be welcomed 
to join the EU. The Commissioner also warned that the risk of collateral damage and a revival of terrorism 
caused by a war, but he added that if military conflict was proven unavoidable, the decision should be taken 
by the UNSC (EU@UN 2003). Blair chose to do just the opposite against Chirac. He highly praised the 
leadership of the “Vilnius” on the Iraq issue in a letter addressed to EU applicant countries. Meanwhile, 
Britain emphasized that force shall be used if Iraq could not be disarmed peacefully and started to work with 
America and Spain to push through a second UNSC resolution sanctioning military intervention in Iraq. 
France and Germany, together with Russia, repeatedly claimed that they would not support such a resolution. 
However, the US and its European followers had made their minds to strike Iraq no matter whether a clear 
UN mandate existed or not. Foreseeing the failure of the UNSC to endorse use of force, they revoked the 
proposed resolution and launched military offences on 19 March (Gordon and Shapiro 2004: 163).  
Until then, the Greek Presidency had exhausted all the institutional and political possibilities in its 
disposal but still the Union failed to close ranks and to reach consensus on an appropriate response to the 
threat posed by Iraq. The Presidency conclusions of the 20 and 21 March European Council reiterated the 
EU‟s commitment to the full disarmament of Iraq and invited the Commission and the HR/SG to explore the 
means by which the EU might be able to contribute to post-war reconstruction (Council 2003a). As all its 
endeavours turned out to be fruitless, Simitis expressed on the eve of war that the Greek government was in 
strict opposition to a war lack of legitimacy and that Greece would not participate in the US-led invasion 
against Iraq. This declaration marked that Greece had officially sided with the Franco-German anti-war axis. 
But Greece supported the US-led coalition indirectly and logistically. It also allowed the US to use its 




Later Blair called on other EU leaders to put their differences over the war in Iraq behind and focused on 
finding a common approach regarding the reconstruction of the country. The Greek Presidency also 
encouraged EU members to search for a common ground to restore the damage to the transatlantic relations. 
On 16 April, Greece issued the Presidency‟s statement in which it called for a further stronger UN 
involvement in post-conflict Iraq and reaffirmed the Union‟s pledge to play a significant role in the political 
and economic reconstruction of Iraq (Council 2003b). Since the Union and some of its key members had 
already been sidelined in the previous military action, its role in Iraq‟s reconstruction was doomed to be 
limited. At the end of the month, the core of “old Europe”, namely France, Germany, Belgium and 
Luxembourg held a small summit in Tervuren to discuss the possibility of closer defence cooperation. None 
of the “new” European states was invited (Mouritzen 2006: 140). This was ferociously criticised by those 
Atlanticist EU members which accused these four countries were trying to institutionalize an already 
divided EU (Menon 2004).  
As the agent of the Union, Greece made achieved certain success by bringing about a common EU 
position. But eventually it failed to facilitate further consensus and fell into the anti-war camp (Mouritzen op. 
cit. 153). The position of the Greek Presidency was backed by HR/SG Javier Solana and External Relations 
Commissioner Chris Patten, who also advocated for diplomatic instruments and multilateralism (Patten 
2003). But both actors took a low-key profile in the crisis, and gradually faded from the debate as the 
intra-EU arguments became heated. This indecisiveness of EU institutions was reaffirmed by the 
Parliament‟s failure to reach any kind of agreement Iraq. The PSC, which was just made a permanent body, 
did not play a meaningful role during the entire process of the crisis. Many PSC ambassadors received strict 
instructions from their respective MFAs that Iraq was to be kept rigorously off the agenda (Juncos and 
Reynolds 2007; Howorth 2010).  
By the time Italy took over the EU Presidency, Iraq had no longer been a top priority on the Presidency‟s 
agenda. Italian Foreign Minister Franco Frattini confirmed his support of a possible US intervention, but 
made it clear that Italy was not a nation at war (Stahl 2008: 91). Frattini also declared that it was time for the 




relationship (Ibid.). There were practically no serious discussions in the Council of Ministers or in the 
European Council on Iraq during the Italian Presidency. EU member states acted as if the matter was for the 
UNSC and the US to solve. After the adoption of UNSC Resolution 1483, the EU lifted its sanctions against 
Iraq. In June 2004, the EU endorsed a medium-term strategy paper for relations with Iraq, which had been 
jointly proposed by the HR/SG and the Commission.124  
6.2.3 Vertical Coherence: Divergent Reactions from EU Member States 
The Iraq crisis marked a nadir of European integration in the field of foreign policy. As some scholars 
have elaborated, the lack of EU representation coherence during the 2003 Iraq war was caused by 
deep-rooted policy differences within the collective principals, i.e., EU member states (Stahl 2008; Portela 
2009). It leads to the vertical dimension of coherence, which needs to be assessed by the degree of 
preference homogeneity or heterogeneity among EU member states, the extent to which they managed to 
coordinate their national policies, and the extent to which those EU member states serving on the UNSC 
concerted and shared information. Moreover, the capacities of EU institutions, e.g., the rotating Presidency 
and the HR/SG, in organising and perhaps facilitating the coordination should be evaluated. It also demands 
an examination of whether the positions stated by EU institutions and national representatives are coherent.  
The consensus of the Union stopped at the point that Iraq should be fully disarmed. Yet EU members 
were profoundly divided over the means – diplomatic or military – to achieve the goal, the importance of the 
UN, and American leadership in regard to solving the Iraq crisis. At the heart of these disputes were 
differing perceptions of the prospect for the Union‟s CFSP and its relationship with the US. Based on 
different considerations of national interests, EU member states parted ways with Britain, Spain, Italy and 
several acceding Eastern European countries, choosing to firmly support a US-led military invasion of Iraq 
while German and France deciding to prevent a war by all means. The rest of EU members at first were 
hesitant to take clear positioning but eventually had to gather around one line or the other. As Patten pointed 
out, CFSP suffered a severe setback because EU member states on both sides of the debate had chosen to 
take firm national policy positions as if they spoke for the EU as a whole (EU@UN 2003). The subsequent 
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analysis will mainly focus on the “Big Three”. In the anti-war camp, Germany and France are selected as 
these two countries were the most determined opponents of a US-led war against Iraq. They are chosen also 
because they were serving the UNSC at the time of the crisis with Germany as an elected member while 
France was a permanent member with veto power. The UK is selected for the same reason but also because 
it was the spearhead of the pro-war camp.  
Germany was the first EU country that clearly clarified its position opposing a war in Iraq due to a 
national election looming in September 2002. Having a sharp nose for a public that was growing 
war-averse,125 Chancellor Gerhard Schröder declared in early August at the start of his re-election campaign 
that Germany was not available for adventures and therefore would not provide troops or money for an 
attack on Iraq even if it was mandated by the UNSC (Hooper 2003). Schröder further distanced himself 
from Bush as the election was approaching. On 30 August, a day after Cheney‟s the speech calling for 
regime change of Iraq, the Chancellor threatened to withdraw German biological and chemical detection 
equipment in Kuwait if the US unilaterally attacked Iraq. Absolute rejection of war brought Schröder a close 
victory of the Social Democratic Party (SPD)-Green coalition in the election but also made him extremely 
unpopular among American and British elites who were advocating military action. For instance, President 
Bush did not congratulate Schröder after he was re-elected, which was unprecedented in the history of 
German-American relations since the Federal Republic was established.  
In November 2002 the UNSC decided to give Iraq a last chance to comply with the UN‟s disarmament 
request or face serious consequences. It was reported that Germany played a crucial role in persuading the 
UK and the US to drop a reference that might imply automatic military intervention in case of Iraq‟s 
uncooperative behaviour (Mahony 2003). Leading policy-makers of Berlin found themselves not convinced 
by the evidence presented by the US that Iraq posed an immediate threat and needed to be neutralized by 
force. Although there was a consensus within the government that war was unacceptable, differences 
existed within the red-green coalition on how to address the Iraq issue publicly. On 21 January 2003, the 
Chancellor declared at a campaign event that Germany would not approve a second resolution authorizing 
                                                 




war. This statement, according to Foreign Minister Joshcka Fischer, had reduced Germany‟s diplomatic 
leeway to zero (Fischer 2011). The Foreign Minister, as a sophisticated diplomat and a Green member, 
preferred not to take a categorical position so that Germany would not be isolated. Largely due to his 
personal efforts, Germany was able to back down and settled with a joint EU statement in February that 
accepted the possibility of the use of force.   
In late January, Hans Blix, the chief weapons inspector, released his first progress report on Iraqi 
disarmament, in which he concluded that although Iraq had decided to cooperate in principle, so far it had 
not provided full information for the unaccounted weapon stocks to inspectors. American and British 
governments took this report as evidence of Iraq‟s further violation of its disarmament obligations and had 
lost their patience for an extension of UN inspection (Gordon and Shapiro 2004). Germany, as a sitting 
member in the UNSC and its Presidency starting from 1 February was unable to present any concrete 
initiative to close ranks within the UNSC. In order not to be isolated, Berlin moved closer to the positions of 
Paris and Moscow. Believing that the inspections were producing results, France shifted its policy of being 
open to all options to steadfast opposition against a military intervention. At the 40th anniversary of the 
Elysée Treaty on 22 January, Schröder addressed the press conference with French President Chirac that the 
two countries had agreed to completely harmonize their positions and find a peaceful solution to the Iraq 
crisis (Hughes 2003). On 10 February, the two countries aligned with Russia and jointly declared their 
preference for the continuation of UN inspection and their determination to disarm Iraq peacefully while in 
the meantime acknowledged the use of force as the last resort (Goldthau 2008). On 5 March Berlin, Paris 
and Moscow hardened their positions in a second joint declaration saying that they would not allow a 
resolution legitimising war to be passed, which implied that France and Russia as permanent members of the 
UNSC were prepared to use their vetoes. The three countries made a last-minute joint attempt to prevent war 
in mid-March. In a letter addressed to the President of the UNSC from Germany‟s Permanent 
Representative to the UN, the foreign ministers of Germany, France and Russia jointly appealed to all 




justified the use of force (UN Security Council 2003). Their efforts can be seen as an attempt to balance the 
hegemonic power of the US on the Middle East.  
Berlin‟s last try to avoid military conflict turned out to be fruitless when one when the US-led “coalition 
of the willing” launched their strikes against Baghdad. Germany‟s absolute anti-war stance on Iraq marked a 
departure from its traditional policy to align with the US at moments of crisis. It reflected Germany‟s 
increasing ambition to play an independent role in international affairs and its deep scepticism regarding the 
use of force in general due to its restraint tradition (Levy et al. 2005). The logic behind Berlin‟s 
decision-making is multi-fold: as far as German statesmen were concerned, a war against Iraq was not only 
unnecessary – especially when the UN inspection team was making progress – but also mistaken (Stahl 
2008). They were worried that an Iraq at war might put regional stability in danger and undermine 
international anti-terrorism efforts. The German government was also afraid of terrorist revenge if Germany 
supported the US. The tragic train bombings in Madrid of 2004 proved that Berlin‟s anxiety had not been 
groundless. But it was domestic political calculations that played a prominent role in German early 
positioning over Iraq. Schröder undoubtedly used the German public‟s widespread scepticism of war and 
anti-American sentiment for electoral advantage. Besides, an approval from the Bundestag for military 
participation in the Iraq war appeared to be very unlikely since the views of Germany‟s political parties 
converged on the war-averse stance. However, Berlin was trapped in its own categorical rhetoric and had to 
stick to it until the end or faced a credibility loss of the coalition government instead (Harnisch 2004).  
This also explains why after its successful re-election, the Chancellery tried to mend fences with the 
American government while holding on to its original position against war and non-participation. As the 
coalition troops were pushing forward, German leaders, including both Schröder and Fischer, softened their 
tones and hoped for a US victory in overthrowing the dictatorship and building democracy in Iraq (Copson 
2003). Regardless of its non-participation in military terms, Germany in fact made a greater material 
contribution to the war than expected. It granted flyover rights for American military aircraft, safeguarded 
US military facilities located within Germany territory, maintained chemical and biological detection 




early as in May following the end of the major combat operations, Schröder indicated that Germany would 
like to participate in the post-conflict reconstruction if the UN would be in dominance of the process. Berlin 
in the end contributed to Iraq‟s reconstruction by providing financial and technical assistance as well as by 
training Iraqi security forces and police outside Iraqi territory.  
France was the closest ally to Germany during the crisis of Iraq. Although France participated in the 
American-led military coalition forcing Iraq out of Kuwait and had severed its relationship with Baghdad 
since 1991. By the mid-1990s, diplomatic and business ties between Paris and Baghdad were gradually 
reconnected. Based on energy and commercial considerations, France started to energetically lobby for 
lifting the sanctions against Iraq. Since then French policy on Iraq had been distancing from that of America 
and Britain. In 1997 and 1999, France twice abstained on UN resolutions regarding the situation of Iraq.126 
The specificity in Franco-Iraqi relations steered the orientation of Paris for a peaceful solution of the crisis. 
When the Bush administration revealed its intention to attack Iraq in the autumn of 2002, the French 
government, though patronizing toward Germany‟s opposition against war, carefully avoided categorical 
pronouncements because it feared that a tough opposition might push the US to simply abandon the UN and 
invade Iraq unilaterally. On 29 August, President Chirac emphasized in a speech to the Annual Conference 
of French Ambassadors that any decision on Iraq must be taken within the framework of the UNSC through 
collective process and suggested the resumption of UN inspectors in Iraq (Gordon and Shapiro 2004). At 
that time, Paris had not completely ruled out a military intervention and even considered the threat of 
resorting to force might help enforce Iraq‟s quicker compliance with the UN. In late September, Chirac 
proposed the need for two UNSC resolutions for a military operation to be taken in Iraq. France accepted a 
resolution threatening the use or force after it made sure that it excluded any automatic trigger of military 
attack in case of Iraq‟s non-compliance. Chirac even offered his services to convince Syria not to vote 
against it so that UNSC Resolution 1441 could be adopted unanimously (Stahl 2008).  
The French open-to-all-option policy towards Iraq only lasted until January 2003. While Washington 
and London insisted that Iraq‟s incomplete cooperation presented in Blix‟s preliminary assessment had 
                                                 




constituted a further material breach of UN resolutions, Paris had a different interpretation which 
recognized the progress made by UN inspection teams and believed that peaceful disarmament was still 
workable. President Chirac stressed that France would only support military action if the UNSC as a whole 
made that decision based on the report of UN inspectors. It was rather an insincere statement since France 
could veto the resolution if it wanted. Still it sent a confusing signal to Washington that Paris might give 
consent to military action. On 20 January, France as the monthly Presidency of the UNSC was holding a 
session on terrorism. Foreign Minister De Villepin had convinced Powell to attend the meeting with a 
promise that there would be no debate on Iraq (Rhodes 2004). But at a press conference after the meeting, 
the French foreign minister told the reporter that nothing in the circumstances raised the prospect for a 
second UN resolution and indicated the possibility of using the veto to stick to its principle (Peterson 2004). 
Two days later, at the anniversary celebrating the 40-year Franco-Germany friendship, Chirac announced 
that the two countries held the same judgment on the Iraq crisis. He portrayed himself and Schröder as the 
representatives of European citizens, which brought discontent from British, Spanish and Italian leaders 
since they felt that their leaderships were downplayed (Hughes 2003; Gaffney 2004).  
In late January and early February, altogether eighteen European countries publicly expressed their 
solidarity with the Anglo-Saxon camp. Afraid of being isolated in the UNSC, France and Germany sought 
Russia‟s support. On 10 February, Russian President Vladimir Putin started his three-day visit to Paris. At a 
press conference that evening, President Chirac read out the France-Germany-Russia joint statement in 
which the three countries emphasized that force could only be used after all peaceful means had been 
exhausted (Lichfield and Penketh 2003). Despite the temporary concession made by the Franco-Germany 
axis in the extraordinary EU summit a week later, two subsequent joint statements with Russia in March 
with stronger rhetoric revealed that no way would France approve another UN resolution justifying war. The 
conflict got further intensified when Chirac made a controversial speech at a press conference after the 
summit, denouncing the choice of the acceding Eastern European states for their alliance with the pro-war 
camp. He admonished these countries for missing a good opportunity to remain silent and threatened that 




As a counterweight to Washington and London‟s efforts to gather international support for military 
intervention, throughout February and March, France carried out active diplomatic activities to pressure the 
other UNSC members to reject a second resolution which could authorize a war against Iraq. For example, 
the French foreign minister on 9 March began a three-day tour to Angola, Guinea, and Cameroon to ensure 
that these African countries would not cast affirmative votes on a pro-war resolution. A day later, Chirac 
appeared in television and declared that France would use its veto “regardless of the circumstances” since 
there were “no grounds for waging war” (Peterson 2004). It became clear until that a second resolution 
would not be passed. The US, Spain and the UK dropped their attempt to secure a UN mandate and 
delivered an ultimatum to Iraq. On the same day, Chirac expressed his regret of Washington‟s decision to 
abandon diplomacy and resort to war. He reasserted that nothing justified a war that might cause heavy 
humanitarian disasters and negative repercussions for the stability of the region. Chirac even refused to 
commit France to economic aid to rebuild Iraq (Kampfner 2003). However, as the war was developing 
toward a victory of the “coalition of the willing”, the anti-war camp softened their tones to remedy the 
fractured relations with the US. Both German Chancellor Schröder and French President Chirac expressed 
their hope for a swift US military victory with the toppling of Saddam Hussein but emphasized the 
importance for the UN to take the lead in the post-war reconstruction.   
The softer approach on Iraq in the earlier days of the crisis was out of its diplomatic considerations to 
have more leeway in negotiations. As UN inspection teams were making progress in Iraq, and Washington 
could not provide decisive evidence of Iraqi possessions of WMD programmes, Paris began to harden its 
position and moved closer to Berlin‟s absolute anti-war orientation. French leaders shared the concerns of 
their German counterparts, worrying that a war in Iraq might further destabilize the region of the Middle 
East and exert a negative impact on the wider fight against terrorism. But its policy making on Iraq was 
mainly guided by national policy preferences and domestic political situations.  First, Paris preferred the 
problem of Iraq to be solved in the UNSC where France as a permanent member could heavily influence the 
decision-making process. Second, France, considering itself as a great power, opposed unilateral US 




policy since Charles de Gaulle. Core French leaderships were firm proponents of multipolarism which 
upholds a multipolar world order based on the primacy of international norms and multilateral cooperation. 
Moreover, the anti-war stance also enjoyed wide support across the political spectrum and among the 
French population. The massive demonstrations in mid-February demonstrated that the majority of the 
Europeans opposed the war. A poll published in April 2003 discovered that around 80 percent of the French 
population opposed an American-led invasion against Iraq and about 75 percent agreed with French foreign 
policy at the time (Wood 2003). Chirac‟s performance during the crisis showed certain opportunism in 
improving personal prestige, both international and national, by portraying himself as the true spokesman of 
European citizens and a counterweight of American hegemony in order to win more political popularity 
(Gaffney 2004; Styan 2006).  
Some may argue that Paris and Berlin were driven by commercial and energy interests. Iraq is indeed 
rich in oil, but during the crisis international sanctions remained in place. It is also true that France tried to 
convince the international community to lift the sanctions on Iraq as the severed business ties had quietly 
started to resume after the mid-1990s. But during the crisis in 2002-2003, France did not have a considerable 
share of trade or oil interests that needed to be protected at the expense of damaging its relationship with the 
UK and the US. At the time of the crisis, French exports to Iraq only accounted for less than 0.3 percent of 
its overall exports and about 0.2 percent of its GDP (Copson 2003). Its imports from Iraq only accounted for 
0.2 percent of overall imports and 0.05 percent of its GDP. As for Germany, its oil and gas companies were 
not part of drilling consortia or involved in pipeline projects in Iraq and its commercial share with Iraq was 
even smaller (Gordon and Shapiro 2004). If commercial and energy interests had been the main 
considerations of France and Germany, they would have aligned with the Anglo-Saxon camp in exchange 
for a fair share of oil and other spoils after the war. Their later shift to a softer rhetoric after the war began 
could be based on the concerns that they would be excluded from taking part in shaping a post-war Iraq and 
the fears that their companies would be barred from getting lucrative reconstruction contracts with Iraq. 
Germany might take the false accusations for being the key of EU division because of the Chancellor‟s 




revealed more details of the decision process during early 2002. Britain in fact had identified itself as the 
loyalist ally of the US months earlier, without any prior coordination with other EU members. As early as in 
the beginning of April, British Prime Minister Tony Blair sent his policy adviser David Manning to 
Washington to find out Washington‟s attitude towards Iraq. Manning reported back that war was inevitable 
since Bush had made up his mind to topple Saddam by force. Bearing Manning‟s findings in mind, Blair 
told the President on 6 April that Britain would go along with the US in principle in a meeting in Crawford. 
Blair and his senior staff had examined specific invasion scenarios of an invasion of Iraq by the time of July 
(Mazarr 2007). For the Premier, the remaining question was on what terms the war would be fought. In 
order to maximise the case of military action, Blair suggested extending the Anglo-American coalition, 
preferably through the UN. On 10 April, Blair told the House of Commons that Saddam Hussein posed a 
threat to his own people, to the region and to Britain and thus could not be left unchecked (Kampfner 2003).  
When Blair could not assemble the support as he had expected either from British political elites or the 
British public, he started to get “cold feet” about military intervention. Feeling that his career might be at 
stake, at the end of July Blair hinted in a personal letter to Bush that without a UN mandate, the UK might 
not be able to participate in the military operations against Iraq (Dunne 2012). Cheney‟s straightforward 
speech advocating for war on 29 August further strengthened his concerns that the US might be ready to 
bypass the UN. Blair decided to pay a personal visit to Camp David to persuade Bush to give diplomacy a 
chance before the scheduled speech of the President at the UNGA on 12 September (Gordon and Shapiro 
2004). They reached an agreement in early September. Bush agreed to go back to the UN but reserved the 
right to go it alone if the UN failed to force Iraq‟s compliance while Blair promised that if a war was proven 
unavoidable London would be at Washington‟s side.  
As the results of public opinion polls were negative and Blair‟s own Labour Party was increasingly 
divided, the Prime Minister felt that he had to provide hard evidence to save his declining popularity 
(Balabanova 2011). On 24 September, Blair presented to the House of Commons a dossier of Iraq‟s material 
breach of disarmament obligations. The document concluded that Iraq‟s WMD programme was active, 




and Iraq‟s neighbours, and that he was actively trying to acquire nuclear weapons capability.127 In the 
statement, Blair claimed that containment was failing and indicated his support for regime change by saying 
that “the region and the whole world would be better off without Saddam”.128 The statement was followed 
by a day-long Parliamentary debate. During the debate, the Liberal Democrats maintained that the focus 
should be re-launching UN inspections in Iraq and warned about the consequences of a “precipitate” 
military action without the backing of the UN. At the end, there were more than fifty Labour MPs who 
registered their opposition to Blair's stance. But it did not seriously jeopardise the decisive vote in the 
Parliament due to the unequivocal support by the Conservatives. Within the EU, both Germany and 
France‟s positions had indicated that their agreement to a unilateral military operation was impossible. 
Chirac called Blair later that day and expressed his view that the dossier had merely offered indications 
rather than proof of Iraq‟s defiance. The Prime Minister felt that the only way to win domestic approval and 
international support of a war against Iraq was a clear UN mandate that would authorize the use of force. 
However, Germany, France and Russia had made clear that they would not accept a resolution which 
included automaticity for the use of force. The US was hesitant to make a compromise on the other side. The 
British government had to spend months to make sure that the US stayed on the route of the UN. Believing 
the UK could act as a bridge between America and Europe, Blair was determined to reach an agreement 
within the UNSC. After eight weeks of intensive negotiations, the UNSC finally unanimously adopted 
Resolution 1441 which demanded the Iraqi government to fully accept and cooperate with the resumption of 
UN weapon inspections or face serious consequences. Both Blair and Foreign Secretary Jack Straw 
considered the resolution a British diplomatic victory, thinking that the UK had played a pivotal role in 
reconciling the differences between the US and the German-Franco axis. They had no idea at the time that 
they would be caught in a trap of their own making. UN inspectors never found the evidence of Iraq‟s 
possession of WMD stockpiles or nuclear capabilities. It became even worse when UN inspection chief 
Blix‟s reports let many, including French President Chirac, believe that inspection was workable and 
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therefore shifted to stronger opposition of military intervention in Iraq. On 2 December, the British 
government published a second dossier documenting human rights abuses in Iraq, attempting to give its 
appeal for military action against Iraq one more moral ground.129 On 18 December British defence officials 
disclosed that ships were being chartered to carry troops and heavy armour to the Gulf (Norton-Taylor and 
MacAskill 2002). Although the British Ministry of Defence insisted the substantial deployment of British 
force was only for a coercive effect, it was hardly convincing that the UK would just use a highly costly 
military deployment for a psychological purpose. 
After the anti-terrorism UNSC meeting and the 40-year anniversary of the Elysée Treaty, it appeared that 
France and Germany had re-found their co-leadership of the EU on the issue of Iraq (Menon 2004). 
Washington had lost its remaining faith in Paris after French foreign minister De Villepin‟s speech when the 
session of UNSC was over. Any lingering hope of the UK for winning the support or acquiescence from 
Chirac for war was dashed to the ground. The true intention of the British government was not fully revealed 
until January 2003 (Peterson 2004). Seizing on that Blix‟s first progress report to the UNSC provided 
compelling proof of Iraq‟s further breach of UN resolutions, Blair expressed his unequivocal support for 
President Bush‟s position against Iraq. Regardless of the temporary agreement reached by the UK with other 
EU members on 27 January because of Greek‟s efforts, Blair had completely jumped into the pro-US camp 
and was determined to rally a coalition to counterbalance the Franco-German axis (Wood 2003).  
On 30 January, the so-called “Letter of Eight”, co-produced by Britain and Spain, appeared in the Wall 
Street Journal and the leading European newspaper of the signatories and publicly advocated a unity around 
the US position on Iraq. This letter, aiming to isolate Germany and France, not only highlighted the deep rift 
within the EU but also mirrored Rumsfeld‟s schism of the “new” and “old” Europe (Levy et al. 2005). Of 
course, Germany and France were not hinted about the existence of the letter in advance. Because of Blair‟s 
insistence, the letter was also kept secret from the HR/SG, Solana and the Greek presidency (Kampfner 
2003). On the contrary, the US was informed about the letter a day before its publication. No coordination or 
any political solidarity prescribed by the EU‟s CFSP was displayed during the entire process. 
                                                 





Despite the release of two governmental documents against Iraq, public opinion polls in Britain 
remained to be strongly war-averse (Balabanova 2011). A poll in 2003 suggested that about 77 percent of 
British citizens opposed invading Iraq without UN approval (Dunne 2012). Parliament members, including 
most members of Blair‟s own Labour Party and the Cabinet also shared this opinion. Blair, who had made 
his mind to go to war, still had considerable political interests in securing an explicit UN mandate of military 
action. Even though both London and Washington understood that the possibility of adopting a second 
resolution was small, Blair was able to convince Bush to stick to the UN route since it was important for the 
British government to be seen that they had exhausted diplomatic means before resorting to war. Blair even 
thought that a war would still be justified if the UNSC was paralyzed by an “unreasonable” veto (Hughes 
2003). Sympathizing with the predicament of Blair, President Bush decided to help his loyalist friend out 
and agreed to submit another proposal of a resolution to the UNSC by the end of February. 
On 24 February, America, Britain and Spain jointly submitted a resolution draft to the UNSC stating Iraq 
had failed to take the final opportunity to be disarmed peacefully afforded to it in Resolution 1441. Blair‟s 
popularity was further frustrated by a parliamentary revolt on 26 February evening when 198 rebels – of 
which 121 were Labour MPs – voted in the lower house against his strategy toward Iraq after an 
impassioned debate. Liberal Democrats constituted the majority of the remaining rebels. The scale of the 
revolt, the biggest within a governing party for more than a century, demonstrated Blair had failed to win 
public or political support at home (White et al. 2003). It also meant that the Prime Minister would have to 
press even harder to secure a second UNSC resolution legitimizing military action. Between February and 
March, British diplomats were zealously competing with their French counterparts for the support from 
other UN members respectively to their own coalitions. Both countries put their focus of lobbying on Latin 
American and African members.130 Foreign Office Minister Valerie Amos travelled to African countries 
while David Manning was dispatched to persuade Mexico and Chile to get on board (Gordon and Shapiro 
2004: 151). British diplomatic efforts turned out to be fruitless since these countries‟ attitude toward Iraq 
remained to be obscure. Realizing its diplomatic efforts were not going anywhere, Britain added to the draft 
                                                 




a list of new benchmarks for Iraqi compliance before the deadline of 17 March.131 In response, Chirac said 
that he would consider the new benchmarks but would not alter his position against any resolution with 
automaticity of war. Britain‟s hope that the undecided states could turn to its side died on 14 March when 
Chile tabled a proposal suggesting giving UN inspectors more time to complete the task (Kampfner 2003). 
Blair, being disappointed, notified Bush that they should meet to discuss military operations for real. On 16 
March, Bush, Blair and Spanish Premier José Maria Aznar met in the Azores. In the summit, they delivered 
an ultimatum to the UNSC to authorize the use of force against Iraq before the end of 17 March or they 
would go to war without a UN mandate (Reynolds 2003). When the deadline was passed, the British 
ambassador to the UN announced the withdrawal of the draft resolution. Two days later, the American-led 
coalition launched the military operations to “decapitate” Saddam. The UK actively participated in the 
fighting with around 40,000 British troops in action.   
The basis on which the UK decided to go along with the US in military attacks of Iraq was British leaders‟ 
deep belief that an armed Iraq posed a consistent threat to regional and world security and needed to be dealt 
with. The 9/11 terrorist attack toughened Blair‟s stance to “rogue states” with WMD programmes (Bluth 
2004). The UK‟s key policy makers were confident that Iraq possessed WMD and that Iraq and al-Qaeda 
were connected. It was believed that Iraq‟s biological and chemical weapons might be available to terrorists 
in the future. Blair and his inner circle were convinced that a rouge state like Iraq had to be confronted and 
the world would be safer with the removal of Saddam‟s regime. Years of sanctions were not able to force 
Iraq‟s compliance with UN resolutions but caused disastrous pain for ordinary Iraqi people. Considering the 
history of Saddam‟s propensity for aggression and disrespect of international norms, an extension of 
containment would not be efficient or effective. For the UK, diplomatic resolution might lead to a more 
undesirable result than military conflict. If UN inspections had been allowed to continue and eventually had 
brought Iraq‟s cooperation, sanctions against Saddam‟s regime would have been lifted. However, there 
would be no guarantee that Saddam would not reconstitute WMD capabilities. Moreover, according to the 
second dossier published by the British government, Saddam was considered an imminent threat to its own 
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population due to the regime‟s long history of human rights violations. It was clear from the beginning to the 
British military intervention would be the least unattractive option compared with peaceful. However, Blair 
was forced to adhere to a UN route because his premiership was on the line of due to fierce domestic 
oppositions from both political elites and the British public. Although public opposition eventually failed to 
stop Britain from launching a war, they were indeed exerting a strong influence on Blair‟s choice to first 
seek a diplomatic solution of the problem of Iraq. The Bush administration persisted in seeking a second 
resolution of the UNSC largely because Blair pleaded that it was needed to sustain British public support. 
Britain‟s rationale to align with the US was also rooted in its enduring Atlanticism. Since the Second 
World War, the UK and the US had maintained a special relationship which Britain considered to be a 
privilege. This closeness, coupled with the existing military cooperation of the two countries within NATO, 
gave impetus to Blair‟s decision to participate in the invasion against Iraq. Adopting an Atlanticist approach 
on security issues had been preferred by almost all former British prime ministers prior to Tony Blair. 
Contrary to Chirac‟s call for a new EU security strategy based on multipolarity independent from the US, 
Blair argued for an EU leadership in harmony with the US where the UK could play a significant role as the 
“transatlantic bridge” (Hughes 2003). Although the development of EU political integration had 
increasingly drawn Britain closer to the EU, close partnership with the US remained the priority for the UK. 
In the case of Iraq, the determination of the Bush administration to remove Saddam with force left Britain 
little choice but to choose sides between the US and the EU. Blair clearly chose the former. It was reported 
that he even told associates that his goal was to have a united Europe that was pro-America but if that proved 
impossible, he would rather have a divided Europe that was partly pro-American to a united Europe lined up 
against the US (Gordon and Shapiro 2004). 
Because of the close Anglo-American relationship, it is frequently argued that Britain was dragged by 
the US into the war against Iraq. This argument was not entirely correct. It is true that Blair‟s decision to go 
to war was influenced by the American policy toward Iraq. But the prime minister himself truly believed 
that Iraq was a threat to Britain and its Western allies and played a pivotal role in facilitating the decision 




you are doing this because the Americans are telling you to do it. I keep telling them that it‟s worse than that. 
I believe in it” (Riddell 2003). A research using the leadership trait analysis showed that Blair‟s personality 
and leadership style was also an influential factor in British policy making during the Iraq crisis (Dyson 
2006). Dyson identified that Blair had a high score of “belief in ability to control events”, meaning that the 
prime minister was convinced that he could exercise considerable control over the developments of political 
events. An example was Blair‟s confidence that he could cut down the rebels down to 50 before he suffered 
a serious revolt in the Parliament (Kampfner 2003). It was this false perception that led to Blair‟s proactive 
foreign policy against Iraq. It is also found that Blair‟s lower “conceptual complexity” could explain his 
tendency to view the situation in Iraq as a moral issue between black and white. He was convinced that 
toppling Saddam was morally justified. Therefore, he eventually decided to go to war even without the 
blessing of the UN. 
Since the “Big Three” were essentially divided on the Iraq issue, other EU member states had no choice 
but choose sides between the pro- and anti-war camps, triggering bitter rows and recriminations within the 
EU. As demonstrated by the “Letter of Eight” the “Vilnius Ten”, this predicament also applied to the Central 
and Eastern European states, which were about to join the EU. Most of these countries quickly chose to 
stand side by side with the UK-led camp supporting the US, not least because the US was considered to be a 
more reliable ally against Russia compared to a divided EU (Serfaty 2006). Moreover, since these countries 
were also waiting to join NATO, it was important for them to appease the US at this critical moment. The 
problem of the two letters did not lie in their contents but rather in their appearances, which sent a signal of 
a divided and weak EU. The disagreement within the EU were also reflected at NATO headquarters, where 
France, Germany and Belgium were sparing no effort to block a plan to use NATO facilities to support 
Turkish defences in the event of an Iraq war, which was backed by the other sixteen NATO members of 
which fourteen holding memberships of the EU (Duke 2012). 
Before the “Letter of Eight” was released, the HR/SG, Javier Solana had worked hard to push forward a 
common approach for the EU, and he succeeded during the Greek Presidency when a collective position 




fierce, Solana began to realize that a common position was beyond reach and kept a low profile throughout 
the crisis (Hughes 2003). The letter was considered a further “insult” towards Solana, since Britain and 
Spain had not informed the HR/SG. Solana, who actually first heard about the publication on the radio, was 
reported to be furious to have been cut out (Gordon and Shapiro 2004: 131). Caught between the divergent 
interests of EU member states, the HR/SG‟s role as an EU agent and a consensus-builder on matters of the 
CFSP was seriously weakened.  
6.2.4 An Assessment of EU Representation Coherence in the Iraq Crisis 
Regardless of the Union‟s continuous efforts to strengthen the CFSP for almost a decade, the EU was in 
serious split over the crisis of Iraq. The lack of agreement among EU member states heavily damaged the 
Union‟s presence at the UN as a collective organization. The credibility of the Union‟s CFSP was 
undermined since there was rarely any prior consultation within the EU or concertation of the positions of 
EU member states at the UN. EU representatives, notably the Presidency, the HR/SG and the Commissioner 
of External Relations were made irrelevant in the impasse of conflicted member states. The analyses of EU 
decision making process at both horizontal and vertical level above have illustrated the structural deficit of 
EU representation in the field of the CFSP and the domestically-driven reactions of EU member states to the 
crisis. This summary section is planning to assess how the EU was represented at the UN on the issue of Iraq 
from a principal-agent perspective. But the role of the EU was doomed to be downplayed since it was unable 
to conclude a common position toward Iraq in the first place. 
Prior to the adoption of the ToL, the alternate Presidency acted as the leading agent of EU external 
representation in issues falling into the CFSP. In the case of Iraq, Denmark and Greece in sequence were 
serving as the EU presidency at the time. Both Denmark and Greece avoided any early categorical 
positioning and tried to act as a moderator to facilitate collective decision-making of the EU. But their own 
policy preferences towards Iraq were not even consistent with each other. While Copenhagen embraced 
Washington‟s appeal for military intervention, Athens as the successor preferred a peaceful disarmament of 
Iraq, a policy which was closer to the positions of Germany and France. Limited by their own national 




coordinator between the pro- and anti-war camps. The ambitions of the two Presidencies to represent the EU 
were also different. Before the succession actually took place, Greek Prime Minister Costas Simitis had 
marked a CFSP on the issue of Iraq as the core of their presidential work. The Greek Council Presidency 
tried to make the best of an impossible job and was successful in reaching a compromise agreement twice, 
even though the common stance was just temporary and largely ignored by both camps of EU members. The 
Greek Presidency‟s role was limited in merely delaying the rift within the EU rather than solving the 
intra-EU differences It is worth mentioning that the common positions reached under the Greek Presidency 
were more desirable to Greece and the anti-war group, indicating that the Presidency might have tried to 
direct the coordination process towards its preference. As the conflicts within the EU became more intense 
and irreconcilable, both Presidencies eventually gave up their diplomatic efforts and joined the camp they 
preferred respectively.  
Horizontal coherence in the EU‟s representation was astonishingly low during the crisis. The EU 
Presidency‟s role was rather limited because of EU member states‟ resistance to make genuine concessions. 
Although the HR/SG managed to assist the Greek Presidency in facilitating two tentative common 
statements, his role was quickly diminished by cutting out the preparation of the “Letter of Eight”.  Both the 
HR/SG and EU Commissioner of External Relations kept a low profile during the ferocious diplomatic war 
of EU members. Therefore, there was hardly any meaningful coordination between the two actors. Since a 
common EU position had never been made, Solana was never invited to address the UNSC regarding the 
issue of Iraq. The security crisis eventually was reserved for the US and NATO to deal with, while the EU, 
as a collective actor, was largely sidelined. 
Since neither Denmark nor Greece was sitting in the UNSC at the time, the Union had to depend on those 
members that do serve on the UNSC, especially the two permanent members, i.e. the UK and France to 
ensure the defence of the Union‟s positions and interests. The risk of agent deviation was even higher since 
the UNSC had been considered as a state-centric forum to promote national priorities and interests. During 
the Iraq crisis, no substantial coordination or concertation among EU members at the level of the UNSC 




“agent losses” was outstanding since EU members have divergent preferences within the EU, which was 
considered a collective principal. A lack of vertical consistency practically led to a lack of mandate for the 
agent of the EU to speak up on behalf of the Union. As the divergence between EU member states grew, 
Solana, Prodi and Patten gradually left the stage of debate and therefore shed little light on the perspectives 
of EU policy making over Iraq. 
Among the EU members that were sitting in the UNSC, Germany and France were united in opposing 
the US and an invasion of Iraq without the authorization of the UN. German and French leaders were not 
convinced by America‟s rationale for war and argued that a diplomatic solution should be given every 
chance. Both countries reversed their earlier pro-US policies to assist American-led military operations e.g. 
in the cases of Kosovo and Afghanistan. Their policy choices over Iraq were largely determined by domestic 
politics and national preferences. Both leaders of Germany and France were suspected to utilize the 
widespread war-averse and anti-America sentiment among the European public to win political popularity, 
both at home and at the international level. Their emphasis that the issue of Iraq should be strictly dealt 
within the framework of the UN was out of the consideration to constrain and counterbalance American‟s 
sole dominance of issues involving international peace and security. Within the Franco-Germany axis, 
Chirac clearly played a more significant role than his counterpart Schröder, since France as the veto holder 
at the UNSC had more leverage to influence proceedings other than to antagonise the US. The French threat 
to use its veto power was also conceived as an abuse of its UNSC privilege by Britain, Spain and other EU 
members which were sympathetic to the American approach. 
On the other side, the UK, Italy and Spain, along with several Eastern European states that were lining up 
to join the EU as well as NATO, aligned themselves with the US in support of military intervention. 
Believing that an Iraq in procession of WMD programmes posed a great threat to the Western world, these 
countries were determined to remove Saddam‟s regime with the use of force, with or without a clear UN 
mandate. Unsurprisingly, the UK, as a permanent member of the UNSC and a special ally with the US took 




The absence of cooperation appeared to be more serious when these countries decided to present a united 
front but excluded anti-war EU members and key figures at the supranational level. 
In summary, the EU was largely marginalized during the Iraq crisis since the issue was preferred by EU 
member states to be tackled at the forum of the UNSC in terms of their relations with the US rather than 
within the framework of the Union‟s CFSP mechanism. Foreign policy making of individual EU member 
states was starkly coloured by domestic considerations rather than collective thinking of common EU 
interest. As the Iraq crisis has demonstrated, the representative system of the EU prior to the adoption of the 
ToL had been initially problematic. Furthermore, as the lack of horizontal consistence in EU representation 
– apart from the structural weaknesses – was largely due to the lack of vertical consistence of EU member 
states to stick to the agreed EU stance, the question of whether the Union would be able to speak with one 
voice would depend on whether EU member states could comply with the spirit of the Union‟s CFSP and 
make necessary concessions in order to establish a common EU representation in international affairs. 
6.3 The EU and the Libya Crisis 
The unrest that started in Benghazi in mid-February 2011 soon spread to other regions of Libya and 
eventually turned into a civil war. Many were killed or injured and thousands became refugees.132 The 
worsening political and humanitarian situation raised international concern with many states and IOs, 
including the UN and the EU, condemning Gaddafi's violent attacks against the protestors. The crisis posed 
an early serious test for the CFSP-related institutional structures set up by the ToL. It broke out about 14 
months after the ratification of the Treaty and just one and a half months after the EEAS was declared 
operational. It provided an opportunity for the HR and the EEAS to demonstrate leadership in crisis 
management and show their strength in representing the EU on the world stage. How the EU and its member 
states responded to this event provides real evidence for the effect of the ToL. Was the Union able to fully 
utilize the new instruments granted by the ToL and stand as one to handle the security crisis? Or did the 
remaining weaknesses in its external representation hold the EU back? In this sub-chapter, following a brief 
account of the background of the Libya crisis, we will examine how EU institutions and EU member states 
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responded to the Libyan crisis and make an assessment of the level of coherence of EU reactions to the 
incident, especially of whether the structural instruments invented by the ToL had a positive effect on EU 
external representation in crisis management, which is an inherent part of the EU‟s CFSP. 
6.3.1 Background 
The story behind the Libyan crisis is not an unfamiliar one. Decades of dictatorship and political 
repression combined with low development, corruption, nepotism and mismanagement had fuelled the 
grievances and rage of Libyans which were waiting to explode. The Tunisian and Egyptian revolution 
certainly provided the inspiring sparks and the government‟s arrest of human rights activist Fathi Terbil 
released the trigger (Chorin 2012:192). On 15 February 2011 hundreds of demonstrators gathered in 
Benghazi, protesting the arrest and demanding for reform and the step-down of Muammar Gaddafi, who had 
been ruling the country over 40 years. After confrontations with national security forces, the protests soon 
escalated into an armed anti-Gaddafi rebellion and later a full-scale civil war. The opposition forged an 
interim governing body, the National Transitional Council (NTC), claiming to be the sole representative of 
the Libyan people. But Gaddafi made it clear that he would rather “die a martyr” than hand over the power 
(Black 2011a). In response, the government deployed lethal means and excessive force, trying to crack 
down the unrest.  
Considering the widespread and systematic attacks against civilians, on 26 February the UNSC reacted 
with “unprecedented speed and unanimity” and issued Resolution 1970, which recalled the Libyan 
authorities‟ “Responsibility to Protect (R2P)” its citizens, imposed sanctions on Gaddafi and his inner circle. 
The Resolution also decided to refer the Libyan situation to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for 
investigation.133 On 1 March the UNGA suspended Libya‟s membership of the Human Rights Council. 
Given that the Libyan authorities failed to comply with Resolution 1970 and the situation in Libya was 
deteriorating on a daily basis, on 17 March the UNSC adopted Resolution 1973 through which it established 
a no-fly zone and authorized UN member states to “take all necessary measures” to protect civilians and 
enforce compliance with the ban on flights. Two days later, in order to implement Resolution 1973, 
                                                 




“Operation Odyssey Dawn” – a multinational military operation led by the US, the UK and France – waged 
a campaign of air strikes against Gaddafi‟s forces. The US soon withdrew its fighter jets and NATO stepped 
in on 31 March taking full command of the mission “Operation United Protector” (OUP) under a UN 
mandate. On 29 March, an international conference of more than thirty-five countries plus the UN and 
NATO was convened in London to discuss the Libya conflict and world leaders agreed to set up the Libya 
Contact Group to support the NTC‟s efforts to overthrow the Gaddafi‟s regime (The Telegraph 2011).134 On 
15 July, the Libya Contact group recognized the NTC as the legitimate authority of Libya (Black 2011a). 
Afterward, there was a period of stalemate concerning the military action. Tripoli finally fell on 20 August. 
After months of intense fighting between the two sides, the conflict ended up with Gaddafi‟s death on 20 
October. He was captured in the Battle of Sirte and was confirmed to be dead shortly.135 Three days later, the 
NTC declared the official liberation of Libya and the end of the civil war.  
6.3.2 Horizontal Coherence: EU-level Response to the Libya Crisis 
The first EU-level response came from the HR, who had been appointed the leadership of EU external 
representation since the adoption of the ToL. It took five days for the HR to issue a declaration on behalf of 
the EU expressing her extreme concern of the events unfolding in Libya. She condemned the repression 
against peaceful demonstrators and urged the Libyan authorities to immediately refrain from further use of 
violence (European Union 2011a). On 23 February, Ashton issued a second declaration with tougher 
rhetoric in which she “strongly” condemned the “unacceptable” repression against civilians. The HR 
declared that the EU was ready to supply humanitarian aid and to take further restrictive measures on the 
Libyan authorities (European Union 2011b). Later on 6 March the HR sent a fact-finding team to Libya, led 
by Agostino Miozzo, the EEAS Managing Director for Crisis Response and Operational Coordination – the 
first international mission of its kind since the violence – to assess humanitarian and evacuation efforts in 
Libya (European Union 2011c). On 9 March in her speech at the EP, Ashton said that she had asked her 
Services to look at possible CSDP engagement to support current evacuation and humanitarian efforts 
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(Europa Press Releases 2011). Unfortunately, a serious proposal on launching a military CSDP mission 
under the Petersberg tasks to enforce the Libyan no-fly-zone was never put on the table (Brattberg 2011). 
The bright side is that on 22 May the HR established a liaison office in Benghazi under the management of 
the EEAS to support the NTC and to bring more efficiency to EU actions. It could be interpreted as a de 
facto recognition of the interim government.  
On 23 February, the same day when the HR delivered her second declaration on Libya, the President of 
the European Council also made a statement addressing the developments in Libya (European Council 
2011a). Though the condemnations and demands for the stop of using violence against civilians was similar 
to the HR‟s declarations, President Van Rompuy seemed to suggest regime change and democratic 
transition with the help of the EU when the HR at the time still counted on the Libyan government to “meet 
its responsibility to protect it population”. On 11 March, the President convened an extraordinary European 
Council meeting to set the strategic direction for future EU policy and action to the situation in Libya. The 
leaders of EU member states agreed that the Gaddafi‟s regime had lost legitimacy while the NTC should be 
considered a “political interlocutor” (European Council 2011b). The Summit also agreed to examine “all 
necessary options” to protect civilians but failed to approve the enforcement of a no-fly zone proposed by 
British Prime Minister Cameron, with the joint support of French President Sarkozy. Both German 
Chancellor Merkel and the HR Ashton were strong opponents to military option with the former 
emphasizing the lack of a legal basis for a no-fly zone while the latter warning about the risk of “collateral 
damage” of civilian casualties (Traynor and Watt 2011). The HR, however, did not take a clear position on 
a military intervention at the beginning nor did she recognize or even publicly meet the NTC (Helwig 2013: 
241). The lack of reference of a no-fly zone at the end of the Summit indicated a one-round victory of 
Ashton but the dispute itself reflected the vertical inconsistence of EU foreign policy over Libya.  
In view of the gravity of the situation in Libya, the EU took the initiative to implement restrictive 
measures against the Libyan authorities that went beyond the UN sanctions. The Council played an 
important role in establishing EU sanction regime against Libya despite the impasse in the first week of the 




violence in Libya. It was the first collective EU reaction since the uprising began. But foreign ministers 
could not reach a common approach on the subject of imposing sanctions. Italy, Malta and Cyprus found 
that they were quarrelling with other pro-sanction EU members, notably France, Germany, Finland and the 
Netherlands. Yet the Council managed to agree on the suspension of the negotiations of EU-Libya 
framework agreement and other ongoing cooperation contracts with the country as of 22 February.136 On 28 
February the Union marched forward and adopted Decision 2011/137/CFSP, which decided to impose 
additional restrictive measures beyond UN sanctions. The measures include an arms embargo, an assets 
freeze and a visa ban on Gaddafi, his family and his closest associates, who were involved in the brutal 
attacks against the population. Since then the decision has been amended numerous times to modify the 
coverage and targets of the list. On 10 March, the EU extended the sanctions to key Libyan financial entities. 
Following Resolution 1973, the EU imposed further sanctions on 21 and 24 March, extending the asset 
freeze to additional persons and Libyan entities, including the National Oil Corporation and five of its 
subsidiaries. On 12 April, the Union included 26 energy firms accused of financing Gaddafi‟s regime to the 
list of asset freeze, and thereby imposed a de facto oil and gas embargo. On 7 June the EU extended the 
assets freeze to six Libyan port authorities (Council 2011b). 137  
The EU made a considerable contribution to alleviating the humanitarian emergency during the Libyan 
crisis. The EU had been at the forefront of the humanitarian response in Libya since the outburst of the 
conflict. As a whole the Union is the biggest humanitarian donor to Libya. Together with its member states 
the Union has provided over €150 million for humanitarian aid and civil protection, of which €80 million is 
contributed by the Commission alone (Balfour et al. 2012: 14). On 20 February, the EU launched the 
Frontex Joint Operation Hermes 2011 as a response to Italy‟s formal request for assistance with the massive 
influx of migrants. Commission President Barroso on 23 February indicated that the EU would support “the 
aspirations of the Libyan people” (Commission 2011a). On the same day, following the request from the 
Hungarian Presidency and the HR, the Commission activated the Civil Protection Mechanism to facilitate 
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the evacuation of EU citizens and other foreigners from Libya. The Commission also sent two teams of 
ECHO experts to the borders of Libya with Tunisia and Egypt to analyze the humanitarian needs. Moreover, 
Minister of State Enik Gyri and Kristalina Georgieva, Commissioner for International Cooperation, 
Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response paid personal visits to the Tunisian-Libyan border on 2 and 3 March 
to show EU engagement and gather first-hand information. The Commission submitted a document of new 
guidelines to the 11 March meeting of the European Council of the EU‟s policy toward the Southern 
Mediterranean. The proposal aimed to help spur the progress of the region on political reform and 
civil-society building (Commission 2011b). On 1 April, the Council adopted a decision on the establishment 
of European Union Force (EUFOR) Libya to contribute to the safe movement and evacuation of displaced 
persons and to support the humanitarian agencies in their activities with specific capabilities to support 
humanitarian assistance operations, if requested by the UN (Council 2011c). Ashton originally had wanted 
the EU to authorize a military operation without waiting for the UN‟s request. However, UN humanitarian 
chief Valerie Amos was iterated that EUFOR Libya would only be considered as the last resort due to her 
reservations about using military means to support humanitarian missions (Gottwald 2012). EUFOR Libya 
turned out to be nothing more than a symbolic gesture. 
Regardless of the limited role of the Parliament in the CFSP/CSDP area, the EP managed to play a 
facilitating function by urging the EU to take actions and supporting efficient spending accordingly in 
dealing with the Libya crisis. On 21 February, then Parliament President Jerzy Buzek made an early 
statement condemning the brutal use of force against protestors and warned the Libyan authorities that those 
who carried out atrocities would be held accountable (European Parliament 2011b). On 23 February, the 
President declared that Gaddafi‟s regime had lost legitimacy and the Libyan dictator had to go. On 8 March 
NTC representatives visited the EP and called for the EU‟s recognition as well as a no-fly zone. In response, 
Buzek made a speech three days later on the extraordinary European Council suggesting a stronger EU 
presence in Libya and the recognition of the NTC (European Parliament 2011c). He said at the end of his 
speech: “We have a rendezvous with history, so let us not miss it this time!” The EP is also well known for 




The harsh critiques from the parliament offered the EU, particularly the HR, an opportunity to adjust its 
strategies in accordance to the dramatic development of the Union‟s southern neighbourhood, and formed a 
certain pressure on EU member states to better coordinate their national policies in resolving the crisis. 
6.3.3 Vertical Coherence: Divergent Reactions from EU Member States 
It must be acknowledged that Brussels‟ reactions to the Libya crisis were, though not swift or consistent 
enough, appropriate in general. The Union‟s overall contribution to supplying humanitarian aid and 
evacuation of EU citizens was considerable. However, EU leaderships in foreign policy, the HR and the 
EEAS in particular could have played a bigger role if they were not trapped in the tensions between EU 
member states. Just like in the case of the Balkans in the 1990s and the Iraq crisis analyzed above, national 
leaders once again put national interests and domestic politics on top of EU common interest over Libya and 
openly criticised each other over how the EU should react to the crisis. The inconsistency undermined the 
Union‟s credibility and the HR‟s leadership over EU foreign policy. There are experts who commented that 
EU splits over Libya were nowhere as high as over Iraq (e.g. Rosemberg 2011), while others sharply 
criticised its lack of leadership and coherence in crisis management (e.g. Brattberg 2011; Santini and 
Varvelli 2011). Some analysts even believed that the EU “hit rock bottom on Libya” and came up with the 
conclusion that the high expectations for the ToL were premature since the EU failed to speak with one 
voice and to get its act together during the Libyan crisis (Asseburg 2013). From a certain perspective, the 
divergence of the Union this time even exceeded that of Iraq, given that people would have higher 
expectations for a more coherent EU foreign policy after the ToL entered into force.  
The situation in Libya posted another humanitarian crisis at the EU‟s doorstep. It reminded Europeans of 
the bitter memories of the inaction of Western countries in the Srebrenica and Rwanda massacre. It seemed 
that European leaders were determined to correct their misdeeds in the past and uphold the UN's policy of 
R2P. EU member states were among the first countries to condemn the use of force of the Libyan authorities 
and to call for the immediate stop of violent repression. Their attitudes toward supplying humanitarian aid to 
Libya and imposing sanctions against Gaddafi‟s regime were generally consistent with EU-level responses. 




interests and domestic politics were factored into the cost-benefit calculations. They were mainly in discord 
with each other over four matters: (1) military intervention; (2) the role of NATO; (3) the status of the NTC; 
(4) migrants and refugees.  
(1) Military Intervention 
Military intervention was the most contentious issue among EU member states. The EU repeated its 
failure in the cases of Kosovo and Iraq by splitting into two camps when the “Big Three” became divided. 
France and the UK were enthusiastic about the military operation against Gaddafi‟s regime, while Germany 
held eminent skepticism on military engagement. The divergence within the EU had become open and 
obvious at the G8 meeting held in Paris in mid-March, during which France, the UK and Canada advocated 
enforcing a no-fly zone in Libya while Germany, the US and Russia tended to disagree. When French 
Foreign Minister Alain Juppé claimed that their plan of implementing a no-fly zone had got a broad support, 
his German colleague Westerwelle even intervened and corrected that notion (Rinke 2011). The divergence 
peaked when Germany sided with China, Russia, Brazil and India (the so-called BRICs) and abstained in 
the vote on UNSC Resolution 1973, which lent legitimacy to military intervention of Libya. Germany‟s 
abstention caused storms of debate and criticism across the EU. While the abstentions of Russia and China 
were understood as a de facto affirmative vote since they could have simply vetoed the resolution, 
Germany‟s abstention was perceived as a “no” by its allies and EU peers. It was considered a grave damage 
to the EU‟s credibility as a collective actor, not to mention that Paris and London were rather irritated and 
disappointed by Berlin‟s absence in the military alliance. Germany was not the only one to blame though. 
During the Libya crisis, national interests and domestic politics were dominant concerns for EU members.  
Activism could be ascertained all along the decision-making process of France on the Libya crisis. 
Together with Britain, France assumed a leading role in pushing for the adoption of Resolution 1973 and 
spearheaded in the coalition military operation. As early as 23 February, Sarkozy had called for a no-fly 
zone over Libya. On 19 March, France was the first to initiate the airstrike campaign against Gaddafi‟s 
forces. During that time, an international conference on Libya was being held in Paris, with attendees 




fact that France had started the attacks even before the end of this meeting caused widespread irritation 
among other allies and EU countries. Some critics pointed out that it appeared that Sarkozy was trying to 
steal the thunder and raise personal profile. Paris argued that they only acted hastily as time seemed to be 
running out since Gaddafi‟s troops were advancing toward Benghazi despite a ceasefire and the risk the city 
would be taken was high. But some diplomats said that it was French insistence on the meeting that had 
delayed the coalition‟s military action.  
This activism of France toward Libya was rooted in its colonial history of the Magreb Africa (Santini and 
Varvelli 2011). History has demonstrated that France did not hesitate to take military actions to intervene 
the affairs of its former colonies, such as in the cases of the Ivory Coast in 2001 and Chad in 2008. Its 
privileged status in the UNSC gives France more leverage to bypass the EU when necessary. The operation 
thus provided France with an opportunity to show its sense of responsibility as a permanent UNSC member.  
National interests and domestic politics played a decisive role in French decision-making on the issue of 
Libya. It is firstly seen as a correction of the mistake committed in the case of Tunisia, which cost the job of 
the former Foreign Minister Michèle Alliot-Marie. 138  During the crisis, there was a pro-intervention 
tendency among the French public. As the 2012 French presidential election approached, it is believed that 
Sarkozy was trying to gain voters through a tough position on Libya at a time of decreased domestic 
popularity. Energy and economic interests were certainly considered in the decision-making. Libya is 
Africa‟s second largest crude oil producer and has the largest proven reserves in Africa. In 2010, Europe 
received over 85 percent of Libya‟s crude exports. Before the uprising, it was the third largest external 
supplier of oil and the fifth largest external supplier of gas to the EU (Bosse 2011). It contributed France‟s 
16 percent of total crude imports (IEA 2011). Since it was commonly agreed that Gaddafi would have to go, 
it was crucial to “invest” the winning party to ensure future energy interest through an advantageous 
presence in Libya and a pro-NTC stance. The French newspaper Libération on 3 April published a letter 
referring to a secret deal, in which the NTC agreed to reserve “35 percent of total crude oil” in exchange for 
the full support of France. The French foreign ministry denied the existence of such a letter. But it is true that 
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rebel leaders had already indicated that countries active in supporting their revolution, especially France and 
the UK, should expect to be treated favourably once the war was over (Lutterbeck 2009).  
Additionally, President Sarkozy himself was a key factor behind the decision to militarily intervene. 
From the very beginning, the French President had been seeing the Libyan crisis in personal terms. It offered 
an opportunity for him to mark the history and outperform his predecessors as a man of action. He also 
hoped for the regain of reputation by resetting the strategy toward the Arab Spring and by wiping away the 
embarrassment after Gaddafi‟s notorious visit in 2007. Besides, Sarkozy held resentment toward Gaddafi, 
the man who openly criticised or even humiliated him multiple times (Asseburg 2013).  
Like France, Britain was a firm advocate of the military intervention in Libya. While initially hoping that 
sanctions would be sufficient to force Gaddafi to surrender, Prime Minister David Cameron on 28 February 
instructed the British Ministry of Defence to draw up plans for a no-fly zone, as Gaddafi showed no 
intention to stop attacks against the rebels or cede his power. On 10 March in a letter jointly sent by Sarkozy 
and Cameron to President Van Rompuy of the European Council, they proposed to their European partners 
and allies to provide support for “all possible contingencies” in Libya, including a no-fly zone or other 
options against air attacks. Concurrently, French and British delegations to the UN were working together 
on a UNSC draft, which was later adopted as Resolution 1973. Two days later, the UK, along with France 
and the US, co-led the military strikes against Gaddafi‟s regime. Albeit Cameron had secured a cross-party 
support for the military operation, he had an open breach during the process with his defence chief over the 
aim of the action when Cameron said the tyrant could be a legitimate target while Sir Richards said Gaddafi 
was “absolutely not” (Chorin 2012). Until mid-April, it turned out to be crystal clear that regime change was 
going to be one of the objectives of the military operation. Sarkozy, Cameron and US President Barack 
Obama jointly stated in a letter that it would be impossible to imagine Libya‟s future with Gaddafi in power 
or even playing a part of it. The letter also reassured that the dictator would be held accountable for his 
crimes. This position was sharply demarcated from some previous options that opted for a peaceful solution 





The motivation behind the UK‟s decision in Libya was a combination of many factors. As other 
European leaders, addressing the humanitarian need was obviously one concern of British leaderships. R2P 
was a core concept behind British decision-making, at least in British official statements. Undoubtedly 
domestic-related interests were involved. Strategically speaking, a stable Libya would be more preferable 
for the UK. But Gaddafi‟s autocratic rule in Libya, his involvement in the Lockerbie bombing and his 
support for the Irish Republican Army convinced the UK that it would be less risky to have him toppled 
down. Energy interests were seriously considered in the UK‟s decision-making. The UK had not benefited 
from Libya‟s rich oil reserves as much as other EU countries did. Up to 2010, Libya‟s crude exports merely 
accounted for 8.5 percent of total British oil imports (Europa 2011). Prior to the uprising, British major 
energy corporation BP had no production in Libya. Though the company had started drilling in the west of 
Libya, the project was suspended when the turmoil burst. Recalling the precedent that the Labour 
government once acquiesced in the release of the Lockerbie bomber Abdelbaset al-Megrahi in exchange for 
massive oil concessions to British major energy corporation BP (Chappell 2011), it was highly possible that 
Cameron‟s government wanted to secure more energy and commercial benefits by supporting the 
opposition, which was expected to win with some “help”. For Cameron, intervention was an easy decision 
to make since he did not face the pressure of elections at the time. Moreover, military intervention was 
welcome among the British public and across political lines. Taking an assertive position was actually 
helpful in adding to the reputation of Cameron personally as a political leader as well as that of the UK as an 
international power with considerable military ability.  
One day before the vote on Resolution 1973, Chancellor Angela Merkel made it clear in an interview that 
she remained sceptical of an outside military intervention and thus could not lead Germany into a mission 
with an uncertain ending (Brockmeier 2012). Berlin‟s abstention certainly caused unpleasantness and 
disappointment for its allies. But its initial reaction to the crisis was by no means neutral or passive. As a 
matter of fact, Germany stood at the fore of the first wave of condemnation of the atrocities that perpetrated 
the Libyan government and called for far-reaching sanctions against Gaddafi‟s regime. Berlin also played a 




were actively involved in drafting and pushing for the passing of Resolution 1970. But when it came to 
military intervention, Germany became rather sceptical and its reaction appeared to be inconsistent. At first, 
it seemed if the three conditions set up at the extraordinary EU summit – namely a demonstrable need, a 
clear legal basis and support from the region – were met, Berlin would agree to enforce the no-fly zone in 
terms of military action (Traynor and Watt 2011). Yet when the Arab League‟s support had been 
confirmed139 and a UN mandate was within reach, even when a phrase “ excluding an occupation force” was 
included in the resolution, Germany still opted for abstention and non-participation. From the view of 
Germany however, “the question of military intervention and German participation in it was quite a separate 
matter” (Federal Foreign Office 2011b). Instead, Berlin preferred a solution through political dialogue and 
tightened sanctions. Major concerns shared by German policy-makers, including the Chancellor, Foreign 
Minister Guido Westerwelle and Defence Minister Thomas de Maizière, were the uncertainty of military 
instruments for humanitarian cause, the danger of fuelling terrorists or Islamic radicals in a Libya of 
political vacuum, the possibility of large casualties as well as the risk of a protracted war. These concerns 
sounded well-grounded but one could not rule out the possibility that they were exaggerated to deemphasize 
other domestic factors.  
Germany‟s reluctance to resort to military action was deeply rooted in its longstanding 
non-interventionist tradition in foreign policy. The legacy of World War II made military action a very 
controversial subject in Germany. Unlike the French and British counterparts who could gain politically 
from an intervention, German politicians faced a population much more critical towards the use of force. 
Due to large domestic opposition, Germany did not join the US and the UK in the Iraq war. Even its military 
participation in Afghanistan was becoming increasingly unpopular. At the time of the crisis, an Emnid poll 
showed that 66 percent of Germans opposed German participation in military action in Libya (Pidd 2011). 
The nuclear calamity that happened on 11 March in Fukushima triggered fierce criticism against the 
government‟s nuclear energy policy. It was speculated that both the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and 
the Free Democratic Party (FDP) were suffering a fall in popularity. As leaders of these two parties 
                                                 




respectively, the last thing Merkel and Westerwelle would want was to further lose voters on this sensitive 
matter in the upcoming state elections (Reguly 2011). Unfortunately, the cautious stance taken by the 
coalition government did not save them from the fiasco of state elections. In Baden-Württemberg, the FDP 
barely passed the 5 percent constitutional barrier to get into the parliament, while the CDU suffered great 
loss to the Greens in this region, which had been its historical base for about sixty years. The FDP were 
voted out of the regional parliament in Rheinland-Pfalz (Dempsey 2011).  
Berlin‟s steadfast stance on abstaining from the Resolution could also be partially attributed to its 
miscalculation of Washington‟s intention. The whole time Berlin believed that a military intervention was 
also an undesirable result for Washington. Only on 16 March, Germany‟s Ambassador to the UN, Peter 
Wittig, was notified by his American counterpart Susan Rice via the phone about the dramatic change of US 
position (Brockmeier 2012). With absent knowledge that the position of the US was about to change, 
Westerwelle had just given a speech on the morning of that day at Bundestag in which he reaffirmed 
Germany‟s great scepticism of a military intervention in the form of a no-fly zone. The sudden shift of 
Washington‟s attitude left Berlin little room to reconsider its position otherwise it might cost the credibility 
and consistency of German foreign policy. Besides, there was not enough time to consult with 
parliamentarians for other options, let alone to get their approval for military action. The remaining question 
for the German Chancellery was what to do with the vote. Voting “no” was obviously not an option since 
Germany would not want to take the blame for blocking the Resolution when Berlin was informed that 
neither Russia nor China would veto against it. It was considered impossible for Germany to vote “yes” on 
the resolution without making actual military commitments. Berlin decided to abstain once Germany was 
ensured that Portugal140 would vote for the resolution, an action which would secure the majority for the 
resolution to be adopted (Rinke 2011).  
Moreover, the influence of Westerwelle as Foreign Minister was crucial during the decision-making 
process. He was personally devoted to pushing for Germany‟s abstention on the resolution. As a staunch 
adherent of “military restraint”, Westerwelle had openly upheld this principle in many occasions since 
                                                 




assuming office. For example, a month prior to the Libya crisis, in his statement on 2 January following the 
start of Germany‟s two-year term of a non-permanent member in the UNSC, Westerwelle said that Germany 
would shoulder its special international responsibilities but in the meantime stand for a culture of military 
restraint (Federal Foreign Office 2011a). Those who believe that Germany‟s abstention was a mistake tend 
to blame Westerwelle‟s incompetence and inexperience in foreign policy. To a certain degree it makes sense 
since the German Foreign Office did fail to capture the signal that the US would reverse their tune. It could 
be true that the Foreign Minister did not fully understand the consequences of the abstention for Germany‟s 
external relations. As the leader of the FDP simultaneously, the Foreign Minister was suffering a lot of 
pressure from his own party because of the imminent state elections, the disastrous result of which later 
nearly cost his entire career. On 3 April, Westerwelle was forced to resign his position as the leader of the 
FDP as the Deputy Chancellor as well. But he was able to keep the job as the Foreign Minister. 
Another explanation for Germany‟s scepticism could be that Berlin thought that Paris and London‟s 
obsession with military intervention was questionable. Sarkozy‟s enthusiasm toward military intervention 
really put Berlin on alert, especially considering his plan in 2007 to establish a Union of the Mediterranean, 
which would involve all Mediterranean littoral countries while excluding Germany. The Federal 
government had reason to worry if France was planning to isolate Germany again in the case of Libya. 
Berlin also had concerns whether London and Paris were purely after Libya‟s oil, commercial interests and 
other potential spoils. German Development Minister Dirk Niebel once accused the military alliance of 
hypocrisy by pointing out that those countries which were dropping bombings in Libya were still drawing 
oil there (Lindström and Zetterlund 2012: 26). On 24 March, Merkel proposed for a complete oil embargo 
against Libya at the EU Summit and called on the international community to stop doing business with 
Gaddafi‟s regime. It seemed to be a de facto confirmation of Niebel‟s accusation. However, Germany is not 
exceptional in this regard. It is true that Germany, during the time of the crisis, had fewer economic interests 
at stake in Libya, compared to other EU countries, e.g. Italy or France. Libya only contributed 7.7 percent of 
total crude German imports at the time (IEA 2011). But it could be that Berlin was thinking about long-term 




Some even wonder if Berlin‟s choice to abstain on the resolution together with the BRICs implied a strategic 
change of foreign policy, since Germany happened to have particularly strong commercial interests in these 
countries (Nethery 2011). 
What is worth mentioning is that although Berlin made it clear that no German troops would take part in 
the military operation against Libya, Germany switched their tune slightly a day after Resolution 1973 was 
approved. Both the Foreign Minister and the Chancellor were careful not to accuse those who had voted for 
the Resolution. While Westerwelle said in this declaration at Bundestag “respect and understand” those who 
chose to support a military intervention in Libya (Federal Foreign Office 2011b), Merkel went further by 
saying that Germany unreservedly “shared the goals” of the Resolution (Peel 2011). This change may 
explain why Germany was actively engaged in providing assistance to the coalition operation. A week after 
the vote, it sent 300 troops to assist Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) mission in 
Afghanistan to relieve the burden of NATO and free up NATO capacities for the operation in Libya. 
German Defense Minister Thomas de Maizière expressed in June Germany‟s intention to provide troops to 
EU missions for reconstruction and humanitarian purposes in Libya. It was also found that over a hundred 
German soldiers were actually involved in selecting bombing targets for alliance airstrikes. It appeared that 
Berlin attempted to repair the wound done by the abstention to its ties with its traditional allies. 
As the “Big Three” could not reach a common ground on the issue of military intervention, it was not 
surprising that the EU became sidelined when the operation started. The fact that other EU members also 
held diverse opinions on the issue further “stirred up” the trouble, indicating the harsh truth that a coherent 
EU foreign policy that the ToL wished to establish had not been established yet, at least in the case of Libya.  
Italy, like other EU countries, rapidly offered humanitarian help to the Libyan people by sending food 
and health kits in the earliest days of the crisis. Italy also assisted evacuating EU citizens and other people 
who wanted to leave Libya (Miranda 2011). But unlike other EU members, Italy had most interests at stake 
in case of an anarchic Libya because of its decades of a cultivated relationship with the country. It explains 
why Italy‟s initial response to the upheaval in Libya was slow and soft. Its view on intervening by military 




he had contacted Gaddafi with regard to the uprising, Prime Minister Berlusconi replied that he did not want 
to “disturb” anyone when the situation was still in flux (Babington 2011). Such a reaction was clearly not in 
line with the prevailing condemnation from Brussels and other EU capitals. Berlusconi‟s failure to timely 
deplore Gaddafi‟s bloody repression encountered furious criticism of his indulgence of brutality. 
Oppositions argued that Berlusconi could have used his personal ties with Gaddafi to press for a halt of the 
violence rather than standing idle (Human Rights Watch 2011).  
In the face of heavy accusations, the Prime Minister turned “alarmed” on 21 February at the escalation of 
the clashes in Libya. He finally broke the silence by describing the use of force as “unacceptable” 
(Babington 2011). On the same day, Foreign Minister Franco Frattini made an identical speech at EU 
foreign ministers meeting. Yet it seemed that back then Rome still had hope Tripoli taking the responsibility 
to terminate the bloodshed and protect its own people. At the meeting, a number of EU countries, notably 
Germany and Finland, proposed a visa ban and asset freeze on Gaddafi along with his closest associates. 
Italy on the contrary declined to impose strict sanctions on Libya due to the fear – a common concern shared 
by Malta – that the collapse of Gaddafi‟ regime would lead to a mass exodus of refugees and an Islamic 
emirate on EU borders. Frattini even warned that the EU should not export democracy to the region. As a 
result, no decision was reached on the particular issue that day. Frattini instead proposed a “new Marshall 
plan” as an alternative, which would mobilize funds to assist the democratic transition and social 
construction of Libya.  
In the first few weeks of the unrest, Rome was indeed struggling in a dilemma between its longstanding 
close relationship with Tripoli and its due loyalties to its Western allies. As the situation unfolded, Italy was 
going through a transition of its attitudes toward Libya. On 22 February, Berlusconi called Gaddafi one last 
time following the Colonel‟s frightening television appearance that afternoon in which he swore that he 
would remain in power and fight until “the last drop of his blood”. He also lambasted Italy and the US for 
having supplied arms to the opponents. In their conversation, Berlusconi rejected the charges and urged 
Gaddafi to seek a peaceful solution for the revolt. His advice failed to serve its purpose when the Libyan 




later, Berlusconi claimed that Gaddafi had lost effective control of events. It was no coincidence that on the 
same day Italy announced the suspension of the Treaty of Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation with 
Libya, a bilateral agreement signed in 2008 which included a non-aggression clause forbidding the use of 
the territories of the two countries for any hostile act against each other (Miranda 2011). The abolishment of 
this treaty paved the way for Italy‟s military contribution to the operation against Libya later. Under the 
pressing requests of its allies and the NTC, and most importantly realizing that Gaddafi‟s days were 
numbered, Italian leaders felt that they could no longer remain a spectator but had to jump on board with 
their traditional allies to impose sanctions, and later the no-fly zone over Libya, no matter how 
uncomforting it was.  
In early March Italy imposed a freeze on Gaddafi-related assets as a support for wider EU and UN 
sanctions. Shortly after the adoption of Resolution 1973, Italy agreed to make its seven air bases available 
for the implementation of the no-fly zone and provide logistic support for the OUP. Yet its military 
contribution was subject to strict restrictions on engaging in combat. It revealed Italy‟s hesitation to 
completely sever the ties with Tripoli. But when April was approaching, Italy once again adjusted its line. It 
looked like Rome was preparing to discard Gaddafi‟s regime when Frattini met the NTC‟s representatives 
on 29 March at the London Conference on Libya. He later commented that Gaddafi‟s departure was the 
precondition for a solution to the conflict (Rizzo and Lucas 2011). It took only a few days for Italy to 
officially recognize the NTC as the “only legitimate interlocutor” of Libya. Until mid-April, it was reported 
that Rome no longer held official relations with the Libyan government. Moreover, Italy was thought to be a 
significant contributor to EUFOR Libya for the purpose of humanitarian aid since the mission would be put 
under the command of an Italian Admiral, Claudio Gaudiosi. On 20 April, Defence Minister Ignazio La 
Russa announced that Italy would join France and Britain in dispatching military advisors to assist the 
Benghazi-based rebels. He affirmed that the advisors were only for training purposes and would not be 
deployed on the battlefield (Cowell and Samaiya 2011). It was consistent with Italy‟s earlier declaration that 
it would not participate in the air raids. However, on 25 April Berlusconi called Obama and expressed that 




force to take targeted military action. Italy later deployed eight combat aircraft for airstrikes on 27 April 
with additional aircrafts patrolling the no-fly zone. 
Meanwhile, Berlusconi‟s behaviour was “awkward”. On one hand, he approved both UNSC resolutions 
over Libya and joined the allies to impose sanctions and no-fly zone. On the other, during the same time 
when Italy was assisting NATO-led airstrikes against Gaddafi‟s forces, the Prime Minister was sending 
confusing messages that he felt uncomfortable with Italy‟s involvement in the military intervention yet had 
no choice but go along with it. It was reported that Rome once hoped to seal a deal with Gaddafi for his 
“honourable exit” in exchange for a peaceful settlement (e.g. Nadeau 2011). But Gaddafi had repeatedly 
rejected any suggestion that he should relinquish power and leave the country. As the situation developed 
dramatically, Berlusconi eventually had to admit that the momentum of persuading Gaddafi to accept an 
exile had been lost. He blamed that the referral of Gaddafi to the ICC left the Libyan leader no room to 
compromise but therefore had to fight until the bitter end. 
Italy‟s decision-making process in respect to the military intervention in Libya was far from swift or 
coherent. But on the other side, Rome‟s course can also be defined as cautious and adaptive based on 
considerations of national priorities. As Berlusconi said, the events in Libya, “affect our trade relations, our 
energy supplies and our own security” (Lombardi 2011: 35). Italy‟s earlier inaction had everything to do 
with its concern not to jeopardize these interests. 
Before the conflict, Italy was Libya‟s largest trading partner. According to the data provided by Eurostat, 
the volume of Italo-Libyan commerce was nearly four times the size of that with Libya‟s next biggest EU 
trading partner Germany (Picardi 2011). Italy provided almost 20 percent of Libyan imports and consumed 
over 40 percent of Libyan exports, of which energy took the largest proportion. It obtained around a quarter 
of its crude oil and about 13 percent of its natural gas from Libya (IEA 2011), making Tripoli its top oil 
supplier and third largest gas provider. The Italian energy giant ENI played a dominant role of oil 
production in Libya. It also operated the subsea pipeline Greenstream, which delivered natural gas from 
Libya to Sicily across the Mediterranean Sea. But on 22 February, ENI had to cut its gas supplies due to the 




concentrating on energy or infrastructure construction projects (Varvelli 2010). Italy was supposed to seal a 
number of large defense deals with Libya in 2011. Libya, vice versa, purchased a large amount of stakes 
from Italy‟s major economic entities. Together Libya‟s Central Bank and the Libyan Investment Authority 
(LIA) owned about 7.5 percent stake in Unicredit, the largest banking system of Italy. There were other 
Libyan investments spanning various sectors, such as energy (e.g. ENI), telecommunications (e.g. Retelit), 
automobile manufacture (e.g. FIAT), and aircraft manufacture (e.g. Finmeccanica). The LIA even had a 7.5 
percent stake in Juventus, a famous football club (Dionisi 2011). Until 2010, Libya had become an 
influential shareholder of Italy‟s economy. The economies of the two countries were so intertwined that the 
Italian stock market declined by 3.6 percent following the first weekend of the crisis (Picardi 2011). Besides, 
the Euro-zone crisis that erupted in late 2009 had already made Italy‟s economy very vulnerable. If Libya 
were to withdraw all of its investments, it could be a lethal blow to Italy‟s already broken economy. 
Therefore, it was of great importance for Italy to secure its economic interests in Libya. 
The lucrative businesses Italy had in Libya were built on a long-established rapprochement of the two 
countries. Italy had adopted an inclusive strategy toward the West when Libya was still considered a pariah 
by the Western world. During that period, Rome was the only Western interlocutor for Tripoli. Not only had 
Italy been playing a bridge role between Libya and the West, but it also had been trying to reintegrate Libya 
to the international community. In 2004, international sanctions on Libya were lifted because of Gaddafi‟s 
promises to give up the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and to halt the sponsorship of terrorism. 
With this obstacle removed, Italo-Libyan businesses and other forms of cooperation began to boom. Their 
bilateral relations were consummated in 2008 when Berlusconi and Gaddafi signed the Friendship Treaty, 
according to which Italy, as Libya‟s former colonial ruler, agreed to pay $5 billion compensations for its 
past wrongdoings and in return Libya would assist Italy in controlling migration flows. The collapse of the 
Libyan government could mean years of efforts going in vain. It was understandable that Italy found it 
difficult to just throw the privileged ties away, especially when it was unsure whether the NTC, which was 




Italo-Libyan “friendship” went beyond commercial, energy and strategic interests. Personal contacts 
have been an indispensible part of Berlusconi‟s charisma. Without exception, the Prime Minister had 
cultivated intimate personal ties with the Libyan tyrant. The two leaders had paid multiple visits to each 
other. Each time, Gaddafi was treated with warm hospitality. Berlusconi once even kissed Gaddafi's hand 
when they met at the meeting of the Arab League, an honour usually reserved for the Pope (Nadeau 2011). 
Five months before the outbreak of uprising, Berlusconi had just hosted a flamboyant celebration ceremony 
for Gaddafi of the second anniversary of the signing of the Friendship Treaty. The Prime Minister also 
openly declared several times that what was happening in Libya hit him personally. When it appeared that 
the conflict had fallen into a stalemate as months of airstrikes were not able to topple Gaddafi, Berlusconi 
tried to broker a deal of a “quite exit” for Gaddafi to avoid the trial of the ICC. Even after Italy‟s 
participation in the OUP operations, Berlusconi confessed that the decision to get involved entailed personal 
difficulties for him and he felt saddened for his “friend” Gaddafi (Dionisi 2011).  
Domestic politics were amid influential determinants of Italy‟s decision-making. During the crisis, 
Italian leaderships were paying extreme attention to the repercussions on the migration flows from North 
Africa if Gaddafi was going to fall, a growing problem that had been given the Italian government 
headaches for years. The core of the 2008 Italo-Libyan Friendship Treaty lied in their bilateral cooperation 
on migration control. Berlusconi justified its deal with the “devil” by fulfilling his election promise of 
combating illegal immigration, which appeared to have bought him some domestic support. Since the riots 
burst out, coast controls on the side of Libya were basically paralyzed because of the war. The sudden 
arrival of over 5,000 Tunisians at Lampedusa caused a panic in Italy that the threat of a “biblical exodus” of 
refugees was real and imminent. What was more terrifying was the possible infiltration of Islamic 
fundamentalists and terrorists along with the migrants. Even though the Prime Minister was not facing an 
upcoming election, he had to properly address these domestic concerns to earn or maintain popularity, 
especially when his personal reputation was already declining. In addition, the Northern League (Lega 
Nord), a key partner of Berlusconi‟s ruling coalition, was well-known for its anti-immigration policy. It was 




the “catastrophic influx” of immigrants. The Northern League intensely objected to Italy‟s engagement in a 
military intervention. Berlusconi‟s hands were tied from taking an active role in the OUP operation as he 
was under the pressure of the Northern League to withdraw. The charges against Berlusconi of paying for 
sex with an underage girl made the Prime Minister more than ever need the support from the Northern 
League. The combination of these elements explains why Italy appeared to be cold to the idea of military 
intervention.  It was the focus on migration and refugees that diverted Italy‟s attention.  
It is fair to say that Paris and London‟s enthusiasm about intervention in military terms and 
Washington‟s turnabout to support the Anglo-French plan must have contributed to the transformation of 
Rome‟s course toward Libya. The same could be said about the pressing requests from the NTC and the 
appeal for humanitarian aid from the international community. However, it was national interests and 
domestic politics that were truly decisive in determining Italy‟s pendulous reaction to the crisis. No matter 
how different it appeared to be from Britain‟s or France‟s approaches, Italy merely followed their steps in 
prioritizing national interests ahead of the collective ones of the EU. From this point of view, the logic 
behind Italy‟s ambiguity in its policy over Libya becomes simpler to comprehend: in case Gaddafi survived 
this war, Italy could have resumed its business with Libya as usual and might even get more profitable 
contracts because of Rome‟s sympathy toward the Colonel; in contrast, if the NTC won, Rome would also 
be in a better position to refresh the deals with the new Libyan government because of its support to the 
sanctions and military intervention, as well as its support to the NTC. Either way, Italy would be able to 
reduce its loss caused by the turmoil to the minimum. 
Following Germany, Poland was the second EU member that caught the alliance by surprise on the issue 
of the military intervention in Libya. Traditionally being an Atlanticist, Poland had participated in the 
military missions in both Iraq and Afghanistan. But this time Warsaw aligned with Berlin and refused to be 
militarily involved though it pledged to provide humanitarian aid and help with a post-Gaddafi democratic 
transition. For Warsaw, the situation in Libya was an “internal problem” that did not particularly interest 
Poland since it barely had any direct business ties with Tripoli. Polish leaders argued that a neutral position 




Besides, its participation in Afghanistan left Poland no extra military capabilities to get involved in Libya as 
well. Neither the Polish public nor its main political parties supported Poland‟s engagement in the military 
operation. The Polish government had to be careful with this sensitive issue because the parliamentary 
elections were approaching (Dylla 2011). 
Divisions of EU member states on military intervention were further exemplified in their disagreements 
over the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for EUFOR Libya. The CONOPS was one of the stages of 
planning the EUFOR Libya mission, which consisted of a military deployment for humanitarian purposes 
(V. A. Schmidt 2012). The FAC on 12 April failed to adopt the CONOPS, however, due to the reservations 
of Sweden and Finland. Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt thought that the CONOPS plan was too 
premature and too military. Finland, as another contributor of the Nordic Battle Group, shared the idea. 
Finnish Foreign Minister Alexander Stubb warned the risk of getting into a “stalemate” as in the Kosovo 
situation (Gottwald 2012). EUFOR Libya, from the outset of its creation, was not fully supported by all EU 
members or was considered seriously by the UN. Eventually, EUFOR Libya was nothing more than a mere 
“skeleton”.  
Last but not least, even those EU countries that did participate in the multinational military intervention 
were not exactly on the same page in terms of contributions. Of the twenty-one EU member states of NATO, 
only ten committed militarily to the mission. Bulgaria and Romania clarified that they would only take part 
in the naval dimension of the arms embargo. There were initially four EU countries, namely the UK, France, 
Belgium and Denmark, that participated in the airstrikes of targets on the ground. Italy joined them only in 
late April with limited contributions. The Netherlands, Spain, Greece and Sweden all set strict restrictions 
preventing themselves of getting involved on the battlefield. It was reported that at the FAC meeting on 12 
April, Spain even rejected the requests straightforward from France and Britain for greater military 
commitments (Asseburg 2013). No wonder that the Anglo-French alliance was deeply frustrated during the 
whole operation because they felt that they were doing all the heavy work. The military operation was 
carried out under the joint leadership of France, the UK and the US from the beginning. Later the US 




invisible the whole time since member states never came close to agree on a proposal of military mission 
within the CSDP framework. 
(2) The Role of NATO 
Official military intervention in Libya began with a multinational campaign under a three-pronged 
leadership of France, the UK and the US.  As mentioned earlier, Obama‟s administration was hesitant about 
getting involved militarily at the onset of the uprising. Albeit the US changed its mind at the eleven hour and 
swung around to supporting the no-fly zone, Washington made sure that the engagement would be limited 
both in scope and time within a multinational framework. The US was so anxious to hand over the command 
of military operations to the alliance that the US reduced its involvement and took on a sort of supporting 
role less than two weeks after the first offensive. NATO was considered a preferable option. By bringing 
NATO on board not only could Washington lead from behind but also could shift the responsibilities to its 
European allies. This proposition however raised internal disputes inside the alliance, except that this time 
the deepest rift was within the Anglo-French coalition.  
The first reaction of France had been strong resistance to letting NATO lead the operation. Paris argued 
that NATO-leadership would give the Arab world a wrong impression that the alliance was dominated by 
the US. France had a history of a bittersweet relationship with NATO. During Charles de Gaulle's 
presidency, France removed all its armed forces out of NATO‟s integrated command in 1966. Although 
Sarkozy himself championed a campaign in 2009 to reintegrate French military forces into the NATO 
structure, the inclination to have independent defence was ingrained in French policy-makers. NATO was 
also afraid that other NATO members, Germany and Turkey in particular, would hinder NATO‟s action. 
Instead, France suggested a Franco-British joint command. Sarkozy saw the Libyan crisis a perfect 
opportunity to test the bilateral defense treaty signed with the UK in November 2010 and to present France 
as a capable military power independent of the US. When the suggestion was refused by the UK, which 
favoured a NATO command, France finally gave in but made sure that political control would fall under a 
separate body other than the North Atlantic Council (NAC). Insisted by France, the Libya Contact Group 




operation decisions were taking place in Paris, London and Washington as well as the capitals of 
participating allies, not least the other five countries contributing to airstrike missions (Johnson and Mueen 
2012).141  
Both the UK and Italy preferred a NATO command of the Libyan operation. After it heard about the US 
intention to surrender leadership to NATO, London started right away to gather support for it to happen. The 
UK was “absolutely in line” with the US in preparing a no-fly zone over Libya (BBC News 2011). The close 
collaboration with France did not change Britain‟s perception about the importance of the transatlantic 
relationship in its security policy. Cameron‟s preference for NATO over the EU was clearly expressed when 
he said that he did not expect the EU to become a military alliance, and NTAO would be the UK‟s alliance in 
this respect after his suggestion of a NATO-led enforcement of a no-fly zone in Libya was rebuffed by other 
EU member states at the emergency EU Summit on 11 March (Traynor and Watt 2011). Besides, NATO 
was believed to be more experienced in dealing with military operations given its previous experiences in 
Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s, in comparison with the new-established Anglo-French defense 
cooperation. Italy saw NATO heading the mission as the sole option; otherwise it would withdraw its 
authorization for the use of Italian military bases (Lombardi 2011). Italy‟s preference FOR NATO lied in its 
deep concern that otherwise France would subsequently take the lead. It would mitigate Italy‟s influence in 
the region and endanger its chances to win more lucrative contracts when the war was over. Luxembourg 
also present NATO‟s command as a precondition of its participation in the coalition operations.  
Germany and Turkey had opposed a NATO participation in air strikes against Gaddafi‟s forces because it 
would go beyond the UN mandate according to their perceptions. But after the passage of Resolution 1973, 
both countries softened their tones and decided to back or at least not to block NATO‟s leadership of the 
mission. Trying to make amends for its abstention on the UNSC Resolution, Germany also agreed to 
dispatch 300 German troops to support the AWACS operation in Afghanistan, thus freeing up NATO 
capacities for the Libyan operation. Turkey at first chose a cautious path because it had concerns about its 
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standing in the Muslim world. But Turkey considered that it would be worse if France was going to lead the 
operation. France had been impeding Turkey‟s accession to the EU for years. Ankara was irritated when 
Sarkozy did not invite Turkey to the 19 March summit on Libya held in Paris. In the end, Turkey made a 
decision not to block NATO from taking the lead in the airstrikes against Gaddafi‟s forces. 
On 31 March NATO took full control of military operations in Libya. As one looks back, it was only 
natural that NATO instead of the EU stepped in and took charge of the intervention. The EU did not possess 
the capability to conduct a complicated military intervention on short notice. For instance, it took only two 
weeks for NATO to come up with possible operational plans for the Libyan crisis, while it took the EU two 
months to reach the same planning stage (Koenig 2012). But most importantly, the EU was not able to reach 
a common approach among its member states of how to best address the Libyan crisis in the first place.  
 (3) The Status of the NTC 
EU members further split over, inter alia, the status of the Benghazi-based rebels. With no exception, 
their policies toward the rebels and the NTC were based on a cost-benefit analysis of the potential 
commercial and energy interests they could obtain in a post-Gaddafi Libya.  
France and Britain in particular advocated early on for assisting the anti-Gaddafi rebels in Libya. In their 
joint letter addressed to Van Rompuy on 10 March, Sarkozy and Cameron expressed their support to the 
interim government and called on the EU to send a “clear political signal” that the NTC would be seen as a 
valid political interlocutor. On the same day, France took the lead becoming the first country to recognise 
the NTC as the sole legitimate authority of Libya without consulting other EU members beforehand, not 
even Britain. At the extraordinary European Council meeting the following day, the entire group of EU 
members was irritated by the French unilateral move, arguing that it prevented the evolution of a common 
EU strategy towards the NTC. The European Council then merely recognized the TNC as “a political 
interlocutor”.  
Both France and the UK were initiators of the Libya Contact Group, which was created in the London 
conference on Libya chaired by British Foreign Secretary William Hague. The UK also co-chaired the 




advisors to Benghazi to help the Libyan rebels improve their military organization, communications and 
logistics. During the visit of the NTC‟s Mustafa Abdul Jalil to London, Hague welcomed him as the head of 
the legitimate representative of the Libyan people. Cameron also invited the NTC to establish an office at 
London when he met with Jalil that day. It was the first such offer made by a foreign government. But the 
British Foreign Office waited only until July 27 to give its formal recognition to the NTC as the sole 
governmental authority in Libya. 
Germany approached the rebels‟ interim authority with prudence, making sure that German forces would 
not be entangled into an uncertain internal conflict on behalf of a group of insurgents without knowing 
whom they represented and what their goals were. Merkel was particularly annoyed when Sarkozy rushed 
into the recognition of the NTC without consulting with Berlin in advance. Therefore, the visit of Foreign 
Minister Westerwelle to Benghazi on 13 June came rather unexpected.  In company with Development 
Minister Dirk Niebel, Westerwelle made a stop in Libya while on his way to a planned trip to Israel and the 
Palestinian territories. After a three-hour talk with rebel leaders, the Foreign Minsiter recognized the NTC 
as the legitimate representative of the Libyan people. Germany then became the thirteenth nation that 
recognized the NTC. Germany would also open a small mission in Benghazi.  
Given Italy‟s compassion for Gaddafi‟s regime and its duplicitous attitude toward military intervention, it 
was shocking that Italy was the third country after France and Qatar that recognized the NTC as the sole 
legitimate government of Libya. Early on Rome had sincere doubts about the rebels and the NTC.  On 21 
February, Foreign Minister Frattini voiced the potential threat of having an Islamic Arab Emirate at EU 
borders. But once the NTC was seen as a valid political interlocutor by the West, it started drawing the 
blueprint about Tripoli‟s future foreign relations in a post-Gaddafi era. The documents issued by the NTC 
inferred that those countries that had helped them would be granted preferential treatment in a post-war 
Libya. Italy certainly would not want to lose its leverage to France or Britain. Therefore, Rome sped up the 
contact with the rebels. In late March Frattini met with representatives of the NTC at the London 
Conference. A few days later, ENI CEO Paolo Scaroni paid a visit to the NTC‟s leadership. According to the 




contracts with Italian firms, including those with ENI (Lombardi 2011). Swiftly after Scaroni‟s visit, 
Frattini announced the recognition of the NTC on 4 April after a meeting with the NTC‟s foreign envoy, Ali 
al-Essawi in Rome. Italy also agreed to host the upcoming meeting of the Libya Contact Group in May. On 
17 June, Italy reached an agreement with the NTC in which the latter promised to honour Libya‟s previous 
agreements with Italy and to co-manage with Italy the problem of illegal immigration (Maccanico 2011). 
On 25 August, Berlusconi announced the release of frozen assets worth €350 million to the NTC for the 
reconstruction of Libya. The Prime Minister also confirmed that the ENI firm would soon sign an accord 
with the NTC to supply a large amount of gasoline and diesel fuel for the needs of the Libyan people 
(Farnesina 2011). Despite its initial vacillation Italy‟s quick decision to turn away from Gaddafi and support 
the NTC finally got paid.  
 (4)  Migrants and Refugees 
Coping with the problem of irregular migration from North Africa had been identified as a priority of the 
EU since 2009 by the European Council (Europa 2011). Yet the Libya crisis marked another failed test of 
EU solidarity on migration flows. As the security situation in Libya was deteriorating, hundreds of 
thousands of people were fleeing out of the country and seeking their way to the shores of Europe. Early on 
Gaddafi threatened that Tripoli would stop the cooperation with the EU on controlling illegal migration 
from North Africa if the Union continued to support anti-government protesters. Brussels rejected Gaddafi‟s 
blackmail right away. But the same determination could not be attributed to Italy, which was at the frontline 
due to its geographic proximity. While most EU countries were busy condemning Gaddafi‟s bloody 
repression against civilians and proposing possible sanctions against the Libyan authority, Italy, foreseeing 
a catastrophic influx underway, aligned with Malta and Cyprus and insisted that the imminent threat of large 
migratory movements must be prioritized.  
A couple of days before the eruption of the Libyan crisis, over 5,000 Tunisian illegal immigrants had 
landed on Italy‟s small island Lampedusa, leading to a declared humanitarian emergency by the government. 
When Libya fell into turmoil, Foreign Minister Frattini estimated that up to 300,000 of migrants would 




Minister Maroni warned about the numbers of refugees and asylum seekers could reach 1.5 million and the 
situation could get even worse (Maccanico 2011). Italy‟s concerns about the repercussions of African 
refugees partially explained its ambiguity toward Gaddafi‟s regime. The Friendship Treaty the two 
countries signed in 2008 included a secret deal according to which Italy and Libya had established joint 
patrolling and electronic surveillance of the Libyan coasts to prevent illegal migration. Although this 
“pushback” practice was harshly criticised by the Catholic Church and human rights groups, the Italian 
government considered it a success since the number of illegal immigrants had dropped by 98 percent 
between 2008 and 2010 (Lombardi 2011). Italy did not rush into advocating regime change because Rome 
was unwilling to see its migration control efforts fall into nothing in a collapsed Libya. By then it was 
uncertain whether the rebels could win the war and whether they would honour the previous Italo-Libyan 
agreement of migration control. 
As the numbers of refugees mounted, Rome turned to Brussels for assistance in mid-February. Italy first 
asked the EU to set up a €100 million emergency solidarity fund to ease the burden of Italy and five other 
Mediterranean countries.142 It then requested Frontex to strengthen its patrolling surveillance of the costs of 
North Africa to detect and prevent illegal immigration. Italy also called for “a common asylum policy” to 
redistribute asylum seekers throughout the EU.  
In response, the EU on 20 February launched Joint Operation Hermes, an Italy-led Frontex operation to 
monitor the migratory movements. The European Council on 11 March called for a rapid agreement among 
member states so that further human and technical resources could be provided to Frontex (European 
Council 2011b). However, northern and western EU members believed that Italy was just crying the wolf 
and refused to contribute to the funding or reallocate migrants across the EU. “There is no refugee influx 
right now”, German Interior Minister Thomas de Maizière said on 24 February, “let‟s not provoke one by 
talking about it”.143 The notion was widely shared by his Hungarian, Belgian, Austrian and Swedish 
counterparts. Swedish Migration and Asylum Minister Tobias Billstrom even pointed out that other EU 
members had taken far more migrants in the past years without begging for help (Chaffin 2011). EU Home 
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Affairs Commissioner Cecilia Malmström also echoed that it was too early to do anything additional for a 
situation that had not come yet. 
Together with Malta and Cyprus, Italy tried to enactive the Temporary Protective Directive of the EU, a 
directive set up in 2001 after the Kosovo war that would automatically allow free circulation of refugees 
across the EU (Mara 2011). The proposal was again turned down by other EU countries and the 
Commission as premature. Feeling very much isolated, Italy decided to act on its own to tackle the surge of 
immigrants. From 5 April, Rome began to issue temporary residence permits to roughly 25,000 refugees, 
which would allow them to move freely throughout the Schengen area. At the Justice and Home Affairs 
Council in Luxembourg on 11 April, a number of EU members rallied around France and Germany, accused 
Italy of violating the “Schengen spirit” and threatened to restore border controls. Italian leaderships in return 
accused other EU member states for their unwillingness to show solidarity and even questioned the value of 
EU membership (Pop 2011).  
The discords within the EU on migration influx culminated after mid-April, when France blocked the 
trains coming from Italy carrying North African migrants and subsequently declared that it would consider 
the suspension of its Schengen obligations. Paris was furious about Rome‟s decision to grant the migrants 
temporary travel visas with full acknowledgement that many of the French-speaking refugees were heading 
to France. After ten days of recriminations, the two countries finally overcame the tensions because of a 
compromise made by Italy. On 26 April, one day following Italy‟s approval of commitments to the 
NATO-led airstrikes in Libya, France and Italy agreed on a joint initiative – during a visit to Rome by 
Sarkozy – calling the EU to allow member states to tighten Schengen controls in exceptional circumstances 
such as the Libya crisis.  
6.3.4 An Assessment of EU Representation Coherence in the Libya Crisis 
The unrest of Libya posed a security threat in the southern backyard of the EU and triggered an 
unprecedented surge of migration to Europe. But it also offered a precious opportunity to have the new 
institutional instruments brought by the ToL tested in the CFSP/CSDP field. It could be a chance for the HR 




to the world. It was expected that the EU would be better fitted to take action than it was during the Iraq war 
and the Balkan crisis because of the implementation of the ToL. However, the performance of the EU and its 
member states during this crisis once again revealed how difficult it was for the Union to shape a common 
foreign policy so that it could tackle foreign policy challenges as a united collective organization. Despite its 
generous humanitarian assistance and swift action to evacuate EU citizens, the Union was sharply criticised 
for its lack of leadership and coherence in crisis management. EU member states clashed on various aspects 
about how to best address the crisis, leading to the absence of a common EU strategy toward Libya and a 
marginalized EU presence during the progress of conflict management.  
The newly established joint agent of EU external representation, namely the HR and the President, took 
the leadership in expressing the Union over the developments unfolding in Libya. With the competences 
granted by the ToL, both representatives were able to show a high profile on the world stage by issuing a 
series of declarations on behalf of the Union in the early stages of the riots and by condemning Gaddafi‟s use 
of forces against civilians and calling for an immediate halt of the violence. There was no evidence that 
either the HR or the President was by any means compromised by domestic politics or national interests. 
However it appeared that the declarations released by the two leaderships were not well coordinated. For 
instance, in one of his statements of early February, Van Rompuy talked about regime change while the HR 
was obviously not ready to accept that course. Small as the dissonance was, it however demonstrated that a 
continual divided EU representation between the HR and the President could cause contradictions in EU 
foreign policy if the two leaderships were lacking communication.  
Indeed, Ashton deserved some credit for the dispatch of an EEAS-led fact-finding team to Libya and the 
opening of a liaison office in Benghazi. But the HR was under fire by presenting a low-profile stand rather 
than taking the initiative. As the foreign policy chief, Ashton did not take the lead in calling for sanctions 
against Gaddafi‟s regime. Nor was she able to push forward a common approach fast enough on imposing 
sanctions as the head of the FAC. EU foreign ministers spent a whole week debating the subject, while the 
HR seemed to be satisfied that at lowest denominator there was a consensus on providing humanitarian 




the HR de facto gave up her responsibility to ensure compliance of member states with the Union‟s action in 
the CFSP area. Ashton was late to make a statement that Gaddafi should go and to make contact with the 
NTC (Helwig et al. 2013:22). Nor was she able to harmonize EU member states‟ diverge at preferences on 
enforcing a no-fly zone under the UN mandate. In fact, the HR herself clashed with Cameron and Sarkozy 
on this particular matter. Therefore, she was not invited to play a part when France and the UK were jointly 
pushing forward the adoption of Resolution 1973 at the UNSC. Most important of all, as EU representative 
in the CFSP field, she failed to foster a joint EU mission within the framework of CSDP, despite the two EU 
countries, i.e. the UK and France were spearheading the military operation against Libya.  
The new-launched EEAS did not contribute to an increase in inter-institutional coherence either. Its 
relationship with the Commission, especially the ECHO, was not as smooth as it should have been due to the 
different working cultures. The EEAS was responsible for strategic guidance and coordination, but financial 
instruments and their implementation remained in the hands of the Commission. The EEAS also lacked 
experience in dealing with the crisis since crisis management structures used to function under the Council 
Secretariat and were only transferred to the EEAS in 2010.  
Apart from the reason of capacity deficit, the agent was paralyzed due to the high preference 
heterogeneity among the actors of the collective principal, in this case, the EU. In other words, the HR was 
not able to better represent the Union because she was trapped in the cost-benefit calculations of member 
states based on divergent national interests and policy preferences. In other words, EU countries disagreed 
with each other on various aspects of how to handle the Libya crisis. The requirement of unanimity for 
decision-making in CFSP/CSDP matters made a common EU position on the military intervention in Libya 
impossible.  
France and Britain, with stronger military capabilities, were proactive in enforcing a no-fly zone over 
Libya in terms of military intervention. When it appeared hopeless to reach a common EU position on this 
issue due to the strong opposition from Germany and the initial scepticism of Italy, the two countries 
decided to circumvent the Union and align with the US to conduct the airstrikes anyway. France even started 




in the UNSC, France and the UK were supposed to defend the EU‟s position and interests in concert with 
other EU members sitting in the UNSC, i.e. Germany and Portugal at that moment. However, there was no 
coordination or concertation at this level whatsoever when the France and the UK aligned themselves with 
Lebanon rather than their EU peers on draft Resolution 1973, which was later supported by the US as well. 
The HR was not involved in the process or invited to present the Union‟s position because a joint position 
was never defined. Portugal, as expected, chose to support the Franco-British initiative, while Germany 
decided to abstain in the vote on this resolution. Agent deviation was obvious in this case. These countries 
tended to focus on their national preferences rather than representing the Union.  
The problem of “dual loyalty” can be detected with the P2. As permanent members of the UNSC, they 
also share the obligation to maintain international peace and security, especially when it matches their 
national interests. After Resolution 1973 was adopted, Paris and London perceived their joint military 
actions along with Washington as their duty under the UN mandate. The appearance of NATO further 
complicated the principal-agent relationships. As most EU members were also members of NATO, the 
loyalty problem became more salient. When NATO agreed to take full command of military operations in 
Libya, EU members also had to fulfil their commitments to NATO, although in reality they contributed to 
the mission to widely differing extents. For France and the UK, when they saw the EU‟s lack of readiness to 
get involved in military intervention, it was only natural that they chose to side with a more preferable 
principal, which is NATO. Not only was the EU sidelined in preparing Resolution 1973, it was also 
marginalized in its enforcement. The EU could be an ideal structure through which to deal with a crisis at its 
doorstep, as the US was adjusting its security strategy and would have liked to see the Union shoulder more 
responsibilities. But instead, the Union could only concentrate on tightening sanctions against Gaddafi‟s 
regime and organizing humanitarian efforts. 
It must be pointed out that two new EU members, Malta and Cyprus, did align themselves with Italy and 
contributed to the postponement of the EU‟s sanctions against Gaddafi and his inner circle due to their 
concerns of a migration exodus. But like Italy, their concerns were mainly based on geographic proximity, 




in the last wave of EU enlargement. Therefore, it would be too assertive to jump to the conclusion that 
enlargement caused incoherence of EU representation in dealing with the Libya crisis. 
In a nutshell, the EU stood little more coherent and unified than it was prior to the ToL. The institutional 
instruments created by the ToL were not sufficient to bring a common EU foreign policy or a unified crisis 
management. It still largely depends on if EU member states are willing to put their national interests and 
domestic politics aside and work genuinely with each other on a common ground. The Libya crisis once 
again demonstrated the incoherence and inefficiency in EU representation. But meanwhile it offered an 
opportunity for the Union to establish new initiatives to improve the leadership capacity of the HR and the 
EEAS under her authority. Most importantly, it offered an opportunity for EU member states to allow a 
common EU policy to work in the reconstruction of a post-Gaddafi Libya. 
6.4 A Cross-Case Comparison 
During the Iraq war, the rotating Presidency was acting as the Union‟s leading agent. As analyzed in the 
previous section, neither the Danish nor the Greek Presidency was able to keep a high profile in representing 
the EU. Both Presidencies were generally reluctant to make clear positions at an earlier stage, not until they 
had figured out the preferences of other EU member states. In comparison, the refashioned HR, with 
extensive competences granted by the ToL, was willing to take the lead from the very beginning and issued 
various statements on behalf of the Union. In this sense, the collective presence of the EU on the world stage 
was somewhat improved. However, as the conflict, especially the possibility of military intervention, 
became further politicized, the role of the HR as the Union‟s representative started to be overshadowed by 
national leaders. EU delegation structure was more streamlined in the case of Libya crisis, since the rotating 
Presidency had been replaced by fixed posts, namely the President and the HR. The problem of 
discontinuity was to a certain degree reduced. But the ToL continued to divide EU representation between 
different foreign policy actors. There was a risk of inconsistent representation across different EU 
institutions. Agent capacity was also strengthened in a limited way. During the Iraq war, both Presidencies 
eventually yielded to national preferences and joined different camps, rather than fulfil their responsibilities 




contributed to the split of the EU, which further reduced the vertical coherence. On the contrary, there was 
no evidence suggesting deliberate agent slack from the HR or the President during the Libya crisis. However, 
the autonomy enjoyed by the HR, was still to a large degree confined by the preference heterogeneity among 
EU member states. Moreover, it appeared that EU member states remained to be reluctant about the 
competence transfer when foreign policy and security issue were involved. In other words, when it came to 
sensitive issues, such as the use of force in third countries, EU member states still felt uncomfortable to 
entrust the HR to represent their national interests. All in all, the limited reform brought by the ToL to the 
EU‟s representation structure might have improved some aspects of EU representation coherence, 
especially in the terms of format and articulation. But at the end of the day, it will depends on the willingness 
of EU member states to allow the HR and EU representatives to fully act within their competences, not least 
when there are still some agency problems left unsolved, as explained earlier in Chapter 4. 
Whereas the case studies are conducted under the “most similar system” design, some differences can still 
be identified between the Iraq war and the Libya crisis: first, although for both conflicts, foreign military 
interventions contributed to the overthrow of the dictators, for the case of Iraq, the justification was based on 
the assumption that Saddam possessed considerable amount of WMD, whereas for the case of Libya, 
intervention was mainly for the purpose of assisting the rebels; second, the action in Libya was authorized 
by the UNSC, while the military action conducted by the US-led coalition did not get a clear UN mandate; 
moreover, the Libya crisis started with an unrest against Gaddafi‟s regime, whereas in 2002-2003, there was 
no such massive popular demonstration against Saddam; fourth, the Arab League opposed US-led invasion 
against Iraq, it actually welcomed the military action in Libya; fifth, the military intervention in Iraq led to a 
long-term occupation whereas the Libya civil war was subject to strict military missions that did not lead to 
occupation; finally, the US took the lead in the invasion against Saddam‟s regime while during the Libya 
crisis, it was France and the UK, and later the NATO that was leading the action implementing the no-fly 
zone, whereas the US was sitting behind the scene. These differences are by no means exclusive and it 




Chapter 7 Conclusions 
Both the UN and the EU are important actors in the realm of global governance. The commitment to 
multilateral solutions remains a central stand of the EU‟s general external strategy. The ToL has confirmed 
the Union‟s support for effective multilateralism and its firm attachment to the UN. The set of institutional 
reforms introduced by the ToL aims to strengthen the EU‟s international clout on the global stage. However, 
few exiting studies have systematically assessed its effects on EU representation in the domain of the CFSP. 
This dissertation represents an effort of exploring the question whether the expectation of the ToL in 
improving EU external representation has been fulfilled in two main UN bodies, namely the UNGA and the 
UNSC. These two institutions together provide appropriate frameworks to examine EU representation and 
to draw more complete conclusions of the impact of the ToL. Inspired by the principal-agent theory, EU 
representation are theorized into different delegation relationships where the EU and its entire membership 
are considered  collective principals, while the actors that play the role of the agent(s) of the Union and the 
specific delegation structures been different under different circumstances. 
It is argued that the ToL has the potential to improve the coherence of EU external representation if 
certain conditions are met, especially if EU member states are willing to genuinely implement its provisions 
to improve their internal coordination. A mixed approach is adopted to combine both quantitative and 
qualitative methods to detect the pre- and post-Lisbon coherence variation in EU representation. At the 
UNGA, EU representation coherence is measured in terms of EU voting cohesion. At the UNSC, some 
descriptive statistics are first presented to describe and summarize the voting behaviour of the EU member 
states sitting on the UNSC, based on which the cases of Iraq and Libya are selected for further investigation. 
Subsequently, the coherence of the EU‟s representation during these two conflicts – both horizontal and 
vertical – is examined and compared by in order to detect the ToL‟s effect on EU representation coherence.  
This conclusive chapter is split into three sections: the first section summarizes and revisits the central 
empirical findings of this dissertation; the second section makes some recommendations concerning EU 
representation coherence based on the lessons that are learned; the final section points out the main 




7.1 Revisiting the Main Findings 
At the UNGA, in terms of agents, the ToL has replaced the rotating Presidency with the newly 
established President and the HR, which are supported by the EU delegation to the UN. The statistical 
results reveal that EU voting cohesion is generally higher than that of the entire UNGA and has been 
increasing gradually over time. This finding is important in the sense that it fits the traditional pattern of 
incrementalism that has characterised the evolution of the CFSP over the past two decades. It implies that 
the effects of institutional adaption and socialization process emphasized by the principal-agent theory and 
the new institutionalism may be slow and subtle, but indeed bear promising power in explaining the variety 
and complexity of EU external representation. 
However, a somewhat troubled trend was identified with the ToL, since there seemed to be a small 
decline in EU voting cohesion after the ToL was adopted. But it would be arbitrary to jump to the conclusion 
that the ToL has negative effects on EU representation coherence. Suffice it to say that the ToL has not made 
the EU a more coherent actor at the UNGA yet. A possible cause could be the agency problems left unsolved 
by the ToL: e.g., the risk of horse-trading in agent selection, the potential of competitions between EU 
foreign policy actors, such as the President, the HR, the President of the Commission; the remaining 
influence that can be exerted by the rotating Presidency through its chairmanship over various Council 
working groups, the overwhelming mandates granted to the HR, the absence of deputising system, the 
dominance of unanimity in CFSP decision making, and the lack of enforceable means. However, it would be 
too arbitrary to jump to the conclusion that the ToL. As institutions and social learning process work very 
slowly, time is still needed, for EU representatives, especially for the HR, to adjust their capabilities so that 
they can truly stand as a fully-fledged EU agent. But as explained before, it largely depends on the 
willingness of EU members to coordinate their different policy preferences and to allow EU representatives 
to take the lead.  
 The statistical tests also shed lights on the relationship between EU representation coherence and some 
alternative variables, e.g., membership size, enlargement, issue areas and the degree of regional integration. 
Contrary to conventional wisdom, it is found that enlargement does not necessarily lead to lower voting 




after each round of enlargement that was discussed in this dissertation. One possible explanation could be 
that the effect of enlargement has been diminished when the errant member states were willing to act 
coherently with the majority of the EU. It may suggest that the current EU enlargement system, including 
the association agreements and the SAP, were well functioning and may need to be further exploited to meet 
the needs of further enlargements. This finding may contribute to silencing the arguments that are against 
EU enlargements. 
Contrary to the common sense that larger group would exhibit lower coherence, the findings that involve 
membership size suggest there is no significant relationship between these two variables. It implies that 
other variables, e.g., integration degree may prevail. However, by comparing the EU and other regional 
organizations at the UNGA, it is found that the Union, which is commonly considered a successful model of 
regional integration, does not outperform other regional organizations at the UNGA in terms of voting 
cohesion. It suggests that either the idea of using the EU as a model for regional integration may need to be 
adapted or further research should be conducted to investigate why these less integrated groups were able to 
show high degree of voting cohesion at the UNGA. 
Finally, the statistical results indicate that EU voting cohesion varies across issue areas, a finding that is 
consistent with the existing literature in this field. But its cohesion in more contested fields, i.e., 
“International Security” and “Decolonization” has not been improved by the ToL. A potential problematic 
trend is that voting cohesion in the area “Human Rights” displayed somewhat decline. But it remains to be 
see how exaclty the ToL is going to influence EU decision making in different areas. These hypotheses, 
while only exploring part of potential effects of the ToL on EU voting cohesion at the UNGA, can reveal 
some interesting developments as to the extent of EU representation coherence in global politics over time, 
and notably after the adoption of the ToL. 
It has to be kept in mind, however, that analyzing voting records of EU member states in the UNGA has 
some potential drawbacks. First, voting only reflects the last stage of a process of coordination and does not 
reveal what happened in the phases before. Nonetheless, the analysis of these records provides an 




context of the UNGA. Second, the analysis conducted here cannot account for the moderating effect of UN 
reform on the influence of the ToL system as far as foreign relations of the EU are concerned. Further efforts 
should be devoted to the analysis of the presence of the EU in UN programmes, specialized agencies, and 
other IOs.  
 At the UNSC, the ToL strengthened the role of the HR and the EU delegation. It also narrowed the 
competence gap between permanent and non-permanent EU member states in defending the Union‟s 
common interests. Following the quantitative analysis, two in-depth case studies of the conflicts in Iraq and 
Libya were conducted. These two cases first caught our attention in light of the guidance of the descriptive 
statistics of EU voting in the UNSC. Topics surrounding the situations in Iraq and Libya stood out even in 
the rare occasion of EU voting deviation at the UNSC. The 2002-2003 Iraq crisis and the 2011 Libya crisis 
were selected not only because these two cases resemble each other in many perspectives but also because 
the factor of the adoption of the ToL marks a difference between them, which allows us to detect whether 
the ToL has affected EU voting cohesion in qualitative terms. The case studies find that the adoption of the 
ToL offers an opportunity to improve the EU‟s representation coherence, at both horizontal and vertical 
levels. Although there is a possibility to establish a de facto EU common presence in the UNSC, so far the 
HR‟s role as the Union‟s agents is still very limited, since its autonomy to a large degree is confined by EU 
member states.  As of today, EU representation is still mainly delivered through its member states sitting in 
the UNSC, especially the permanent members, i.e. the UK and France, given that a profound reform to 
include regional organizations in the UN‟s membership is unlikely in the foreseeable future.  
 The weak representaton of the EU at the UNSC has a lot to do with the remaining agency problems, 
including, inter alia, the lack of formal EU representation, the predominant role of France and Britain as EU 
agents, the absence of control over agent selection, or the unsolved puzzles left by the ToL, e.g., the risk of 
agent slack due to the unanimity rule in the CFSP and the absence of enforceable instruments. The ToL risks 




7.2 Recommendations: Towards a More Coherent EU? 
Although there was no significant empirical evidence of improved EU representation after the adoption 
of the ToL either in the statistical results or in case studies, it is believed that if EU institutions and member 
states can act in concert, implementing the spirits of coordination, consultation and solidarity prescribed by 
the treaty, the EU can become a more effective and influential actor in the international community. This 
chapter goes through the possible scenarios of the EU‟s future status at the UN and makes some 
recommendations from both academic and practical perspectives  
Despite the recent contributions brought by the Lisbon Treaty, flaws continue to exist in the institutional 
design of the Union, affecting its representation abroad and at home. Since the procedure of treaty revision 
is too complicated and would certainly take considerable time, more punctual, specific technical solutions 
are advised. Firstly, the role of the HR as head of EU foreign policy could be further strengthened. The 
critiques regarding the absence of Lady Ashton from different working meetings, her inadequate presence in 
the media and her lack of action must be addressed institutionally. The office of HR must take a leading role 
in setting policy priorities and should act as the contact agent on behalf of the EU when it comes to relations 
with third countries. Arguably, the way in which the mandate is imagined today, with so many roles that the 
HR must fulfill (vice-president of the Commission, head of the European Defense Agency, head of the 
EEAS, chair of the Foreign Affairs Council etc.), makes it rather an impossible mission than a proper job 
(Marangoni 2012). Therefore, granting more flexibility and space of manoeuvre by putting at its disposal 
more (manpower) resources could help the HR in carrying out its mandate efficiently.  
Secondly, in order to better assist the HR and other EU bodies in their activity, the EEAS should act as a 
comprehensive and proactive policy entrepreneur, capable of developing EU foreign policy strategies, 
providing accurate analysis regarding current issues of world politics, and of submitting proposals on how 
the EU should react to any given situation. Impartiality and professionalism should be the guiding principles 
when providing the EU institutions and the member states with the information they need. To ensure these 
two „golden principles‟, a careful selection process must be conducted so as to recruit personnel with 




daily working skills, and – more importantly – will enable shared understandings of EEAS working 
approaches.  
Moreover, connecting the EEAS to national diplomatic services can consolidate the relations with the 
member states and would nevertheless make the EEAS much more visible and present inside the EU. 
National embassies could transfer some of their competencies to the EEAS to avoid duplication fatigue and 
unnecessary costs. Just as in the European and Euro-Atlantic military sphere, concepts such as “pooling and 
sharing” or “smart defense” have been elaborated and implemented precisely to save costs, particularly in 
times of economic crisis, so too the diplomatic sector of the EU can adopt similar concepts for the same 
pragmatic purposes. On the other hand, should the economic crisis come to an end in the near future, thus 
making resources available once again, the EEAS could benefit greatly from this context.  
Thirdly, to increase the external cohesion of the EU, further convergence of policy preferences and better 
internal coordination among the Member States are required in the long-run. The process of coordination 
must be more streamlined and less time-consuming. In order to make decision-making more efficient, QMV 
could be applied to more areas, including even some issues related to CFSP. A more transparent 
policy-making system is also needed to promote mutual understanding among EU member states. Mutual 
understanding would be achieved easier if information sharing becomes more frequent. In this sense, the 
formal processes of exchanging information among member states and EU institutions could be 
complemented by informal channels of communication.  
More specifically, in terms of EU voting, the reality that EU cohesion ranks very high in some issue areas, 
such as “Middle East” or human rights should be cultivated in the direction of moving towards full 
consensus. In other cases where cohesion has been traditionally low, such as nuclear or decolonization 
issues, there is probably not too much that can be done to achieve consensus in the short-run. However, by 
setting up early warning mechanisms and dispute settlement procedures, deep voting fractures may be 
avoided. France and the UK are more likely to deviate from the common position, not necessarily only 
because of divergent interests, but especially because of their privileged status in the UNSC. The 




as to bring these two states on board. Fear of isolation alone may not suffice. The EU still needs to enforce a 
system not only of „carrots‟ but also of „sticks‟ so that serious errant members can be held responsible.  
Finally, the EU should continue to seek an enhanced status at the UN, including within the Security 
Council. The EU could campaign for its own seat in the UNSC; however, extensive disagreements already 
exist among the EU member states. Even if the member states can reach an agreement on this, the other UN 
members could vote against the proposal on the grounds that the EU is already over-represented in the 
UNSC. Apart from France and the UK which are permanent members, there are also two seats for Western 
Europe and 1 seat for Eastern Europe. One single EU seat would probably be an acceptable solution to the 
other UN members but it is doubtful that France and the UK will agree to terminate their privileged 
positions. Another attempt could be a UNSC resolution inspired from the UNGA resolution that granted the 
EU an enhanced status. However, if it aspires to increase its influence at the UN, the EU first has to 
demonstrate that it is able to speak with one voice and act coherently in its external relations. 
7.3 Contributions, Limitations and Future Prospects 
This dissertation aims to contribute to a better understanding of the EU‟s role in international fora in 
general and at the UN in particular, by providing a clearer conceptualization of EU representation coherence 
– distinguished from other related concepts, e.g., actorness and effectiveness – and concrete measurements 
of coherence in both quantitative (voting cohesion) and qualitative terms (horizontal and vertical coherence). 
It strengthens the analyses on EU voting behaviour at the UNGA in the form of a sophisticated statistical 
investigation of EU voting cohesion within a relatively broader time frame. In the meantime, this research is 
able to reassess some alternative explanatory variables, including inter alia, membership size, socialization 
and issue areas on voting cohesion, based on a more complete data collection that includes the resolutions of 
the latest two UNGA sessions. It also adds creative values to the studies of the EU‟s presence at the UNSC 
by applying a mixed approach that combines descriptive statistics and case studies. The examinations of a 
classic case concerning the Iraq war and a timely case regarding the Libya crisis against the background of 
the Arab Spring are going to enrich the empirical observations on the EU‟s representation at the forum. 




implications of the ToL and conducts a systematic empirical test of its effects on EU representation 
coherence, which steers the discussions surrounding the ToL away from legal and theoretical perspectives 
to real-world evidence. Finally, this dissertation bridges the research traditions emphasizing the importance 
of outcomes and the approaches emphasizing the process of decision making that accounts for the 
international role of the EU. 
The current study has some limitations regardless of the great efforts and large amount of time spared on 
the research: first, it is not generally possible to specify the causality of the variation of EU voting cohesion 
based on the principal-agent model; second, it is difficult to assess the relative importance of various factors 
on EU representation. Future research should be conducted to identify a more sophisticated combination of 
determining factors that influence the effectiveness of EU representatives. Incorporating the external 
context, such as the influence of the US, could be a worthwhile attempt. Efforts could also be devoted to 
study the presence of the EU and the quality of EU agency relationships in UN programmes, specialized 
agencies, or in other IOs. A thorough content analysis of EU statements and documents could also be 
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This dissertation explores the effects of the Treaty of Lisbon (ToL) on the coherence of the external 
representation of the European Union (EU) in the field of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) at 
two main UN bodies, i.e., the UN General Assembly (UNGA) and the Security Council (UNSC). It 
theorizes EU representation into a principal-agent relationship and assesses the developments of the EU 
delegation relationship since the adoption of the ToL. In both contexts the EU and its entire membership are 
considered a collective principal while the actors that play the role of the agent(s) have been different 
through different historical periods. 
 
A mixed approach is adopted to combine both quantitative and qualitative methods to detect the pre- and 
post-Lisbon coherence variation in EU representation. At the UNGA, EU representation coherence is 
measured in terms of EU voting cohesion. At the UNSC, some descriptive statistics are first presented to 
describe and summarize the voting behaviour of the EU member states sitting on the UNSC, based on which 
the cases of Iraq and Libya are selected for further investigation. Subsequently, the coherence of the EU‟s 
representation during these two conflicts – both horizontal and vertical – is examined and compared by 
looking at the coordination mechanisms and articulation consistency of the EU and its member states.  
 
The empirical evidence suggests that EU representation coherence, in general, has increased in parallel with 
the developments of the CFSP over time. The reformed delegation structure introduced by the ToL, 
however, has not yet contributed to greater EU representation coherence at the UN. Whereas the ToL offers 
an opportunity to strengthen agent capabilities and control mechanisms, coherent EU representation appears 
to be unlikely in the near future, if the remaining agency problems are left unaddressed. Especially it 
depends on the genuine willingness of EU member states to overcome diverging preferences and support 
common EU positions. Only until their declaratory commitments lead to real cooperation can the Union 
truly stand united and speak coherently on foreign affairs. Of equal importance is the demand for closer 
coordination among different EU institutions for the sake of consistent and complementary representation. 
Time is still needed for EU representatives, namely the President of the European Council, the Commission 
President and the refashioned High Representative – the External Action Service under her authority as well 
– to develop into fully-fledged agents with more autonomy and clearer delimitation of representation 
competences.    
 
The chapters of this dissertation are organized as follows: 
 
Following an overview of the status of the EU‟s presence at the UN, Chapter 1 considers the conceptual and 
methodological issues of this research. It firstly defines EU representation coherence and distinguishes the 
fundamental concept of coherence from other prominent themes in the studies in respect to the EU‟s role or 
performance in external relations. Then it continues to introduce how EU representation coherence is going 
to be measured within the two contexts of the UN and the corresponding analytical methods that will be 





Chapter 2 reviews the existing bodies of literature with reference to the EU‟s representation in the 
international system, notably at the UNGA and the UNSC, and explains how this dissertation contributes to 
the relevant fields of studies.  
 
Chapter 3 first lays out the fundamental assumptions of the principal-agent theory and argues that this 
theoretical mode bears promising power in explaining the complexity and variety in the EU‟s external 
representation. Within this framework, the situations of EU representation in multilateral organizations are 
theorized into different types of delegation relationships, in which the EU and its member states are 
considered collective principals, while the actors that play the role of agents and the delegation structures 
are conditioned by the division of EU competences and the status of EU in particular international 
institutions. This section develops the typologies of EU competences and EU status models, and then 
specifies the agents and delegation structures under different (combinations of) circumstances within 
selected IOs. The final section of Chapter 3 places the principal-agent theory in a broader theoretical 
framework of new institutionalism. It compares the principal-agent theory with historical and sociological 
institutionalisms, and indicates that an extended and adapted model of the principal-agent theory that 
absorbs the strengths of the other two approaches of new institutionalism will serve as the theoretical 
foundation for this dissertation.  
 
Chapter 4 is divided into two sections, which respectively draw a panorama for the evolution of EU 
representation at the UNGA and the UNSC from an adapted principal-agent point of view. Following a brief 
introduction of the institutional structures the UNGA, the first section takes a look back at the “problematic” 
delegation relationship of the EU‟s external representation at this forum in the pre-Lisbon era. Then it 
describes the reformed representation structure of the Union established by the ToL and points out the 
remaining agency problems. Based on the post-Lisbon developments in EU representation, and drawing on 
the insights of the extended principal-agent theory outlined in Chapter 3, six hypotheses regarding the 
coherence of EU representation – measured by the voting cohesion of EU member states at the UNGA – are 
proposed to be tested using a quantitative method in Chapter 5. The second section briefly describes the sui 
generis institutional structure of the UNSC and examines the horizontal coherence of EU representation 
within this context in the pre- and post-Lisbon eras. It also examines the vertical representation coherence 
by looking at the implications of the ToL on the Union‟s coordination and concertation mechanisms on UN 
matters. It is proposed that the innovations of the ToL – although limited – would contribute to an increase 
in the Union‟s representation coherence at the UNSC. The final section touches upon the inevitable question 
about the reform of the UNSC and explores the EU dimension in the ongoing debate.  
 
Chapter 5 tests the hypotheses formulated in Chapter 4 on EU representation coherence at the UNGA, with 
systematic statistical analyses of the voting behaviour of EU member states. This chapter also presents the 
descriptive statistics of voting in the UNSC, which not only demonstrate the unique decision-making 




Guided by the descriptive statistics in the previous chapter, Chapter 6 assesses EU representation coherence 
in two case studies, i.e., the 2002-2003 Iraq war and the 2011 Libya crisis, which are divided by the entry 
into force of the ToL. In each case, EU representation coherence is examined at both horizontal and vertical 
levels. In order to uncover the variation in coherence after the implementation of the ToL, a follow-up 
cross-case comparison is conducted.  
 
The conclusionary chapter, Chapter 7, is split into three sections: the first section summarizes and revisits 
the central empirical findings of this dissertation; the second section makes some recommendations 
concerning EU representation coherence based on the lessons that are learned; the final section points out 
























Dit proefschrift onderzoekt de gevolgen van het Verdrag van Lissabon (ToL) op de coherentie van de 
externe vertegenwoordiging van de Europese Unie (EU), op het gebied van het gemeenschappelijke 
buitenlandse beleid en veiligheidsbeleid (CFSP) bij twee belangrijke VN-organen, namelijk, de Algemene 
Vergadering van de VN (UNGA) en de Veiligheidsraad (UNSC). EU-vertegenwoordiging wordt gezien in 
termen van een principal-agent relatie en dit theoretisch kader wordt toegepast voor de beoordeling van de 
ontwikkelingen sinds de vaststelling van de ToL. In beide contexten wordt de EU en haar gehele 
lidmaatschap beschouwd als een collectieve opdrachtgever, terwijl verschillende acteurs de rol van de 
agent(en) spelen gedurende de verschillende historische perioden. 
 
Er wordt een “mixed-methods design” toegepast door kwantitatieve als kwalitatieve methoden te 
combineren om veranderingen in de pre- en post-Lissabon fase in EU-vertegenwoordiging te kunnen 
detecteren. In de UNGA is cohesie in vertegenwoordiging van de EU gemeten in termen van samenhang bij 
stemprocedures. Voor de VN-Veiligheidsraad wordt eerst beschrijvende statistiek gepresenteerd dat het 
stemgedrag van de EU-lidstaten die in de VN-Veiligheidsraad vertegenwoordigd zijn beschrijft en 
samenvat, op basis waarvan de gevallen Irak en Libië worden geselecteerd voor verder onderzoek. 
Vervolgens wordt de cohesie van de vertegenwoordiging van de EU tijdens deze twee conflicten - zowel 
horizontale als verticale cohesie - onderzocht en vergeleken, door te kijken naar de coördinatiemechanismen 
en de consistentie van uitspraken van de EU en haar lidstaten. 
 
Uit empirische gegevens blijkt dat, door de jaren heen, de cohesie in de vertegenwoordiging van de EU in 
het algemeen is toegenomen in lijn met de ontwikkelingen van de CFSP. De hervormde delegatiestructuur, 
die werd geïntroduceerd door de ToL, heeft echter nog niet bijgedragen aan een grotere coherentie bij de 
EU-vertegenwoordiging van de VN. Terwijl de ToL daarentegen een kans biedt om de 
vertegenwoordigingsmogelijkheden en controlemechanismen te versterken, lijkt coherente 
vertegenwoordiging van de EU niet waarschijnlijk in de nabije toekomst, indien de overige 
„agency‟-problemen niet worden aangepakt. Het hangt vooral af van de daadwerkelijke bereidheid van de 
EU-lidstaten om uiteenlopende voorkeuren te overwinnen en gemeenschappelijke EU-standpunten te 
ondersteunen. Slechts wanneer de aangegeven toezeggingen leiden tot echte samenwerking, kan de Unie 
zich daadwerkelijk verenigd opstellen en coherent spreken in het kader van buitenlands beleid. Van 
evengroot belang is de vraag naar een nauwere coördinatie tussen de verschillende EU-instellingen in het 
belang van een consistente en complementaire vertegenwoordiging. Het zal nog tijd kosten voordat de 
vertegenwoordigers van de EU, namelijk de voorzitter van de Europese Raad, de voorzitter van de 
Commissie en de vernieuwde rol van High Representative – alsmede de European External Action Service 
onder haar gezag – zich kunnen ontwikkelen tot volwaardige „agents‟ met meer autonomie en en 
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